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Introduction
Contingency Fee Agreements (CFAs) are now a fixed feature of the Ontario litigation landscape.
However, little research or study has been done on exactly how they operate in practice, whether they
advance the objectives that they were intended to achieve, and whether litigants are best served by the
current arrangements. In this study, I intend to make a preliminary start to that research, set out some
tentative criticisms of the CFA system as it currently operates, and, where appropriate, suggest
preliminary proposals for change.
It should be said at the outset that my efforts to obtain real and serious data and information about the
reliance on and kind of CFAs utilized by Ontario lawyers have been frustrated at every turn. Although
often divided and divisive in interests, the Plaintiffs’ Bar seems to be almost uniquely united in striving to
resist any efforts to render the fee-charging process more transparent and knowable. Accordingly, this
Report has been written not only without any assistance from the Plaintiffs’ Bar, but with its concerted
opposition. While there is an understandable concern among the Plaintiffs’ Bar about any inquiry that is
driven and funded by the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC), the extent of the concern has reached almost
paranoid proportions in attitude and response. However, I have tried to ensure that this fact has not
influenced my analysis and recommendations.
In what follows, I will first outline the formal regime within which contingency fees are allowed and
regulated in Ontario. The focus of this Part is to get a general and comparative sense of the legal and
policy framework for CFAs. The core of the Report attempts to go behind the received picture of CFAs
and get to a more realistic sense of how they actually work in practice. Next, I draw some tentative
conclusions and critical observations from the available data and information. Finally, I will put forward
some proposals to address the more apparent failings of the present system in order to enhance its
efficiency, fairness, and transparency.
Throughout the Report, the emphasis will be on understanding and improving the existing system from
the point of view of the litigant-as-consumer. The challenge is to make justice more available, but at a
reasonable cost so that the interests of both litigants and lawyers are fairly represented, balanced and
advanced.

PART A -- THE REGIME OF CFAs
1. The Costs of Litigation
The expense incurred in staffing and maintaining the courts is met largely by the state, with the litigant
paying only a minimal sum to utilize these facilities. The major financial burden incurred by the parties is
the cost of legal representation. A lesser expense is the payment of incidental expenses, so-called
disbursements, that are incurred throughout the litigation. In allocating this burden, the legal system has
two alternative solutions. It can permit costs to lie where they fall and leave litigants to pay their own
costs, regardless of the outcome of the litigation, or it can order that costs should follow the event and
require the unsuccessful litigant to pay the costs of the successful litigant.
Whereas the Americans have adopted the former as a general rule, the Anglo-Canadian system has opted
for a general rule of indemnity. This means that successful litigants may recover any costs that have been
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reasonably incurred in litigating the dispute, provided that their conduct is not of a kind that should result
in no entitlement. It is generally acknowledged that a successful party will receive about 50-60% of the
actual costs incurred.
Although contingency fee arrangements are a long-standing feature of the American litigation system,
they have only been allowed in Canada in more recent decades. This reflects an historical antipathy in the
Anglo-Canadian system to allowing CFAs because they are generally thought to encourage lawsuits. The
basic hostility to contingency fees as a form of champertous 1 agreement is captured by Spiegel J.’s
statements in Bergel & Edson v. Wolf:
Rules against maintenance and champerty were introduced over 700 years ago in
response to abusive interference in the legal system by powerful royal officials and
nobles. Although the particular abuses against which the prohibitions were directed had
been cured by the time of the Tudors, the rules continued to survive. In modern decisions
concerning maintenance, courts do not refer to the mediaeval origins of the doctrine, but
justify its continued existence on the basis of public policy considerations. The antipathy
of the courts to champertous agreements similarly is supported by policy concerns. In
these expressions of policy are the roots of the arguments justifying the present ban on
contingent fees.2
Nevertheless, a proportionate relation between fees and the amount of damages awarded has always
played a role in fee arrangements, even if a limited and understated one. For instance, in Cohen v. Kealey
& Blaney in 2000, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed a list of considerations to be taken into account
by an assessment officer when conducting a fee assessment:3
the time expended by the solicitor;
the legal complexity of the matters to be dealt with;
the degree of responsibility assumed by the solicitor;
the monetary value of the matters in issue;
the importance of the matter to the client;
the degree of skill and competence demonstrated by the solicitor;
the results achieved;
the ability of the client to pay; and
the client’s expectation as to the amount of the fee.
2. Rationale for Contingency Fee Agreements
The basic rationale for allowing any kind of CFA is that it allows people who cannot afford legal services
to bring claims that they would otherwise have to abandon. This general policy objective seems
unimpeachable in its logic and effect. The litigant will be able to proceed in the confidence that they will
not be left with an enormous economic burden if their claim fails. Of course, this state of affairs is

1

Definition: referring to sharing in the proceeds of a lawsuit by an outside party who has funded or assisted in
funding the litigation.
2
Bergel & Edson v. Wolf (2000), 50 O.R. 3rd 777 at para. 22. For a general history from an Ontario standpoint,
see Andrew Murray, Contingency Fees What Is Old Is New Again (March 4, 2005).
3
Cohen v. Kealey & Blaney (1985), 26 C.P.C. (2d) 211 at 215.
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premised on the high cost of legal services – lawyers’ fees are often perceived to be prohibitive by many
potential litigants, especially where they are already injured or indebted. That said, it also must be
recognized that lawyers should be entitled to a reasonable rate of compensation for services rendered.
Consequently, the challenge is to ensure that the benefits of CFAs to litigants are not obtained at an
exorbitant cost and that a balance is struck and maintained between the advantages of more claims being
litigated and the costs of doing so. In other words, any legitimate regime of CFAs must work to ensure
that both sides of the equation, litigants and lawyers, are balanced. Access to justice should be obtainable
at a reasonable cost and lawyers should be entitled to fair compensation for their services, but they should
not be allowed to obtain undue financial benefit from the plight of impecunious or vulnerable litigants. In
short, although promoted as a device to benefit litigants, CFAs must not be permitted to operate to
prioritize the financial interests of lawyers over litigants.
When a lawyer is paid a percentage of the settlement amount (with the settlement amount often equaling
the insurance limit), a lawyer’s financial incentives will vary considerably. Under the traditional billing
regime, a lawyer knows that he or she will be paid in accordance with the work that they have done.
While this system presents some risk that the client will not pay, most lawyers finesse this possibility by
requiring retainers up-front. Indeed, under the traditional arrangements, there is a genuine concern that
lawyers will have an incentive to do more work than a file may require.
Under a CFA, a lawyer will face a very different set of incentives. This is because, irrespective of the
amount of hours the contingency fee lawyer puts in, the lawyer will be paid a percentage of the settlement
or judgment amount. While this may incentivize them to ensure that their client wins a substantial
amount, they will also be disincentivized from putting in “too much” time since their compensation
remains fixed. Indeed, their economically optimal approach is to ensure that their efforts will lead to an
improved resolution of the case, but only up to a certain point. In other words, rational lawyers under
CFAs will strive to maximize their compensation by constantly assessing the cost-benefit of proceeding
further in the case. The cost can simply be seen as the amount of hours the lawyer puts into a case, while
the benefit is their percentage of the total settlement amount. A potential conflict of interest arises if the
lawyer’s incremental financial benefit from proceeding further will cause the lawyer’s effective hourly
rate or total compensation to fall.
According to Richard Posner, the doyen of law-and-economics scholars, the lawyer is effectively a “cotenant of the property represented by the plaintiff’s claim” and therefore “may lack an adequate incentive
to exploit the right (to litigate) because the value he creates will accrue in part to another person”. 4
Indeed, this may well incentivize lawyers to settle too early. Again, Posner offers a good example of this:
“A problem with the contingent fee is that in any situation of joint ownership – and a
contingent fee contract makes the lawyer in effect a co-tenant of the property represented
by the plaintiff’s claim – each owner… may lack an adequate incentive to exploit the
right because the value he creates will accrue in part to another person. Suppose the
plaintiff’s lawyer is offered a settlement of $100,000; if he goes to trial, there is a 90
percent chance that the plaintiff will win $150,000 but it will cost the lawyer $25,000
worth of his time to try the case; the parties are risk averse; and the contingent fee is 30
percent. If the plaintiff agrees to the settlement, he will net $70,000 and the lawyer
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RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONMICS OF JUSTICE (*th ed. 19**).
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$30,000. If the case goes to trial, the net expected gain to the plaintiff rises to $94,500 (.9
* ($150,000 - $45,000)) but the lawyer’s net expected gain falls to $15,500 ($45,000 * .9
- $25,000). So there is a conflict of interest between the parties that is due to the fact that
the lawyer does not obtain the whole benefit of a trial (the expected net benefit of trial is
($50,000 * .9) - $25,000, and is thus positive).”5
In accordance with this perspective, it can be argued that lawyers should be entitled to receive a higher fee
than might otherwise be the case since they are seeking to spread the risk across a range of cases that have
no guarantee of success. So, in assessing the fairness of any fee received by a lawyer under a CFA, it is
important to acknowledge that, in some cases, a lawyer will invest considerable time and effort in a case
that does not produce any, or sufficient, funds to cover the time expended by the lawyer. However, as
Posner puts it, this “risk is reduced because the lawyer specializing in contingent fee matters can pool many
claims and thereby minimize the variance of the returns.” Accordingly, in order to assess the overall fairness
of lawyers’ compensation from CFAs, it would be necessary to obtain data on all files covered by CFAs to
ascertain the relative number of ‘losing’ cases (i.e., the lawyer receives no fees) that are undertaken by
lawyers as well as the relative number of ‘winning cases’ that are undertaken.
As regards the conflicting incentives for lawyers and clients under CFAs, the courts have acknowledged
that the difference between settling and going to trial can have some perverse effects on the lawyer-client
relationship. For instance, in the leading case of Hodge, it was estimated that, prior to trial,
disbursements amounted to $65,177.52. If the matter had proceeded through trial preparation or through
trial, that figure would have been several times higher due to the cost of expert witnesses. Moreover, the
lawyer’s fees would have been many times higher if the matter had proceeded to trail. But the cost to the
lawyer might be so high as to place the lawyer’s firm in serious jeopardy.
The challenge of mediating conflicting interests was well described by the court, especially when the
problem of “double-dipping”6 was involved:
“[W]hen cases settle prior to trial, such clauses will frequently put the solicitor in a direct
conflict of interest with his own client. It is the solicitor who negotiates the settlement.
Defendants typically have no particular interest in how much of a settlement payment is
allocated to damages and how much is allocated to costs. What a defendant is interested
in is the bottom line - how much in total the defendant is prepared to pay to settle the
case. Often, the settlement amount is an all-in figure. If the plaintiff's lawyer is taking a
flat percentage, there is no issue. However, if the plaintiff's lawyer takes a percentage of
the damages in addition to all of the costs, it is in the interests of the lawyer to maximize
the amount allocated to costs and in the interests of the client to maximize the amount
allocated to damages. A simple example is illustrative. Suppose there is a contingency
agreement providing for a 20% fee to the lawyer and a settlement agreement is reached
for $100,000, all-in. The lawyer's fee would be $20,000. On the other hand, if the
lawyer's fee is 10% of the damages plus all of the costs, and the $100,000 settlement is
allocated as $70,000 for damages and $30,000 for costs, then the lawyer's fee is $37,000.
Since it is often the plaintiff's lawyer who negotiates the allocation of costs, or, even

5
6

Posner , id. at 614.
See later in this report for more on this topic.
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worse, allocates the costs/damages himself, the conflict of interest is obvious.”7
3. Contingency Fee Agreements
It was not until October 1st, 2004 that the Solicitors Act was amended to allow for contingency fee
arrangements (see Appendix One). Ontario was the last Canadian province to take this step. Section 28.1
provides that a solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement – the lawyer’s fees may be
contingently calculated upon the disposition of the matter -- with a client as long as certain conditions are
met. In particular, the CFA cannot contain a provision that any amount that is to be paid for partial
indemnity costs or substantial indemnity costs can be subject to a contingency arrangement. The only
exception is where the lawyer and client jointly apply to a Judge of the Superior Court of Justice for the
inclusion of such costs in the CFA and the Judge is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances (see
s.28.1 (8)).
Also, for personal injury claims, there are additional provisions under Ontario Regulation 195/04:
Contingency Fee Agreements (under the Solicitor’s Act) that must also be included in order for a CFA to
be valid (see Appendix Two):
1. If the client is a Plaintiff, a statement that the solicitor shall not recover more in fees than the
client recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement;
2. A statement in respect of disbursements and taxes, including the GST payable on the
solicitor's fees, that indicates,
whether the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and, if the client is responsible
for the payment of disbursements, a general description of disbursements likely to be incurred, other than
relatively minor disbursements; and
that if the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and the solicitor pays the
disbursements or taxes during the course of the matter, the solicitor is entitled to be reimbursed for those
payments, subject to Section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 (legal aid charge against recovery),
as a first charge on any funds received as a result of the judgment or settlement of the matter;
1. A statement that explains costs and the awarding of costs and that indicates,
a. that, unless otherwise ordered by a Judge, a client is entitled to receive any costs
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if
the client is the party entitled to costs; and
that a client is responsible for paying any costs contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or
substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party liable to pay costs;
1. If the client is a Plaintiff, a statement that indicates that the client agrees and directs that all
funds claimed by the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements shall be paid to the
solicitor in trust from any judgment or settlement money;
2. If the client is a party under disability, for the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
represented by a litigation guardian,
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Hodge v. Neinstein (2015 ONSC 7345)
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a. a statement that the Contingency Fee Agreement either must be reviewed by a Judge
before the Agreement is finalized or must be reviewed as part of both the motion or
application for approval of a settlement or a consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure;
a statement that the amount of the legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements are subject to the approval of
a Judge when the Judge reviews a settlement agreement or consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure; and
a statement that any money payable to a person under disability under an Order or settlement shall be paid
into Court unless a Judge orders otherwise under Rule 7.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In November of 2002, Rule 2.08(3) was amended to incorporate a comment about CFAs. As well as
confirming the general validity of CFAs, there is editorial commentary (see Appendix Three):
In determining the appropriate percentage or other basis of the contingency fee, the
lawyer and the client should consider a number of factors, including the likelihood of
success, the nature and complexity of the claim, the expense and risk of pursuing it, the
amount of the expected recovery and who is to receive an award of costs. The lawyer
and client may agree that, in addition to the fee payable under the agreement, any amount
arising as a result of an award of costs or as a part of a settlement is to be paid to the
lawyer, which agreement under the Solicitors Act must receive judicial approval. In such
circumstances, a smaller percentage of the award than would otherwise be agreed upon
for the contingency fee, after considering all relevant factors, will generally be
appropriate. The test is whether the fee in all of the circumstances is fair and reasonable.
In general, therefore, CFAs are approved if they are found to be:
-- In compliance with the relevant provisions of the Solicitors Act and accompanying
Regulation;
-- Fair, assessed as of the date the arrangement was entered into; and
-- Reasonable, assessed as of the date of the hearing.
A contingency fee agreement can only be declared void, or be cancelled and disregarded, where the court
determines that it is either unfair or unreasonable. In other words, the emphasis of the analysis is on the
reasonableness and fairness of the agreement over and above compliance with the more discrete
requirements of CFAs set out in the CFA Regulation. However, compliance with these requirements may
also have some bearing on whether or not the CFA is determined to be fair and reasonable. For example,
if a CFA does not include the required statement that the client has a right to review, that shortfall may be
considered in weighing the CFA’s fairness. Accordingly, if the agreement is not fair and reasonable, it
will be declared void and referred for an assessment to the courts’ assessment officers.
In Raphael Partners v Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417, the Ontario Court of Appeal explained the two-step
process to be followed by a judge where enforcement of a CFA is sought pursuant to s. 24 of
the Solicitors Act:
Upon any such application, if it appears to the court that the agreement is in all respects
fair and reasonable between the parties, it may be enforced by the court by order in such
manner and subject to such conditions as to the costs of the application as the court thinks
fit, but, if the terms of the agreement are deemed by the court not to be fair and
8

reasonable, the agreement may be declared void, and the court may order it to be
cancelled and may direct the costs, fees, charges and disbursements incurred or
chargeable in respect of the matters included therein to be assessed in the ordinary
manner. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 24. [emphasis added]
The lawyer bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the agreement was fair; it would be unjust to expect
the client to show that it was unfair in light of the overall imbalance in power and circumstances between
lawyer and client. As such, the fairness requirement is about the circumstances surrounding the making
of the agreement and whether clients fully understand and appreciate the nature of the agreement that they
executed. As noted, this is to be determined as of the date that the CFA was entered into.8 Notably, any
breach of the rules and regulations must be fundamental, not merely technical in nature and scope.9
In Hodge, the court made it plain that lawyers have a fiduciary duty to protect and promote the client’s
interests above their own. It went on to say that:
“Ms. Hodge's claim alleges that the solicitors in this instance entered into agreements that
enabled the solicitor to receive as fees both costs and a percentage of the damages.
Further, they did so without including in the agreement a provision that advises the client
that costs belong to the client unless a judge orders otherwise (as required under the
Regulations [sic]) and without getting a judge's approval for taking the costs (as required
under the Solicitors Act). The purpose of both provisions is the protection of clients ...
Further, the plaintiff alleges that the law firm entered into all-in settlements and then
simply allocated a portion of the proceeds to costs, thereby increasing the fees to be
received by the solicitors, to the detriment of the client. That would be a conflict of
interest and a further basis for a claim in contract and for breach of fiduciary duty. These
provisions [ss. 28.1(6), 28.1(8), 28.1(9)] of the Solicitors Act are intended for the
protection of the public and to improve access to justice. These are issues vitally
important to the integrity of our justice system. As such, they are to be given a broad and
liberal construction, consistent with that remedial purpose”10
In the recent case of Zha, it was stated that:
“It is unfortunate that experienced counsel are not following the guidelines that have been
repeatedly set out by the Court, as to what is required insofar as solicitor's fees are
concerned, in numerous cases dating back to at least 2007. See, for example, Marcoccia
(Litigation Guardian of) v. Gill, [2007] O.J. No. 12 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Lau (Litigation
Guardian of) v. Bloomfield [2007 CarswellOnt 5269 (Ont. S.C.J.)], 2007 CanLII 34443.
Furthermore, in an effort to provide assistance to counsel in their preparation of written
motion material for these motions Justice Wilkins of this Court, who deals with the vast
majority of these motions, issued the Rule 7.08 Best Practices Guidelines in late April
2013 ("the Guidelines").”11

8

Edwards (Litigation guardian of) v. Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) 2016 ONSC 2501
Séguin v. Van Dyke (2013 ONSC 6576)
10
Hodge , supra note 7..NSC 7345)
11
Zhau (2015 ONSC 785)
9
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Also, in Warnica, the court went further and contended that the lawyer has to demonstrate what it is that
she or he actually did in order to earn the 30% contingency fee claimed. Because that was not done, “the
appropriate mechanism to permit that to happen, and also to ensure that [the lawyer] is paid a fair fee for
the service provided… is to refer the matter for assessment” 12 This approach has much to recommend it.
4. A Comparative Survey
The Ontario scheme bears many similarities to and differences from other Canadian provinces as well as
other common law jurisdictions (i.e., the United Kingdom and Australia) (see Appendices Four and Five).
I have included detailed charts that summarize these comparisons. I have not thought it pertinent to
canvass the arrangements in the United States because the basic difference in handling of costs (i.e., there
is no general rule in the U.S. that a substantial portion of the winner’s legal fees is paid by the loser; each
party is responsible for their own lawyer’s fees) makes any comparisons unreliable and distorted.
However, it is worthwhile to offer some general comments on the contrasts between the Ontario regime
and other jurisdictions in regard to contingency fee arrangements. While I do not pretend that these
comments are exhaustive or definitive, I do believe that they capture some important insights into factors
that make for a fair and effective CFA system.
1. While all provinces provide that there are lists of factors that must be contained in any CFA,
only New Brunswick provides and requires that a standard form be used;
2. Although there are exceptional circumstances in which court approval is required, almost all
provinces do not offer any approval or filing process. However, New Brunswick and
Northwest Territories/Nunavut require that a CFA must be filed with an officer of the court;
3. Apart from the filing process in 2 above, any complaints about a CFA are left to the
discretion of the client. Each province offers a court-based process for challenging a CFA;
4. As regards permissible percentages or fees charged under a CFA, only New Brunswick
(25%) and British Columbia (33 1/3%) impose a maximum figure. As for the other
provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan have established very limited constraints on
contingency fees, while the remainder generally demand that fees charged are ‘fair and
reasonable’.
5. The Way Forward
The proof of any pudding is in the eating. It is only possible to assess the fairness and efficacy of a
particular scheme if data is available as to compliance with the letter and spirit of the statutory
framework. While there will inevitably be a gap between legislative intent and practice, the key issue is
the size of the gap – are the statutory expectations followed more in the breach than in observance? And
how can the requirements and rules be amended so as to better protect the interests of litigants and
maintain the integrity of the litigation process from a public policy perspective?
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PART B – THE REALITY OF CFAs: DATA AND STUDY
1. Initial Attempts at Data Collection
As stated in the introduction to this report, my efforts to conduct a rigorous and sophisticated empirical
study were foiled at every turn by the plaintiffs’ bar. There was not only no appetite for the study, but
also a defiant refusal to be part of it. Although I found this to be a disturbing and entirely over-heated
reaction, I have tried to remain open and balanced in my approach; I have sought to keep an open mind
about the both the benefits and drawbacks of CFAs and their operation in practice.
The study began with personal e-mails to a sampling of leading plaintiffs’ counsel in late October 2015.
The plan was to gauge counsels’ responses to a draft set of questions and determine if changes to the
questions were needed for the study itself. The initial e-mail sent read as follows:
I am writing to you as part of a research project that I am conducting on Lawyers’ Fees in
Personal Injury Actions.
It is my intention to obtain as much empirical data as possible on the fee arrangements
entered and charges made by both plaintiff and defendant lawyers. My focus is on the
situation of the injured parties and whether the present regime is best suited to advancing
their interests and needs. I have no axe to grind in this matter; it is simply a matter of
obtaining better and fuller information than is presently available.
In accordance with the ethics protocol for academic research, any information disclosed
will be held in the strictest confidence and treated with complete anonymity. I consider
this to be an essential commitment of professional integrity as a result of being both a
lawyer and a professor.
As such, I attach a short questionnaire for your perusal. I am sending this to all the
leading law firms in Ontario who engage in personal injury litigation. Ideally, I would
like to meet with you to discuss these matters.
I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your cooperation in this
important matter.
Regards, Hutch
Allan C. Hutchinson LL.D.
Distinguished Research Professor
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University
T 416 736 5048
ahutchinson@osgoode.yorku.ca
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The questionnaire attached to the e-mail read as follows:
Personal Injury Litigation (Plaintiffs)
What kind of fee agreement do you generally enter into with prospective clients as
regards personal injury claims?
Do you use a standard retainer letter/contract? Please provide a copy if you do so.
Is it by way of hourly rates (which are?)?
Is it by way of contingency fee (which is?)?
Or is it a combination of both?
If it is by way of a contingency fee, is your percentage fixed? Or does your percentage
vary depending on a set of variables (e.g., length of time, amount of claim, etc.)?
Whether you use a contingency fee arrangement or not, do you provide the client with a
billing statement of hours spent on the file?
What do you do about disbursements? Are they chargeable whether the client wins or
loses? And, if they win, is it on top of the contingency fee?
If you are successful and recover costs as part of a settlement or judgment, are those costs
treated as part of the contingency percentage? Or is it on top of that percentage?
Do you loan money to clients or arrange for them to obtain loans? On what terms and
conditions? Please provide a copy if you do so.
Can you provide examples of cases that you have settled or won and what the final
figures were for damages obtained, fees charged, disbursements charged, and any other
connected charges?
The response to this initial e-mail was a firestorm of negative e-mails and phone calls. The views ranged
from reasonable suspicion through suggestions of political naivety on my part to outright allegations of
betrayal (as a fellow member of the Plaintiffs’ Bar). The fact that the work was being done through the
IBC was considered to be a major bone of contention. Despite efforts by me to allay concerns that I was a
prejudiced and ‘bought’ researcher, the criticism and resistance did not abate. Accordingly, it soon
became clear that any attempt to proceed with my proposed approach would be met with stiff and
concerted opposition. After consulting with staff at IBC, it was agreed that I should proceed with the
research, but in a very scaled-down and modest manner. Consequently, I developed and implemented a
second-best approach to studying the operation of CFAs in practice.
2. Revised and Second-Best Approach
A plan was made to access all reported Ontario cases that mentioned the words ‘contingency fee’. The
period under study was from January 2010 to April 2016. This search generated an overall total of 471
cases. A number of these cases only mentioned ‘contingency fee’ in passing and so were deleted from the
database. The bulk of cases arose by way of application by a disgruntled litigant who was objecting to the
fees charged by their lawyer. The sample included not only those cases involving personal injury matters,
but also encompassed other subject matter, such as class actions and guardians. The justification for
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including the latter was that some of the commentary by judges and assessment officers had relevance to
contingency fees more generally. However, care has been taken to place the personal injury cases front
and centre in the ensuing analysis.
It should be noted at the outset that it is fully appreciated that this is a far from ideal way of proceeding
with the study. These cases represent a narrow view of contingency fees in that the cases only involve
files either where the plaintiff party identified some problem, real or imagined, with the ultimate charge
for legal fees or where the claimant, by law, required a litigation guardian and court approval of fee
arrangements was compulsory. Of course, there were many cases during the period examined in which
such circumstances did not apply and there was no court review. It seems reasonable to comment,
therefore, that looking at the overall practice of CFAs through the lens of such cases is like watching and
analyzing the world by looking through a keyhole; what you see might well not be representative of the
overall situation and may well be distortive of it. However, all that having been said, this way of
proceeding was the only one available in the circumstances. Although the conclusions drawn from the
data may well be limited and flawed, I maintain that they do offer some, albeit partial, insight into the
operation of the CFA system.
The recent Clatney case offers an example of the kind of unscrupulous, heavy-handed and frankly abusive
tendencies that can be engaged in. The case focuses on the plaintiff switching law firms in mid-litigation,
and casts a further shadow over the murky world of fee arrangements between personal injury lawyers
and injured parties. It notably demonstrates that there can be a considerable disconnect between work
done and fees charged. In her decision, Epstein JA for the Ontario Court of Appeal cited two excellent
sources concerning the overall role and stance of courts in regulating lawyers’ fees:
“In Plazavest Financial Corp. v. National Bank of Canada (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 647
C.A.), at para. 14, Doherty J.A. explained how the public interest informs the court’s role
in supervising the rendering of legal services and payment of legal fees:
“The rendering of legal services and the determination of appropriate compensation
for those services is not solely a private matter to be left entirely to the parties. There
is a public interest component relating to the performance of legal services and the
compensation paid for them. That public interest component requires that the court
maintain a supervisory role over disputes relating to the payment of lawyers’ fees. I
adopt the comments of Adams J. in Borden & Elliot v. Barclays Bank of Canada:
“The Solicitors Act begins with s.1 reflecting the legal profession’s monopoly
status. This beneficial status or privilege of the profession is coupled with
corresponding obligations set out in the Act and which make clear that the
rendering of legal services is not simply a matter of contract. This is not to say a
contract to pay a specific amount for legal fees cannot prevail. It may. But even
that kind of agreement can be the subject of review for fairness: see s.18 of the
Solicitors Act.”
In Price, at para. 19, Sharpe J.A. further elucidated the court’s role:
“Public confidence in the administration of justice requires the court to intervene
where necessary to protect the client’s right to a fair procedure for the assessment
of a solicitor’s bill. As a general matter, if a client objects to a solicitor’s account,
the solicitor should facilitate the assessment process, rather than frustrating the
13

process.... In my view, the courts should interpret legislation and procedural rules
relating to the assessment of solicitors’ accounts in a similar spirit. As Orkin
argues, “if the courts permit lawyers to avoid the scrutiny of their accounts for
fairness and reasonableness, the administration of justice will be brought into
disrepute.” The court has an inherent jurisdiction to control the conduct of
solicitors and its own procedures. This inherent jurisdiction may be applied to
ensure that a client’s request for an assessment is dealt with fairly and equitably
despite procedural gaps or irregularities.”13
3. Analysis of Available Data
The available data does not lend itself to rigorous or quantitative analysis. It is merely suggestive, at best,
revealing certain tendencies and trends (see Appendices Six, Seven and Eight). However, on the whole, it
does not represent a very reassuring snapshot of the landscape of CFAs. Thus, it appears that not only are
some lawyers pushing on and back the limits of what is permitted in CFAs, but also some are engaged in
routine disregard of both the letter and spirit of the rules and regulations in regard to CFAs.
There are four particular issues that bear more attention – judicial oversight, disbursements, ‘doubledipping’, and percentages charged by way of a contingency fee.
A. Judicial Oversight
Hodge gives a stark glimpse of what can happen when contingency fee agreements are made outside of
the courtroom and without judicial oversight. In this case, the lawyers created agreements that were
contrary to the law (e.g., the lawyer receiving compensation through both costs and a contingency fee,
without court approval, and thus contrary to s.28 (1)(8)). Furthermore, the proposed representative
plaintiff in Hodge was provided with only 27% of the total settlement amount apportioned for that
individual; there are 4-6,000 others who also had agreements with the law firm of Neinstein LLP. 14
Hodge is the first case where the Superior Court interpreted the regulatory framework surrounding
contingency fees. For instance, the court clearly contrasted permissive and mandatory language, such as
“may” and “shall”, within the Solicitors Act. Thus, ss. 28.1(1) and (2) are permissive, stating that a
solicitor "may" enter into these agreements, while s. 28.1(4) is expressed in mandatory language: a
contingency fee agreement "shall be in writing.” Likewise, there is a proscription in s. 28.1(3) against
contingency fee agreements in certain types of cases - criminal and family - and it also employs
mandatory language (the solicitor "shall not enter into a contingency fee agreement...”).
While lawyers seem to understand that the law does not allow them to be compensated with contingency
fees in criminal law or family law cases, the data reveals many cases where lawyers have acted contrary
to the double-dipping section (i.e., lawyers cannot receive both a contingency fee and any costs awarded
or agreed to) of the legislation. This is despite “s.28.1 (8) [using] the same kind of proscriptive language
as the subsection prohibiting contingency fees in criminal and family law cases [with that section being
s.28.1(3)].”15
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B. Disbursements
There are several sample CFAs available on the web. A good example, incorporating more than two
dozen required clauses further to the Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.15 and Contingency Fee
Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, is contained in Appendix Nine.16
In practice, it is very difficult to ascertain what a “typical” CFA is in personal injury cases. Very few
actual agreements are evidenced in the reported cases; reference is usually only made to particular
disputed clauses. There are several sample CFAs available on the web. A good example is contained in
Appendix Nine. This document incorporates more than two dozen required clauses further to the
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.15 and Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04.
For instance, there is no simple answer to whether CFAs require the client to pay disbursements whatever
the outcome. While many do contain such clauses, not all do. The courts have indicated that what
constitutes a fair and appropriate contingency fee may well be influenced by whether the agreement
requires the client plaintiff to recompense the lawyer for disbursements even if the case fails. Further, the
Ontario Superior Court has held that a firm may not charge interest on outstanding disbursements.
In Hodge, Ms. Hodge signed a standard form retainer agreement that included a clause stipulating that she
would be required to pay the firm 25% of any damages recovered plus anything recovered for partial
indemnity costs (the total of which would be no more than 40% of the damages award). She would also
be liable to pay for any disbursements incurred by the firm.”17 This was not considered reasonable. By
contrast, in Cogan the Court found that a contingency fee of 33% was fair and reasonable because
plaintiff's counsel had assumed the risk of paying the disbursements in the event that the action was
unsuccessful.” It is notable that for few of the cases identified for this study was there a breakdown of
what was to be included in disbursements.
Another important issue is what expenses can or should be included under the general rubric of
‘disbursements’. In Henricks-Hunter, the reported disbursements were found to include a significant
number of office expenses and items such as "drinks" and "finding a Tim Horton’s restaurant.”18 Again,
in Hodge, an amount of 48,942.37 was charged for disbursements. The disbursements included
$4,008.27 for photocopies; $2,791.20 for laser copies; $1,280.70 for scanned documents; $1,372.33 for
interest recovery; and $200.00 for Miscellaneous Expenses/File Closing Charges. It has to be
remembered that Ms. Hodge ultimately only recovered the total sum of $41,906.41.”19
Some lawyers have sought to charge interest on outstanding disbursements. The rationale is that these
amounts are paid at the end of the case, once it is settled or fully litigated. Yet the courts have held that
lawyers may not charge interest on outstanding disbursements. In Umbach, the courts took the view that
interest charges totaling $937.01 in respect of a particular expert could not be charged: “As one of the
justifications for contingency fee agreements is that the lawyer often has to carry significant
disbursements for a prolonged period of time, I decided to invite submissions as to why the client should
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pay interest on unpaid disbursements as well as fees on a contingency basis, when part of the rationale
behind contingency fees is that the lawyer carries the disbursements.”20
C. Double-Dipping
A very egregious practice is where lawyers charge a contingency fee on any settlement reached as well as
pocket any costs recovered as a result of or included in the settlement. This might best be described as
‘double-dipping’. As per s.28.1 (8) of the Solicitors Act, the lawyer’s costs cannot be claimed over and
above the contingency percentage unless the court elevates the circumstances to exceptional. The courts’
general attitude to the issue has been in conformity with the regulation. In Dryden v. Oatley Vigmond,
the assessment officer inferentially reduced the lawyers’ fees by the exact amount of costs. The action
was settled for $285,000 in respect of damages and interest, plus $42,500 for costs inclusive of sales tax,
and $47,500 for disbursements. Following the settlement, Mr. Dryden was charged $127,905.16 for legal
services. The assessment officer held that the CFA that had been established between the law firm and
Mr. Dryden was unjustified. Further, she concluded that the $128,000 legal bill that had been rendered to
Mr. Dryden was excessive and should be reduced by almost $43,000, to $85,000 including GST. On this
issue, the Hodge case is notorious for the fact that the client was required to pay to the law firm the
contingency fee plus any costs recovered or bargained for, up to 40% of the amount recovered. She
would also be liable to pay for any disbursements incurred by the firm. Although the CFA provided that
the solicitors would be paid a fee plus any costs recovered, no application was made to a judge for
approval of the agreement, as required under s. 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act.
There are other cases on the public record where the lawyer sought to claim costs on top of a contingency
fee. In Seguin v Van Dyke,21 the plaintiff signed a CFA with her lawyer pursuant to which the lawyer
was to be paid, in the event of a settlement, 33.3% of the settlement amount (including costs) plus
disbursements. However, in the event of judgment after trial, her lawyer was to receive 33.3% of the
damages, plus 100% of the costs. The CFA was declared to be unenforceable. Also, in Choi v Choi,22
the CFA was found to be unenforceable where a lawyer sought to obtain $1M be paid to the law firm for
partial indemnity costs and disbursements inclusive of GST; and a further $1.6M as a contingency fee.
D. Percentages Charged
The data that was available for this study (see Appendix 6 for summaries of the relevant cases) is wholly
inadequate for describing the typical experience of Ontario personal injury plaintiffs with respect to the
cost of their legal representation. It does, however, illustrate that, of the CFAs that have been challenged
or reviewed before the courts in recent years, a large number have been either deemed unenforceable, in
violation of the Solicitors Act, ordered for reassessment and/or otherwise had their original terms altered
in favour of the client. It also shows that even among challenged CFAs that have ultimately received
court approval, the total amount of compensation paid to the lawyer in contingency fee, costs, and
disbursements, depicted as a percentage of the total of awarded damages, can be quite high.
The chart that follows shows the break-down of compensation paid to the plaintiff lawyer in thirteen
personal injury cases where the CFA was challenged and ultimately deemed to be enforceable. For
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illustrative purposes, the amounts for the class action case of Hodge v Neinstein -- where the CFA was
determined to be unenforceable -- are included in the chart.
NOTE: Red is the highest % whereas
green is the lowest
Chronological

Settlement
Amount24

Compensation paid to lawyer (% of
settled or awarded damages)23
Contingency
Fee (CF)

CF +
Costs

CF + Costs
+ Disburse

Other relevant information
Disburse (% of
settlement
amount)

Costs paid to
lawyer
$-

1. Cogan (Litigation
Guardian)

$7,362,500.00

25%

25%

26%

1%

5. Aywas (Litigation
Guardian)

$144,375.00

17%

17%

27%

9%

$14,350,000.00

7%

13%

14%

1%

$75,000.00

8%

8%

10%

2%

14. Laushway

$650,000.00

32%

32%

36%

5%

$-

17. Consky

$250,000.00

24%

24%

31%

7%

$-

$285,000.00

30%

30%

46%

17%

$-

21. Henricks-Hunter
(Litigation Guardian)

$2,050,000.00

22%

22%

24%

2%

29. Soulliere (Litigation
Guardian)

$8,500,000.00

28%

28%

31%

4%

33. Umbach (Litigation
Guardian)

$1,250,000.00

25%

25%

32%

7%

30. St. Jean

$550,000.00

29%

29%

45%

15%

81. Hodge v Neinstein
(2015)

$150,000.00

20%

40%

73%

33%

38. Batalla

$5,741,560.00

17%

17%

19%

1%

37. Edwards (Litigation
Guardian)

$2,750,000.00

8%

8%

10%

2%

9. Choi (Litigation
Guardian)
12. Dolan (Litigation
Guardian)

25

19. Dryden

23

$$863,110.00
$-

$$$$$30,000.00

This necessarily excludes agreements deemed unenforceable by the court.
Complete amount paid by the defense for tort/negligence action (i.e., excludes SAB actions). This also excludes
costs. GST was oftentimes broken out, but sometimes not.
25
This is the case where the assessment officer reduced the amount payable by the dollar value of costs.
24
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PART C – THE FAILINGS OF THE PRESENT REGIME
OF CFAs
In both theory and practice (insofar as it is possible to know), Ontario’s CFA regime is open to a number
of serious objections and criticisms. The main appeal of CFAs and the basic rationale for allowing them
is that they permit claimants to pursue litigation that would otherwise remain out of reach. They are
intended as a response to the fact, and widespread perception, that the costs of legal services are
prohibitively expensive. While other ways exist to contain or respond to the high cost of legal services
(e.g., legal aid, pro bono, etc.), CFAs are one way to enable claimants to have access to the courts and
perhaps, through that, to some measure of justice. They allow claimants to seek to enforce their legal
rights with confidence that, although they might not be successful, they will not be even worse off than
they already are.26 This purpose is not be underrated or scoffed at.
At the same time, a central question is whether, in current circumstances, the benefit to plaintiffs is often
being obtained at too high a price to litigants and at too large an advantage to lawyers. While litigants
may gain from CFAs, it must not be to the greater comparative advantage of lawyers who might receive a
regular windfall in the fees received, In short, is the price of access to justice still too high? Are lawyers,
not claimants, the big winners under the present regime of CFAs?
1. Consumer Protection
The focus that I have taken to this study can be broadly understood as a ‘consumer protection’
perspective. It is now fully accepted that consumers need to be protected against the greater economic
and bargaining power of large merchants and corporations in the marketplace; there is consequently a
detailed and comprehensive set of protections and entitlements (e.g., standard terms, enhanced remedies,
etc.) in both statute and common law that serve to guard the consumer against disreputable and
exploitative practices. If there is a case for such safeguards in the general market (which there surely is),
then there is an even stronger case for protections and entitlements in regard to dealings between lawyers
and potential clients. Three particular considerations spring to mind: the enforcement of legal rights is a
mainstay of society’s commitment to democracy and the Rule of Law; the stakes are extremely high for
clients, especially those with personal injuries, seeking compensation for damages caused by the
wrongdoing or negligence of others; and lawyers hold a monopoly as gatekeepers to the legal process.
Taken together, these factors mean that there should not only be appropriate and similar protections in
place for legal clients as in the general consumer context, but perhaps that the protections provided in the
legal context should be elevated.
When persons with personal injuries seek legal assistance to pursue any claims available to them, they are
doubly vulnerable. Not only is there an obvious and large imbalance in knowledge and power between
them and lawyers in regard to the validity, strength and viability of their claims, but they are also in a
debilitated and injured state. In such circumstances, it is essential that the system operates to ensure that
they are not further taken advantage of, especially by their legal advisers. Insofar as lawyers hold
themselves out as a ‘noble profession’ with social duties and responsibilities, they are not simply another
26
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business in the marketplace. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the system, both by way of legislation and
professional regulation, to take decisive steps to ensure that the interests of clients are given the fullest
protection against exploitive and unfair practices and that, conversely, lawyers are restrained from and
penalized for engaging in such practices.
As things stand now and as a result of the research done for this study, it cannot be reported that the
present scheme in regard to CFAs is operating to protect and advance the interests of clients in their
dealings with lawyers. Indeed, there is evidence that the existing scheme of regulations and rules are
allowing some lawyers to recoup larger fees than they otherwise might do under the normal hourly-fee
arrangements for services rendered. While lawyers are fully entitled to receive fair and reasonable fees
for services rendered, there is suggestive evidence that lawyers are cashing in on the opportunities for
enhancing their fees afforded by CFAs.
While the data assembled and available is limited and opaque, it appears that there are two major claims
by lawyers that need immediate and reliable confirmation:
-- that lawyers take on a significant number of cases that are unsuccessful in producing any or
sufficient compensation for the client such that the lawyer does not receive adequate fees for the
time expended on the file?; and
-- that it is possible for clients to choose to enter arrangements with personal injury lawyers that
are not based on a CFA?
Any defence of the existing system demands that both these questions can be answered in the affirmative.
Unless there is a significant number of ‘losing cases’, the argument in favour of allowing lawyers to
receive more by way of fees than they otherwise would do so becomes unpersuasive. Secondly, unless
personal injury claimants can enter other kinds of fee-arrangements with lawyers and not be simply
presented with a take-it-or-leave-it CFA (even a balanced and reasonable one), they are being exploited
by the legal process. Genuine and informed choice by consumers is a basic standard that consumers are
accorded in other commercial settings. To have less than that in the lawyering and rights-enforcement
context is simply unacceptable and against the public interest. The legal profession as much as the public
at large has a serious interest in ensuring that ‘access to justice’ is real, and not simply a stated ambition.
2. Baseline Standards
A major challenge in making a sensible and reasoned assessment of Ontario’s CFA system is the need to
develop a base-line level of compensation against which any changes in the billing arrangements can be
measured. One possibility recommends itself – to measure what happens across files that have CF
agreements against what those files would have generated if they had been billed on a traditional hourly
basis.
Imagine that a lawyer charges an hourly rate of $200; this is about average for a Toronto personal injury
lawyer and could be said to represent what the lawyer thinks is a reasonable and achievable rate (less
substantial overheads) for their services. The precise amount will vary from lawyer to lawyer, but this is
not important for illustrative purposes. If they only worked on a traditional hourly basis, they might bill
$400,000 annually if they worked 40 hours per week for 50 weeks. Assuming that this amounts to a
reasonable level of remuneration for the hours of work done, it seems reasonable that a broadly similar
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amount should be earned under CF arrangements, assessed as the cumulative total for both ‘winning’ and
‘losing’ files.27 If lawyers were to earn substantially more than this, then they would seem to be taking
advantage of those clients who were obliged by circumstances to enter into such CF agreements. If they
were to earn substantially less than this, then they would be providing their services on a discounted rate.
To play out this logic more fully, if a lawyer were to take on files and had a 50% success rate, they would
be entitled to charge an amount that would average out to $400 per hour (or twice their normal fee of
$200) for the winning cases. This would result in them receiving their normal level of annual billing if
they were billing on an hourly basis. If their success rate were 75/25%, they would be entitled to charge
an amount that would average out to $266 per hour (or 1/3rd (25/75) over their normal fee) for the
winning cases. This would result in them receiving their normal level of annual billing of $400,000 if
they were billing on an hourly basis.
To determine the reasonableness of the fee, law firms would need to keep time dockets, and Ontario
courts occasionally do request such information of lawyers. In Young (Litigation Guardian of) v. Hinks
Estate, it was stated that “it is incumbent on Mr. Acri to justify the reasonableness of the [$67k] his firm
claims in relation to the tort claim and [$76k] in relation to the accident benefits settlement… I want to
see documents evidencing his retainer and dockets and understand exactly [what Mr. Acri did on the case
over 6 years].” That said, there are many instances where the court has not requested time docket
information, and have actually spoken against a reliance on time dockets, in both personal injury and class
action litigation. In Henricks-Hunter (Litigation guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc, it was noted that
“the determination of the proper fee in a CFA is not based on the value of the time spent, but rather on the
amount recovered for the client.” Also, in West Coast Soft Wear Ltd. v. 1000128 Alberta Ltd., it was
concluded that “using a percentage calculation in determining class counsel fees properly places the
emphasis on the quality of representation, and the benefits conferred to the class. A percentage-based fee
rewards ‘one imaginative, brilliant hour’ rather than ‘1000 plodding hours’.”
3. Losing Cases?
As regards the reasonableness of lawyers’ billing under CFAs, the key factor will obviously be the ratio
of winning to losing cases that they take on. There is no reliable information, about this ratio, but it is not
as though lawyers have not made the ‘losing cases’ argument before the court. However, it defies both
logic and reason to assume that experienced lawyers are taking on more than 25% of files that they
consider to be likely to lose. There is no evidence that lawyers are risking taking on files with a less than
75% chance of success. Because the effect of taking on losing cases is so dramatic (i.e., no remuneration
for work done), it would be foolhardy of lawyers to take on too many losing cases.
Moreover, it would also be wrong-headed for the legal process to proceed on the basis that lawyers took
on more losing cases than winning cases and to make rules (e.g., CFA legislation) that assumed such
miscalculation. Accordingly, any system of billing that routinely results in lawyers receiving
significantly more or less than their base-line hourly-billings amount would be unreasonable. In the
former case, litigants would be paying too much by way of legal fees and lawyers would be receiving too
27
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much. In the latter, lawyers would be receiving less than they deserve and litigants would collectively be
paying less than they should.

PART D – SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF CFAs
The reality of the functioning of CFAs and the criticism that I and others have leveled at them suggest a
number of possible reforms. While the continued use of CFAs seems to be taken as a given from an
‘access to justice’ standpoint (and for good reasons), there are several relatively small changes that could
be made that would enhance the operation and regulation of CFAs. The challenge is, as previously stated,
to make justice more accessible, but at a reasonable cost so that the interests of both litigants and lawyers
are fairly represented and balanced. The following proposals are made with this end in mind.
(1) The most pressing need is to get a better and fuller picture of how CFAs work in practice. At present,
there is far too much dark and shadow to go forward confidently with any wide-ranging reform. In light
of the aversion shown by the Plaintiffs’ Bar to an outside study, it is incumbent upon the Law Society of
Upper Canada (LSUC), the legal profession’s governing body, to commission and implement a thorough
and wide-ranging study of lawyers’ fees in personal injury litigation. The LSUC is the only organization
that has the prestige and authority to conduct the kind of thorough, unconditional and comprehensive
survey that is needed, and it can deal effectively with any concerns that lawyers claim to have about
privacy and confidentiality. Such a study would benefit everyone. It would confirm or contradict the
findings, criticisms, and proposals put forward in this Report, and it might well develop and validate other
insights and concerns about the whole process of fee-charging by lawyers.
(2) A particular challenge is whether leaving lawyers to fix their own percentage contingency is a fair and
defensible way to proceed. My own sense is that this has had a tendency to price access to justice at too
high a cost. While contingency fees open up litigation to more people than would otherwise be the case,
the available evidence indicates that the system has allowed some lawyers to reap financial benefits that
are out of proportion to the work done and the risk undertaken. there is not only an imbalance of power
between lawyers and clients when it comes to entering the litigation process, but clients are also in an
injured and often desperate situation. In short, clients are in need of protection. Accordingly, although
the better preference might be be to go with a fee-multiplier for successful cases rather than a straight
percentage (as this would ensure a link between the final compensation received and the actual amount of
work done), a second-best proposal would be to fix a maximum percentage that lawyers could charge.
Such maximum figure might be 25%. On the evidence available this would be a generous figure as it
generally assumes that lawyers will be taking on around 20% of cases that lose. While this seems high, it
nevertheless offers a basis on which to ensure that lawyers are adequately rewarded for their efforts.
(3) Lawyers should be mandated to keep hourly log/dockets of the time worked on any file, especially
those that are the subject of a CFA. The absence of this requirement is irresponsible and permits abuse
by unscrupulous lawyers. It is impossible to assess the fairness or reasonableness of any fee-charging
agreement between lawyers and clients without some knowledge of the time expended by the lawyer on
the file. Indeed, without such information, no court or assessment officer can realistically arrive at any
decision about the fairness or reasonableness of the fee charged. Consequently, failure to keep hourly
log/dockets of the time worked on any file should be a basis for ordering that no fees are awarded to the
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lawyer under a CFA.
(4) In order to reduce the scope for abuse or misunderstanding, lawyers should be required to use a
‘standard-form’ CFA. At present, only New Brunswick provides and requires that a standard form be
used. If lawyers wanted to deviate from that standard form, they would need to obtain the approval of the
court. In any other situation, a deviation from the standard form would render the CFA invalid and
unenforceable. The great attractions of the standard form are that the information provided would be
consistent and put consumers in a position to compare the costs of using different law firms, while they
would also ensure fairness and protection for clients. Although there are many possible formats that such
a standard form might take, I have included a possible draft of such a standard-form CFA in Appendix
Nine.
(5) All CFAs should be registered or filed with an officer of the court. At present, this requirement has
only been mandated by New Brunswick and the North West Territories. This recommendation is not that
all CFAs are approved by an officer of the court; this would be too time-consuming and expensive.
However, the need to register or file all CFAs, along with the reliance on standard forms, will place
appropriate and increased pressure on any lawyer who might be tempted to operate through unfair or
unreasonable agreements. This requirement will introduce a level of transparency that is sorely missing
from the existing process of regulation. In particular, again when combined with a standard-form
requirement, this will provide a genuine check on the unlawful and not uncommon temptation to doubledip. Of course, truly unscrupulous lawyers might still be prepared to do ‘side-deals’ with clients, but this
will hopefully be extremely rare (and a cause for severe disciple or disbarment).
* * * * *
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APPENDIX ONE
Solicitor’s Act, RSO 1990, c S15
Agreements Between Solicitors and Clients
Definitions

15. In this section and in sections 16 to 33,
“client” includes a person who, as a principal or on behalf of another person, retains or employs or is
about to retain or employ a solicitor, and a person who is or may be liable to pay the bill of a solicitor for
any services; (“client”)
“contingency fee agreement” means an agreement referred to in section 28.1; (“entente sur des honoraires
conditionnels”)
“services” includes fees, costs, charges and disbursements. (“service”) R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 15; 2002,
c. 24, Sched. A, s. 1.
Agreements between solicitors and clients as to compensation

16. (1) Subject to sections 17 to 33, a solicitor may make an agreement in writing with his or her client
respecting the amount and manner of payment for the whole or a part of any past or future services in
respect of business done or to be done by the solicitor, either by a gross sum or by commission or
percentage, or by salary or otherwise, and either at the same rate or at a greater or less rate than that at
which he or she would otherwise be entitled to be remunerated. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 16 (1).
Definition
(2) For purposes of this section and sections 20 to 32, “agreement” includes a contingency fee agreement.
2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 2.
Approval of agreement by assessment officer

17. Where the agreement is made in respect of business done or to be done in any court, except the Small
Claims Court, the amount payable under the agreement shall not be received by the solicitor until the
agreement has been examined and allowed by an assessment officer. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 17.
Opinion of court on agreement

18. Where it appears to the assessment officer that the agreement is not fair and reasonable, he or she
may require the opinion of a court to be taken thereon. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 18.
Rejection of agreement by court

19. The court may either reduce the amount payable under the agreement or order it to be cancelled and
the costs, fees, charges and disbursements in respect of the business done to be assessed in the same
manner as if the agreement had not been made. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 19.
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Agreement not to affect costs as between party and party

20. (1) Such an agreement does not affect the amount, or any right or remedy for the recovery, of any
costs recoverable from the client by any other person, or payable to the client by any other person, and
any such other person may require any costs payable or recoverable by the person to or from the client to
be assessed in the ordinary manner, unless such person has otherwise agreed. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15,
s. 20 (1).
Idem

(2) However, the client who has entered into the agreement is not entitled to recover from any other
person under any order for the payment of any costs that are the subject of the agreement more than the
amount payable by the client to the client’s own solicitor under the agreement. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15,
s. 20 (2).
Awards of costs in contingency fee agreements

20.1 (1) In calculating the amount of costs for the purposes of making an award of costs, a court shall
not reduce the amount of costs only because the client’s solicitor is being compensated in accordance with
a contingency fee agreement. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 3.
Same

(2) Despite subsection 20 (2), even if an order for the payment of costs is more than the amount payable
by the client to the client’s own solicitor under a contingency fee agreement, a client may recover the full
amount under an order for the payment of costs if the client is to use the payment of costs to pay his, her
or its solicitor. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 3.
Same

(3) If the client recovers the full amount under an order for the payment of costs under subsection (2), the
client is only required to pay costs to his, her or its solicitor and not the amount payable under the
contingency fee agreement, unless the contingency fee agreement is one that has been approved by a
court under subsection 28.1 (8) and provides otherwise. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 3.
Claims for additional remuneration excluded

21. Such an agreement excludes any further claim of the solicitor beyond the terms of the agreement in
respect of services in relation to the conduct and completion of the business in respect of which it is made,
except such as are expressly excepted by the agreement. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 21.
Agreements relieving solicitor from liability for negligence void

22. (1) A provision in any such agreement that the solicitor is not to be liable for negligence or that he
or she is to be relieved from any responsibility to which he or she would otherwise be subject as such
solicitor is wholly void. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 22.
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Exception, indemnification by solicitor’s employer

(2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit a solicitor who is employed in a master-servant relationship from
being indemnified by the employer for liabilities incurred by professional negligence in the course of the
employment. 1999, c. 12, Sched. B, s. 14.
Determination of disputes under the agreement

23. No action shall be brought upon any such agreement, but every question respecting the validity or
effect of it may be examined and determined, and it may be enforced or set aside without action on the
application of any person who is a party to the agreement or who is or is alleged to be liable to pay or who
is or claims to be entitled to be paid the costs, fees, charges or disbursements, in respect of which the
agreement is made, by the court, not being the Small Claims Court, in which the business or any part of it
was done or a judge thereof, or, if the business was not done in any court, by the Superior Court of
Justice. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 23; 2006, c. 19, Sched. C, s. 1 (1).
Enforcement of agreement

24. Upon any such application, if it appears to the court that the agreement is in all respects fair and
reasonable between the parties, it may be enforced by the court by order in such manner and subject to
such conditions as to the costs of the application as the court thinks fit, but, if the terms of the agreement
are deemed by the court not to be fair and reasonable, the agreement may be declared void, and the court
may order it to be cancelled and may direct the costs, fees, charges and disbursements incurred or
chargeable in respect of the matters included therein to be assessed in the ordinary manner. R.S.O. 1990,
c. S.15, s. 24.
Reopening of agreement

25. Where the amount agreed under any such agreement has been paid by or on behalf of the client or by
any person chargeable with or entitled to pay it, the Superior Court of Justice may, upon the application of
the person who has paid it if it appears to the court that the special circumstances of the case require the
agreement to be reopened, reopen it and order the costs, fees, charges and disbursements to be assessed,
and may also order the whole or any part of the amount received by the solicitor to be repaid by him or
her on such terms and conditions as to the court seems just. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 25; 2002, c. 24,
Sched. B, s. 46 (2); 2006, c. 19, Sched. C, s. 1 (1).
Agreements made by client in fiduciary capacity

26. Where any such agreement is made by the client in the capacity of guardian or of trustee under a
deed or will, or in the capacity of guardian of property that will be chargeable with the amount or any part
of the amount payable under the agreement, the agreement shall, before payment, be laid before an
assessment officer who shall examine it and may disallow any part of it or may require the direction of
the court to be made thereon. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 26; 1992, c. 32, s. 26.
Client paying without approval to be liable to estate

27. If the client pays the whole or any part of such amount without the previous allowance of an
assessment officer or the direction of the court, the client is liable to account to the person whose estate or
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property is charged with the amount paid or any part of it for the amount so charged, and the solicitor who
accepts such payment may be ordered by the court to refund the amount received by him or her. R.S.O.
1990, c. S.15, s. 27.
Purchase of interest prohibited

28. A solicitor shall not enter into an agreement by which the solicitor purchases all or part of a client’s
interest in the action or other contentious proceeding that the solicitor is to bring or maintain on the
client’s behalf. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Contingency fee agreements

28.1 (1) A solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement with a client in accordance with this
section. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Remuneration dependent on success

(2) A solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement that provides that the remuneration paid to the
solicitor for the legal services provided to or on behalf of the client is contingent, in whole or in part, on
the successful disposition or completion of the matter in respect of which services are provided. 2002,
c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
No contingency fees in certain matters

(3) A solicitor shall not enter into a contingency fee agreement if the solicitor is retained in respect of,
(a) a proceeding under the Criminal Code (Canada) or any other criminal or quasi-criminal
proceeding; or
(b) a family law matter. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Written agreement

(4) A contingency fee agreement shall be in writing. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Maximum amount of contingency fee

(5) If a contingency fee agreement involves a percentage of the amount or of the value of the property
recovered in an action or proceeding, the amount to be paid to the solicitor shall not be more than the
maximum percentage, if any, prescribed by regulation of the amount or of the value of the property
recovered in the action or proceeding, however the amount or property is recovered. 2002, c. 24,
Sched. A, s. 4.
Greater maximum amount where approved

(6) Despite subsection (5), a solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement where the amount paid
to the solicitor is more than the maximum percentage prescribed by regulation of the amount or of the
value of the property recovered in the action or proceeding, if, upon joint application of the solicitor and
his or her client whose application is to be brought within 90 days after the agreement is executed, the
agreement is approved by the Superior Court of Justice. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
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Factors to be considered in application

(7) In determining whether to grant an application under subsection (6), the court shall consider the
nature and complexity of the action or proceeding and the expense or risk involved in it and may consider
such other factors as the court considers relevant. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Agreement not to include costs except with leave

(8) A contingency fee agreement shall not include in the fee payable to the solicitor, in addition to the fee
payable under the agreement, any amount arising as a result of an award of costs or costs obtained as part
of a settlement, unless,
(a) the solicitor and client jointly apply to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice for approval to
include the costs or a proportion of the costs in the contingency fee agreement because of
exceptional circumstances; and
(b) the judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances apply and approves the inclusion of the
costs or a proportion of them. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Enforceability of greater maximum amount of contingency fee

(9) A contingency fee agreement that is subject to approval under subsection (6) or (8) is not enforceable
unless it is so approved. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Non-application

(10) Sections 17, 18 and 19 do not apply to contingency fee agreements. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Assessment of contingency fee

(11) For purposes of assessment, if a contingency fee agreement,
(a) is not one to which subsection (6) or (8) applies, the client may apply to the Superior Court of
Justice for an assessment of the solicitor’s bill within 30 days after its delivery or within one year
after its payment; or
(b) is one to which subsection (6) or (8) applies, the client or the solicitor may apply to the
Superior Court of Justice for an assessment within the time prescribed by regulation made under
this section. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4.
Regulations

(12) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations governing contingency fee agreements,
including regulations,
(a) governing the maximum percentage of the amount or of the value of the property recovered
that may be a contingency fee, including but not limited to,
(i) setting a scale for the maximum percentage that may be charged for a contingency fee
based on factors such as the value of the recovery and the amount of time spent by the
solicitor, and
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(ii) differentiating the maximum percentage that may be charged for a contingency fee based
on factors such as the type of cause of action and the court in which the action is to be heard
and distinguishing between causes of actions of the same type;
(b) governing the maximum amount of remuneration that may be paid to a solicitor pursuant to a
contingency fee agreement;
(c) in respect of treatment of costs awarded or obtained where there is a contingency fee
agreement;
(d) prescribing standards and requirements for contingency fee agreements, including the form of
the agreements and terms that must be included in contingency fee agreements and prohibiting
terms from being included in contingency fee agreements;
(e) imposing duties on solicitors who enter into contingency fee agreements;
(f) prescribing the time in which a solicitor or client may apply for an assessment under clause
(11) (b);
(g) exempting persons, actions or proceedings or classes of persons, actions or proceedings from
this section, a regulation made under this section or any provision in a regulation. 2002, c. 24,
Sched. A, s. 4.
Where solicitor dies or becomes incapable of acting after agreement

29. Where a solicitor who has made such an agreement and who has done anything under it dies or
becomes incapable of acting before the agreement has been completely performed by him or her, an
application may be made to any court that would have jurisdiction to examine and enforce the agreement
by any person who is a party thereto, and the court may thereupon enforce or set aside the agreement so
far as it may have been acted upon as if the death or incapacity had not happened, and, if it deems the
agreement to be in all respects fair and reasonable, may order the amount in respect of the past
performance of it to be ascertained by assessment, and the assessment officer, in ascertaining such
amount, shall have regard, so far as may be, to the terms of the agreement, and payment of the amount
found to be due may be ordered in the same manner as if the agreement had been completely performed
by the solicitor. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 29.
Changing solicitor after making agreement

30. If, after any such agreement has been made, the client changes solicitor before the conclusion of the
business to which the agreement relates, which the client is at liberty to do despite the agreement, the
solicitor, party to the agreement, shall be deemed to have become incapable to act under it within the
meaning of section 29, and upon any order being made for assessment of the amount due him or her in
respect of the past performance of the agreement the court shall direct the assessment officer to have
regard to the circumstances under which the change of solicitor took place, and upon the assessment the
solicitor shall be deemed not to be entitled to the full amount of the remuneration agreed to be paid to him
or her, unless it appears that there has been no default, negligence, improper delay or other conduct on his
or her part affording reasonable ground to the client for the change of solicitor. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15,
s. 30.
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Bills under agreement not to be liable to assessment

31. Except as otherwise provided in sections 16 to 30 and sections 32 and 33, a bill of a solicitor for the
amount due under any such agreement is not subject to any assessment or to any provision of law
respecting the signing and delivery of a bill of a solicitor. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 31.
Security may be given to solicitor for costs

32. A solicitor may accept from his or her client, and a client may give to the client’s solicitor, security
for the amount to become due to the solicitor for business to be transacted by him or her and for interest
thereon, but so that the interest is not to commence until the amount due is ascertained by agreement or by
assessment. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 32.
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APPENDIX TWO
Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the Solicitor’s Act)
CONTENTS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Signing and dating contingency fee agreement
Contents of contingency fee agreements, general
Contents of contingency fee agreements, litigious matters
Matters not to be included in contingency fee agreements
Contingency fee agreement, person under disability
Contingency fee excludes costs and disbursements
Contingency fee not to exceed damages
Settlement or judgment money to be held in trust
Disbursements and taxes
Timing of assessment of contingency fee agreement

Signing and dating contingency fee agreement

1. (1) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition to being in writing, a contingency fee
agreement,
a. shall be entitled “Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement”;
b. shall be dated; and
c. shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each of their signatures being
verified by a witness. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 1 (1).

(2) The solicitor shall provide an executed copy of the contingency fee agreement to the client and
shall retain a copy of the agreement. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 1 (2).
Contents of contingency fee agreements, general

2. A solicitor who is a party to a contingency fee agreement shall ensure that the agreement includes the
following:
1. The name, address and telephone number of the solicitor and of the client.
2. A statement of the basic type and nature of the matter in respect of which the solicitor is
providing services to the client.
3. A statement that indicates,
i.
that the client and the solicitor have discussed options for retaining the solicitor other
than by way of a contingency fee agreement, including retaining the solicitor by way of an
hourly-rate retainer,
ii. that the client has been advised that hourly rates may vary among solicitors and that the
client can speak with other solicitors to compare rates,
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iii. that the client has chosen to retain the solicitor by way of a contingency fee agreement,
and
iv. that the client understands that all usual protections and controls on retainers between a
solicitor and client, as defined by the Law Society of Upper Canada and the common law,
apply to the contingency fee agreement.
4. A statement that explains the contingency upon which the fee is to be paid to the solicitor.
5. A statement that sets out the method by which the fee is to be determined and, if the method of
determination is as a percentage of the amount recovered, a statement that explains that for the
purpose of calculating the fee the amount of recovery excludes any amount awarded or agreed to
that is separately specified as being in respect of costs and disbursements.
6. A simple example that shows how the contingency fee is calculated.
7. A statement that outlines how the contingency fee is calculated, if recovery is by way of a
structured settlement.
8. A statement that informs the client of their right to ask the Superior Court of Justice to review
and approve of the solicitor’s bill and that includes the applicable timelines for asking for the
review.
9. A statement that outlines when and how the client or the solicitor may terminate the contingency
fee agreement, the consequences of the termination for each of them and the manner in which the
solicitor’s fee is to be determined in the event that the agreement is terminated.
10. A statement that informs the client that the client retains the right to make all critical decisions
regarding the conduct of the matter. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 2.
Contents of contingency fee agreements, litigious matters

3. In addition to the requirements set out in section 2, a solicitor who is a party to a contingency fee
agreement made in respect of a litigious matter shall ensure that the agreement includes the following:
1. If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that the solicitor shall not recover more in fees than the
client recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement.
2. A statement in respect of disbursements and taxes, including the GST payable on the
solicitor’s fees, that indicates,
i.
whether the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and, if the
client is responsible for the payment of disbursements, a general description of disbursements
likely to be incurred, other than relatively minor disbursements, and
ii. that if the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and the solicitor
pays the disbursements or taxes during the course of the matter, the solicitor is entitled to be
reimbursed for those payments, subject to section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998
(legal aid charge against recovery), as a first charge on any funds received as a result of a
judgment or settlement of the matter.
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3. A statement that explains costs and the awarding of costs and that indicates,
i.
that, unless otherwise ordered by a judge, a client is entitled to receive any costs
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client
is the party entitled to costs, and
ii. that a client is responsible for paying any costs contribution or award, on a partial
indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party liable to pay costs.
4. If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that indicates that the client agrees and directs that all
funds claimed by the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements shall be paid to the
solicitor in trust from any judgment or settlement money.
5. If the client is a party under disability, for the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
represented by a litigation guardian,
i.
a statement that the contingency fee agreement either must be reviewed by a judge before
the agreement is finalized or must be reviewed as part of the motion or application for approval
of a settlement or a consent judgment under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
ii. a statement that the amount of the legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements are subject to
the approval of a judge when the judge reviews a settlement agreement or consent judgment
under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and
iii. a statement that any money payable to a person under disability under an order or
settlement shall be paid into court unless a judge orders otherwise under rule 7.09 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 3.
Matters not to be included in contingency fee agreements

4. (1) A solicitor shall not include in a contingency fee agreement a provision that,
(a)
requires the solicitor’s consent before a claim may be abandoned, discontinued or settled
at the instructions of the client;
(b)
prevents the client from terminating the contingency fee agreement with the solicitor or
changing solicitors; or
(c)
permits the solicitor to split their fee with any other person, except as provided by the
Rules of Professional Conduct. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 4 (1).

(2) In this section,
“Rules of Professional Conduct” means the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper
Canada. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 4 (2).
Contingency fee agreement, person under disability

5. (1) A solicitor for a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian with whom the
solicitor is entering into a contingency fee agreement shall,
(a)

apply to a judge for approval of the agreement before the agreement is finalized; or

(b)
include the agreement as part of the motion or application for approval of a settlement or
a consent judgment under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 5 (1).
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(2) In this section,
“person under disability” means a person under disability for the purposes of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 5 (2).
Contingency fee excludes costs and disbursements

6. A contingency fee agreement that provides that the fee is determined as a percentage of the amount
recovered shall exclude any amount awarded or agreed to that is separately specified as being in respect
of costs and disbursements. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 6.
Contingency fee not to exceed damages

7. Despite any terms in a contingency fee agreement, a solicitor for a plaintiff shall not recover more in
fees under the agreement than the plaintiff recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement. O. Reg.
195/04, s. 7.
Settlement or judgment money to be held in trust

8. A client who is a party to a contingency fee agreement shall direct that the amount of funds claimed by
the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements be paid to the solicitor in trust from any
judgment or settlement money. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 8.
Disbursements and taxes

9. (1) If the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes under a contingency fee
agreement, a solicitor who has paid disbursements or taxes during the course of the matter in respect of
which services were provided shall be reimbursed for the disbursements or taxes on any funds received as
a result of a judgment or settlement of the matter. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 9 (1).

(2) Except as provided under section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 (legal aid charge
against recovery), the amount to be reimbursed to the solicitor under subsection (1) is a first charge on the
funds received as a result of the judgment or settlement. O. Reg. 195/04, s. 9 (2).
Timing of assessment of contingency fee agreement

10. For the purposes of clause 28.1 (11) (b) of the Act, the client or the solicitor may apply to the
Superior Court of Justice for an assessment of the solicitor’s bill rendered in respect of a contingency fee
agreement to which subsection 28.1 (6) or (8) of the Act applies within six months after its delivery.
O. Reg. 195/04, s. 10.

11. OMITTED (PROVIDES FOR COMING INTO FORCE OF PROVISIONS OF THIS REGULATION). O. Reg.
195/04, s. 11.
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APPENDIX THREE
LSUC Rules of Professional Conduct
Contingency Fees and Contingency Fee Agreements
3.6-2 Subject to rule 3.6-1, except in family law or criminal or quasi-criminal matters, a lawyer may enter
into a written agreement in accordance with the Solicitors Act and the regulations thereunder, that
provides that the lawyer’s fee is contingent, in whole or in part, on the successful disposition or
completion of the matter for which the lawyer's services are to be provided. [Amended – November 2002,
October 2004]
Commentary [1] In determining the appropriate percentage or other basis of the contingency fee, the
lawyer and the client should consider a number of factors, including the likelihood of success, the nature
and complexity of the claim, the expense and risk of pursuing it, the amount of the expected recovery and
who is to receive an award of costs. The lawyer and client may agree that in addition to the fee payable
under the written agreement, any amount arising as a result of an award of costs or costs obtained as a
part of a settlement is to be paid to the lawyer. Such agreement under the Solicitors Act must receive
judicial approval. In such circumstances, a smaller percentage of the award than would otherwise be
agreed upon for the contingency fee, after considering all relevant factors, will generally be appropriate.
The test is whether the fee in all of the circumstances is fair and reasonable.
[New - October 2002, Amended October 2004, October 2014] [2] [FLSC - not in use]
LSUC Rules of Paralegal Conduct
Contingency Fees (7) Except in quasi-criminal or criminal matters, a paralegal may enter into a written
agreement that provides that the paralegal’s fee is contingent, in whole or in part, on the successful
disposition or completion of the matter for which the paralegal’s services are to be provided. (8) In
determining the appropriate percentage or other basis of a contingency fee under subrule (7), the paralegal
shall advise the client on the factors that are being taken into account in determining the percentage or
other basis, including the likelihood of success, the nature and complexity of the claim, the expense and
risk of pursuing it, the amount of the expected recovery, who is to receive an award of costs and the
amount of costs awarded. (9) The percentage or other basis of a contingency fee agreed upon under
subrule (7) shall be fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all of the circumstances and the factors
listed in subrule (8).
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APPENDIX FOUR
CONTINGENCY FEES IN CANADIAN JURISDICTIONS

B.C.

ALTA.

SASK.

MAN.

QUE.

N.B.

Permitted

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Legal Authority

Legal Profession Act SBC
1998, c 9, ss 66, 67.

Alberta Rules of Court,
Alta Reg 124/2010, r 10.7,
10.8, 15.5.

The Legal Profession Act,
1990, SS 1990-91, c L-10.1, ss
64, 65, 67.

The Legal Profession Act,
SM 2002, c 44 - Cap L107, s
55.

Code of Professional Conduct
of Lawyers, CQLR c B-1, r
3.1, ss 99-110.

Law Society Act, 1996,
SNB 2009, c 25, s 83.

Note: Quebec no longer has
any specific regulations
regarding contingency fees,
their only requirement is that
the fees be fair and reasonable.

(See also, Speers v
Hagemeister (1974), 52 DLR
(3d) 109 (SK CA).)

Since when

1979

1969

1975

1980

1968

1973

Pre-Authorized
Forms

Benchers may make rules
including but not limited
to: form, content, limits on
how much lawyer may
charge, conditions lawyer
must meet

Must be: in writing; signed
by lawyer and client(s) or
agent; witnessed by a
person who sees the
client(s) sign the agreement
and witness must swear an
affidavit of execution;
served to client(s) within 10
days after signed and
person who serves client(s)
must swear an affidavit of
service

Benchers may make rules re:
form, content, scope, and
subject matter of provisions
that shall or shall not be
included in fee agreements

Must be in writing; signed by
client(s)/agent; and lawyer
must provide client(s) with a
copy of the “contingency
contract”

No

Standard “Contingent Fee
Agreement” provided by
Law Society; agreement
may vary from standard
form if approved by a
reviewing officer and
consistent with
requirements set-out under
section 83 of the Act

From Law Society Rules
2015, Part 8: Must be in
writing

From Rules of The Law Society
of Saskatchewan, r 1501(1),
(3):
Must be in writing, signed by
each party, and copies
delivered to each party by
lawyer
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P.E.I.

N.S.

N.L.

Y.T.

N.W.T./N.U.

ONT.

Permitted

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Legal Authority

Rules of Civil Procedure, r
57.

Nova Scotia Civil
Procedure Rules, r 36.15,
77.14, 82.05.

Rules of Supreme Court,
1986, r 55.15 -55.20.

Legal Profession Act,
RSY 2002, c.134, s 5.

Rules of the Supreme
Court of the Northwest
Territories, NWT Reg
010-96, r 657-663.

Solicitors Act, RSO 1990, c S15, ss
20-30.

(adopted from Ontario in
1990)
Since when

1977

1972

Formally 1986

1980

Formally 1979

Formally 2004

Pre-Authorized
Forms

Must be in writing &
signed by client(s)/agent

Must be in writing &
signed and dated by
client(s)/agent and lawyer;
once signed, lawyers must
deliver copy “immediately”
to each client(s), place
original in a sealed
envelope, and keep it so
that it can be produced on
order of an adjudicator
under the Small Claims
Court Act or a judge

Must be in writing &
signed by client(s)/agent;
copy must be provided to
client(s)

Must be in writing; cannot
contain provision stating
that lawyer is not liable
for negligence; Benchers
may make rules re: form
and content, maximum %
for different classes of
service and for different
stages of a proceeding

Must be in writing &
signed by client(s)/agent

Must be in writing; entitled
“Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement”;
dated; signed by lawyer and client(s);
signatures must be verified by witness;
lawyer must provide client(s) with
executed copy and keep copy themselves
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From Ontario Regulation 195/04:
Contingency Fee Agreements (under the
Solicitors Act)

Statutory Lists of
Mandatory and
Restricted
Contents

B.C.

ALTA.

SASK.

MAN.

Agreement must state that client(s) may apply to
district registrar of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia for review within 3 months after
agreement was made or retainer was terminated;
agreement cannot include provision stating that
lawyer not liable for negligence or relieved from any
responsibility lawyer would otherwise be subject;
agreement cannot include provision stating that
lawyer is entitled to both fee based on proportion of
amount recovered and portion of amount awarded as
costs or paid as costs in settlement (Law Society
Rules 2015, ss 8-1(2), 8-3.)

Name & address of client(s) & lawyer;
nature of claim; statement of event or
contingency; statement about manner of
calculation; maximum fee or rate;
responsibility for disbursements and other
charges; if lawyer to receive part of costs
award, then statement of: whether complete
or partial portion of costs,
acknowledgement of client(s) waiving right
to complete or partial costs,
acknowledgement that lawyer’s portion of
costs award is in addition to other legal
fees, % of costs award that lawyer receives
may not exceed % of judgement or
settlement lawyer is entitled to; statement
that client(s) may terminate agreement
within 5 days after being served; statement
that review officer may review agreement
and any lawyer’s charges upon client(s)’s
request and review officer’s decision may
be appealed to a judge

Agreement cannot
purport to: 1) exclude the
member’s liability for
negligence; 2) require the
member’s consent before
a client(s)’s cause may be
abandoned, discontinued
or settled; or 3) prevent
the client(s) from
changing solicitors
before the conclusion of
the retainer

Lawyer must provide client(s) with notice of their
right to review accompanying their “contingency
contract”

No

For personal injury or wrongful death arising out of
the use or operation of a motor vehicle: agreement
must include statement per s. 8-4(1) of Law Society
Rules 201528
In any other claim for personal injury or wrongful
death: agreement must include statement per s. 8-4(2)
of Law Society Rules 201529

QUE.

(Rules of The Law
Society of Saskatchewan,
r 1501(2))

Filing with Courts

No

No

No

No

No

Sanctions

If lawyer does not comply with agreement
requirements, lawyer only entitled to compensation
in absence of agreement, but only if the event that
would have allowed payment under the void
agreement occurs

If lawyer does not comply with agreement
requirements, lawyer only entitled to
compensation in absence of agreement

No

If don't deliver notice of right of review, lawyer
only entitled to compensation in absence of
agreement; if contract found to be void upon
review lawyer may have to reimburse the client(s)
for any payment made under the contract

No

28

Statement must read: Under the Rules of the Law Society of British Columbia, without court approval, a lawyer may charge a maximum of 33 1/3% of the total amount recovered in a claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising
out of the use of a motor vehicle. The percentage limit applies to all matters related to the trial of a lawsuit, but does not include any appeal. A lawyer and a client(s) may make a separate agreement for legal fees for an appeal. Fees charged
by different lawyers vary.
29

Statement must read: Under the Rules of the Law Society of British Columbia, without court approval, a lawyer may charge a maximum of 40% of the total amount recovered in a claim for personal injury or wrongful death. The
percentage limit applies to all matters related to the trial of a lawsuit, but does not include any appeal. A lawyer and a client(s) may make a separate agreement for legal fees for an appeal. Fees charged by different lawyers vary.
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N.B.
Statutory Lists of
Mandatory and
Restricted
Contents

Name of client(s) & lawyer/firm;
description of legal services to be
performed; amount of fees to be charged
for legal services; method by which fees
are to be calculated and paid; description
of costs, charges, disbursements and taxes
to be paid under agreement; manner in
which costs awarded by the court are to be
applied to the payment of fees, costs,
changes, disbursements and taxes; any
other matter that affects the agreement;

P.E.I.
Name & address of client(s) & lawyer;
nature of claim;
statement of contingency and whether
and to what extent the client(s) is liable
to pay compensation otherwise than
from amounts collected by the lawyer; a
statement that reasonable contingent
compensation is to be paid for the
services; the maximum amount or rate
of compensation after disbursements;

N.S.

N.L.

YUKON

Name & address of client(s) & lawyer;
nature of claim; description of client(s)’s
claim; condition prescribing contingency
upon which services or disbursements are
to be paid; term providing for any part of
the services or disbursements the client(s)
is required to pay regardless of the
contingency, or providing that there are no
such services or disbursements; term
providing the amount to be paid on the
contingency, either as a gross sum or by a
stated formula; the responsibilities of the
parties if the solicitor-client(s)
relationship terminates before the claim is
settled or determined; statement that the
client(s) has the right to have the
agreement and any payment due under it
reviewed for the reasonableness and
necessity of the charges by an adjudicator
under the Small Claims Court Act or a
judge

Name & address of client(s) &
lawyer; nature of claim; statement of
contingency; whether and to what
extent the client(s) is to be liable to
pay compensation otherwise than
from amounts collected by the
lawyer; statement that reasonable
contingent compensation is to be paid
for services; maximum amount or
rate which the compensation is not to
exceed after deduction of
disbursements; and statement to the
following effect: "This agreement
may be reviewed by a taxing officer
at the client(s)'s request, and may
either at the instance of the taxing
officer or the client(s) be further
reviewed by the Court, and either the
taxing officer or the Court may vary,
modify or disallow the agreement."

Specify %
applied; notice of
right of review
by the clerk of
the Supreme
Court

statement that client(s) is entitled to copy
of the agreement upon execution;
agreement shall not include provision
allowing lawyer to be paid both a fee based
on a proportion of amount recovered and
costs awarded to client(s) by order of a
court or by settlement of the matter

statement to the following effect: "This
agreement may be reviewed by the
Prothonotary at the client(s)'s request,
and may either at the instance of the
Prothonotary or the client(s) be further
reviewed by the court, and either the
Prothonotary or the court may vary,
modify or disallow the agreement".

Filing with Courts

Yes, filed with the Executive Director as a
confidential document and maintained on
file until the final disposition of the matter

Yes, filed with the Prothonotary as a
confidential document within 10 days of
being signed

No

No

No

Sanctions

If lawyer does not comply with agreement
requirements, lawyer only entitled to
compensation in absence of agreement, but
only if the event that would have allowed
payment under the void agreement occurs

If lawyer does not comply with
agreement requirements, lawyer only
entitled to compensation in absence of
agreement

No

If don't deliver notice of right of
review, lawyer only entitled to
compensation in absence of
agreement; if contract found to be
void upon review lawyer may have to
reimburse the client(s) for any
payment made under the contract

No
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N.W.T./N.U.
Statutory Lists of
Mandatory and
Restricted
Contents

Memorandum evidencing contingency
agreement shall state: name & address of
client(s) & lawyer; nature of the claim;
contingency and whether and to what extent
the client(s) is liable to pay compensation
otherwise than from amounts collected by the
solicitor;
that contingent compensation must be
reasonable and is to be paid for services;
maximum amount or rate after deduction of
disbursements;
and statement to the following effect: "This
agreement may be reviewed by the Clerk of
the Supreme Court at the client(s)’s request
and may at the instance of either the Clerk or
the client(s) be further reviewed by a Judge of
the Supreme Court and either the Clerk or the
Judge may vary, modify or disallow the
agreement."

ONT.
Name, address & telephone number of client(s) & lawyer; statement of the basic type and nature of lawyer’s services; description of contingency
upon which fee is based; method by which fees are to be determined; if method is percentage, then statement that recovery excludes costs and
disbursements; a simple example of how fee is calculated; statement outlining how fee is calculated if recovery is by structured settlement; statement
that client has right to ask for review, including applicable timelines; explanation of how lawyer or client may terminate agreement, and the
consequences for each party and manner in which fees would be determined in the event the agreement is terminated; agreement cannot contain
provisions stating client cannot terminate contingency fee agreement or that the lawyer may split the fee with any person, other than provided for
under LSUC’s Rules of Professional Conduct; statement that client(s) retains right to make all critical decisions regarding the matter; and statement
indicating: 1) client(s) and lawyer have discussed options other than contingency fee agreement, including hourly-rate retainer; 2) client advised that
hourly rates may vary across lawyers and that they can compare rates; 3) client has chosen to retain lawyer by way of contingency fee agreement;
and 4) client understands that all usual protections and controls on retainers apply
In addition to the above, if agreement is with regard to litigious matter, then agreement must also include: if client is plaintiff, statement that lawyer
shall not recover more in fees than damages or settlement; statement with regard to disbursements and taxes, including if client(s) is responsible for
payments and a description of disbursements likely to be incurred, and that the client(s) may have to reimburse lawyer for these payments; statement
explaining that, unless otherwise ordered by a judge, if client(s) is party entitled to costs they are entitled to receive costs contribution or award on a
partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, and if client(s) is the party liable and responsible to pay costs then they must pay on one of the
two aforementioned scales; if client is a plaintiff, statement indicating client(s) agrees and directs all funds claimed by lawyer for legal fees, cost,
taxes, and disbursements to be paid to the lawyer in trust from any judgement or settlement money; if client(s) under disability and represented by a
litigation guardian under the Rules of Civil Procedure: statement that agreement must either be reviewed by judge before finalized or reviewed as
part of motion or application for approval of settlement or a consent judgment under rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, along with all of legal
fees, costs, taxes, and disbursements, and statement that any money payable to person under disability under an order or settlement shall be paid into
court unless a judge orders otherwise under rule 7.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
From Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the Solicitors Act)

Filing with Courts

Yes, memorandum filed with the Clerk as a
confidential document within 15 days of
signing

No

Sanctions

If agreement does not comply with content
and filing requirements, lawyer only entitled
to compensation in absence of agreement

Upon application to the Superior Court of Justice, agreement may be declared void and cancelled; in that case, any costs, fees, charges and
disbursements incurred or chargeable are to be assessed in the ordinary manner
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B.C.
Prohibited Areas &
Clients

Court Review
Available &
Limitation Period

ALTA.

Child custody or access;
Matrimonial disputes (unless
Court approved)

No

Yes, client(s) may apply to
district registrar of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia for
review within 3 months after
agreement was made or retainer
was terminated

Yes, client(s) can request an
officer to review the
reasonableness of the account
and contingency agreement;
review officer’s decision may
be appealed to a judge

P.E.I.
Prohibited Areas
& Clients

Court Review
Available &
Limitation Period

SASK.

No

Yes, at any time after
the agreement is
formed up until 6
months after payment
of the bill, client(s)
may apply to the
Prothonotary, who then
may refer to court

MAN.

Child custody or access; Matrimonial
disputes (unless Court approved)

QUE.

No

No

Child custody or access;
Matrimonial disputes;
Criminal or quasi-criminal
matters, unless approved by
the Court

Yes, at any time within 6
months after receiving the bill
client(s) may apply for
assessment; or within 6 months
after payment of the bill,
client(s) may seek a
declaration that the contract is
not fair and reasonable

No

Yes, within 90 days after the
agreement is made or the
retainer is terminated
client(s) can apply to
reviewing officer,
notwithstanding payment
under the agreement

(Rules of The Law Society of
Saskatchewan, r 1502)

N.S.
No

Yes, client(s) has
right to have
agreement and any
payment due under it
reviewed by an
adjudicator or a
judge under the
Small Claims Court
Act

Yes, at any time after agreement is made
up until 30 days after the client(s) is
billed, or at any time if the court is
satisfied that it is in the interests of justice
to do so; alternatively, an application for
review can be made to the local registrar
after the client(s) has been billed, at the
request of both the lawyer and client(s)

N.L.
No

Yes, client(s) can apply
to taxing officer at any
time after agreement is
made until expiry of 6
months from date on
which lawyer received
fee or part of the fee, and
from there, taxing officer
can refer to the Court

YUKON

N.W.T./N.U.

Family law; distribution of
Estates; any proceeding in
relation to the property of
any person under Legal
Disability

No

Yes, within 90 days after
agreement made or retainer
terminated client(s) may
apply to clerk of the
Supreme Court for review,
notwithstanding payment
under the agreement;
decision may be appealed to
judge of the Supreme Court

Yes, client(s) may request review from
Clerk at any time after agreement
made until 1 year from last date lawyer
has received the fee or part of the fee;
at any time while contingency
agreement is before the Clerk for
review or within 15 days after Clerk’s
decision, Clerk may, on the request of
client(s) or lawyer refer to a judge
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N.B.

ONT.
Criminal or quasi-criminal matters;
Family law
Court approval required for
agreements made with persons under
disability (Ontario Regulation 195/04:
Contingency Fee Agreements)
Yes, client(s) or lawyer may apply to
the Superior Court of Justice for
assessment of the lawyer’s bill within
6 months after its delivery
From Ontario Regulation 195/04:
Contingency Fee Agreements (under
the Solicitors Act)

B.C.
Fixed or Maximum
Fee Specified & Basis
of Compensation

Total fee cannot exceed the remuneration
provided for in the agreement
For personal injury or wrongful death arising out
of the use or operation of a motor vehicle: 33
1/3% of the amount recovered (unless higher
remuneration approved by Court)

ALTA.

SASK.

MAN.

QUE.

If lawyer receives portion of
costs award then % of costs
award received may not
exceed % of judgement or
settlement lawyer is entitled
to

Total fee cannot exceed the remuneration
provided for in the agreement

No

No

Unless approved by a reviewing
officer, lawyer may retain 25% at
most of the amount recovered for
the client(s), exclusive of costs,
taxes and disbursements; if the
matter proceeds to an appeal, the
maximum percentage increases
to 30%

None

Agreement cannot purport to require
lawyer consent to abandon, discontinue,
or settle

None

None

None

None

None

None

In any other claim for personal injury or wrongful
death: 40% of the amount recovered (unless
higher remuneration approved by Court)30
Settlement Provision

Agreement cannot purport to require lawyer
consent to abandon, discontinue, or settle

N.B.

(Rules of The Law Society of
Saskatchewan, r 1501(1)(d))
Termination/ Change
Lawyer Provision

Agreement cannot purport to prevent the client(s)
from changing solicitors before the conclusion of
the claim or cause of action

Client(s) may terminate
lawyer without incurring any
liability under the agreement
within 5 days of service

30

Agreement cannot purport to prevent the
client(s) from changing solicitors before
the conclusion of the retainer
(Rules of The Law Society of
Saskatchewan, r 1501(e))

In the alternative, agreement may provide that the lawyer may elect to forego any remuneration based on a proportion of the amount recovered and receive instead an amount equal to any costs awarded to the
client by order of a court.
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P.E.I.
Fixed or Maximum
Fee Specified & Basis
of Compensation

No

N.S.
No

N.L.
No

Y.T.
No

N.W.T./N.U.
No

ONT.
No fixed or maximum fee, however contingency fee must exclude costs
and disbursements, and cannot exceed damages
From Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the
Solicitors Act)
(Solicitors Act: The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations
governing the maximum amount or percentage of remuneration that may
be paid to lawyer pursuant to a contingency fee agreement; agreements
may exceed any regulated maximum if, upon joint application by the
lawyer and client(s), agreement is approved by the Superior Court of
Justice within 90 days after agreement executed)

Settlement Provision

Termination/ Change
Lawyer Provision

Provision requiring
lawyer consent to
abandon,
discontinue, or settle
is void

None

Client(s) may
change lawyer
before the
conclusion of the
retainer,
notwithstanding
agreement

Agreement must
include provision
outlining the
responsibilities of the
parties if the solicitor
and client(s)
relationship
terminates before the
claim is settled or
determined

Provision requiring
lawyer consent to
abandon, discontinue, or
settle is void

None

If lawyer
terminated/changed then
application may be made
by or on behalf of either
party to the taxing officer
to determine the amount,
if any, due for the
services rendered under
the retainer with regard
to terms of the agreement

No

Note: This chart is up-to-date as of 2015.
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Provision requiring
lawyer consent to
abandon, discontinue,
or settle is void

Agreement cannot contain provision requiring lawyer consent to abandon,
discontinue, or settle

Client(s) may change
lawyers
notwithstanding
agreement

Agreement cannot contain provision preventing client(s) from terminating
agreement with lawyer or from changing lawyers

From Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the
Solicitors Act)

From Ontario Regulation 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements (under the
Solicitors Act)

APPENDIX FIVE
CONDITIONAL & DAMAGES-BASED AGREEMENTS IN THE U.K. AND AUSTRALIA
UK Conditional Fee
Agreements [CFA] with/without
success fee (or “uplift”)
Description

CFAs “…are sold on the
understanding that a lawyer will
not take a fee if the claim fails. In
most cases, if the claim is
successful, the lawyer will charge
an uplift (known as a success fee) in
addition to their base costs.” (“'No
win, no fee' agreements” from the
Legal Ombudsman)

UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA]

“DBAs are a type of ‘no win, no fee’ agreement
under which a representative can recover an agreed
percentage of a client’s damages if the case is won,
but will receive nothing if the case is lost.”
(Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013)
Note: the Civil Justice Council has recently published
a report on Damages-Based Agreements, including a
number of recommended changes (see, The
Damages-Based Agreements Reform Project:
Drafting and Policy Issues)

Australia Conditional Costs Agreements
with/without success fee (or “uplift”)

Australia Damages-based
Agreements

“A costs agreement may provide that the payment of
some or all of the legal costs is conditional on the
successful outcome of the matter to which those costs
relate” (Legal Profession Act 2004, No 112, ss 32324)

From the Productivity Commission’s final
report on Access to Justice Arrangements:
The Australian, State and Territory
Governments should remove restrictions
on damages based billing (contingency
fees). This recommendation should only
be adopted subject to the following
protections being in place for consumers:
• the prohibition on damages based
billing for criminal and family matters, in
line with restrictions for conditional
billing, should remain.
• comprehensive disclosure requirements
— including the percentage of damages,
and where liability will fall for
disbursements and adverse costs orders —
being made explicit in the billing contract
at the outset of the agreement.
• percentages should be capped on a
sliding scale for retail clients with no
percentage restrictions for sophisticated
clients.
• damages based fees should be used on
their own with no additional fees (for
example, lawyers should not be able to
charge a percentage of damages in
addition to their hourly rate).
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UK Conditional Fee
Agreements [CFA] with/without
success fee (or “uplift”)

UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA]

Australia Conditional Costs Agreements
with/without success fee (or “uplift”)

Australia Damages-based
Agreements

Permitted

Yes

Yes

Yes

No (not yet anyway… see above)

Legal Authority

Courts and Legal Services Act
1990, c 41, s 58.

Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, c 41, s 58.

Each state and territory has an Act in force
entitled Legal Profession Act, based on national
template legislation, which allows for Conditional
Costs Agreements and sets-out the specific
requirements and restrictions of the Agreements
with and without success fees; at least some of
these Acts also explicitly ban contingency fee or
damages-based agreements (see for example: New
South Wales’ Legal Profession Act 2004, No 112, s
325, “contingency fees are prohibited”)

NA

Since when

1998

2010 (for employment proceedings only); 2013 (for
all civil litigation)

NA

Pre-Authorized
Forms

Must be in writing; must relate to
proceedings of a description specified
by order made by the Lord
Chancellor; must comply with any
requirements prescribed by the Lord
Chancellor

Must be in writing; must not provide for a payment
above a prescribed amount or for a payment above an
amount calculated in a prescribed manner (see,
“Fixed or Maximum Fee Specified & Basis of
Compensation”); must comply with such other
requirements as to its terms and conditions as are
prescribed (see, “Statutory Lists of Mandatory and
Restricted Contents”); and must be made only after
the person providing services under the agreement
has provided prescribed information (see below)

NA

(Law Society provides model CFA as
a suggested starting point for building
agreements)

For employment matters: any amendment to a DBA
to cover additional causes of action must be in
writing and signed by client and lawyer; and lawyer
must provide client with,
Information in writing about the meanings of terms,
as defined in the Damages-Based Agreements
Regulation;
Further explanation, advice, or information about the
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UK Conditional Fee
Agreements [CFA] with/without
success fee (or “uplift”)

UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA]

Australia Conditional Costs Agreements
with/without success fee (or “uplift”)

Australia Damages-based
Agreements

circumstances in which client may seek a review of
lawyer’s costs and expenses and the procedure for
doing so
the dispute resolution service provided by the
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
(ACAS) in regard to actual and potential claims;
Whether other methods of pursuing the claim or
financing the proceedings are available, and, if so,
how they apply to the client and the claim or
proceedings in question (i.e., advice under the
Community Legal Service, legal expenses insurance,
pro bono representation, or trade union
representation);
The point at which expenses become payable; and
A reasonable estimate of the amount that is likely to
be spent upon expenses, inclusive of VAT
Statutory Lists of
Mandatory and
Restricted
Contents

Description of damages (can only
include those specified by the Lord
Chancellor in the Conditional Fee
Agreements Order 2013; see “Fixed
or Maximum Fee Specified & Basis
of Compensation”); statement that the
success fee is subject to a maximum
limit; maximum limit expressed as a
% of the damages awarded in the
proceedings (see “Fixed or Maximum
Fee Specified & Basis of
Compensation”); statement that the %
by which the amount of fees which
would be payable if it were not a
CFA is to be increased

Description of claim or proceedings or the parts of
them to which the agreement relates; description of
the contingency; explanation for setting the amount
of payment at the level agreed (in an employment
matter, must include whether the claim or
proceedings is one of several similar claims or
proceedings)
DBAs must not require an amount to be paid by
client other than the payment, net of any costs,
disbursements incurred by lawyer, and any expenses
incurred by lawyer
For personal injury proceedings: DBAs must not
require an amount to be paid by client other than:
general damages for pain, suffering and loss of
amenity, damages for pecuniary loss (other than
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NA

UK Conditional Fee
Agreements [CFA] with/without
success fee (or “uplift”)

UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA]

Australia Conditional Costs Agreements
with/without success fee (or “uplift”)

Australia Damages-based
Agreements

future pecuniary loss), net of any sums recoverable
by the Compensation Recovery Unit of the
Department for Work and Pensions
Filing with
Courts

No

No

NA

Sanctions

Breach of the statutory requirements
of s.58 of the Courts and Legal
Services Act renders a CFA
unlawful/unenforceable and no costs
may be recovered

No

NA

(If DBA terminated, lawyer may not charge client
more than their normal costs and expenses for the
work undertaken in respect of the client’s claim or
proceedings)

Examples of breaches are:
a success fee of more than 100%
the CFA is not in writing
there is no statutory cap in PI cases
where the CFA provides for a success
fee to be paid
Criminal proceedings (other than
under section 82 of
the Environmental Protection Act
1990); Family proceedings (including
child custody or access and
matrimonial disputes)

No (open to all civil litigation)

Court Review
Available &
Limitation Period

No

No

Fixed or
Maximum Fee
Specified & Basis
of Compensation

Success fee may not exceed 100% of
the lawyer’s fee

For personal injury claims at first instance: maximum
fee is 25% of damages, including VAT; fee may be
taken from general damages for pain, suffering, loss
of amenity, damages for pecuniary loss [other than
future pecuniary loss], and net of any sums

Prohibited Areas
& Clients

Success fee under a CFA may not be
recovered by a lawyer from a losing

NA

Previously, DBAs were limited to employment
tribunals only

NA
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UK Conditional Fee
Agreements [CFA] with/without
success fee (or “uplift”)
party, only from their successful
client (previously, lawyer could
recover from losing party)
For personal injury claims: maximum
fee is 25% of damages in proceedings
at first instance; and 100% of
damages in all other proceedings, i.e.
appeals; (in proceedings at first
instance or on appeal, fee may be
taken from general damages for pain,
suffering, loss of amenity, damages
for pecuniary loss [other than future
pecuniary loss], and net of any sums
recoverable by the Compensation
Recovery Unit of the Department for
Work and Pensions (some limitations
such as in the case of diffuse
mesothelioma, insolvency work or
publication and privacy proceedings,
see the Conditional Fee Agreement
Order 2013, s 6(2))

UK Damages-based Agreements [DBA]

Australia Conditional Costs Agreements
with/without success fee (or “uplift”)

Australia Damages-based
Agreements

recoverable by the Compensation Recovery Unit of
the Department for Work and Pensions
For employment matters: maximum fee is 35% of the
sums ultimately recovered by the client in the claim
or proceedings, including VAT
In any other claim or proceedings at first instance:
maximum fee is 50% of the sums ultimately
recovered by the client, including VAT

Settlement
Provision

No

No

NA

Termination/
Change Lawyer
or Agreement
Provision

No

Client may not terminate DBA after settlement has
been agreed; or within 7 days before the start of the
tribunal hearing

NA

Lawyer may not terminate DBA and charge costs
unless the client has behaved or is behaving
unreasonably
(see, “Pre-Authorized Forms” for amending a DBA
relating to an employment matter)
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Cogan, Re (2010 ONSC 915)
2010 Carswell Ont 1148, 2010 ONSC 915, [2010] O.J. No. 827, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 779, 92 C.P.C. (6th) 356
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: February, 2010

Parties

Moving Party: Cogan, Q.C.

Counsel

For himself (motion): J. Arthur Cogan, Q.C.

Judge/s

Then: Hackland R.S.J.

Quick Facts

P. (minor) and Litigation Guardian (“LG”) brought a medical negligence action (birth injury).
MOTION by solicitor for approval of contingency fee to be charged to minor plaintiff and
litigation guardian.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act: ss. 28.1(1), 28.1(2), 28.1(8), 28.1(8), 28.1(12); Reg 195/04: s.5(1); Rules of
Civil Procedure: referred to: s.5; Family Law Act

Contingency Fee
Agreement

33.33% CFA: "[s.2.(4) of Reg] “…the clients hereby agree that the lawyer's fee shall be
contingent upon the successful resolution of the litigation whether by court disposition after
trial or by way of settlement during trial, which fee shall be: [33% and then there was a
calculation example provided, as per the Reg]” AND "[Solicitor] arranged for independent
legal advice for them in relation to the [CFA]."
Settlement: $8.5M with $800,000 attributable to party-and-party costs

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. What fees should be allowed to the solicitor whether under the CFA, or otherwise, for his
services to the minor P. in this action
B. Should the CFA be strictly interpreted
C. What factors should be considered when assessing the CF%

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. 25% contingency fee + disbursements + GST approved.
A. Responding party ordered to pay fees of $1.84M [25% * ($8.5M -0.800M-0.338M)]; also
ordered to pay disbursements of $65k "The fees allowed amount, in my estimation, to a
premium of about four times the billings which would likely have accrued on an hourly basis
[quantum meruit] and accordingly promote the goal of access to justice in that the economics
of taking on a complex medical negligence action such as this are sufficiently favourable to
attract experienced counsel of the calibre of the solicitor."
B. “Submissions of Solicitor and Litigation Guardian indicated that strict wording of CF not
applicable to pre-trial settlement;
C. Solicitor incurred significant financial risk and incurred $65k in costs prior by settlement;
adverse results could have placed Solicitor's law firm in serious jeopardy; P. (minor) had
strong case on liability; Given strength of case apparent from preliminary expert reports, case
was of low to medium risk for Solicitor; Solicitor's fees wouldn't encroach on amounts for P.
(minor) present or future needs
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Seguin v. Chaput (2010 ONSC 1275)
2010 CarswellOnt 1092, 2010 ONSC 1275, [2010] O.J. No. 767, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 70
Date

Heard: February, 2010
Judgement: February, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Seguin
Defendant: Chaput

Counsel

For Plaintiff: William J. Sammon, S. Tia Hazra
For Defendant: Pat Peloso

Judge/s

Then: Lafrance-Cardinal J.

Quick Facts

The P. was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and then attended mediation with her lawyer,
and insurance company reps. ACTION to set aside the minutes from the settlement meeting,
as the P. desires more money

Statute & Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure: 1.03(1), 59.06(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement

NA – the issue regarding CFA requires a further application Settlement: P. accepted offer of
[$340k]

Issue/s with
Agreement

"Secondary Issue: Does the Court have jurisdiction in this Motion to set aside the [CFA]
between Plaintiff and Solicitor?"

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed. Motion to set aside the meeting minutes set aside
Secondary issue: "As the original claim has been satisfied by the judgment issued, a fresh
application will have to be brought against the Plaintiff's original solicitor if [the CFA] issue
is to be argued. In that action, the Plaintiff will be able to raise the validity and legality of the
[CFA]."
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Access Legal Services Professional Corp. v. Padjen (2010 ONSC 1412)
– SEE ONCA DECISION BELOW
2010 CarswellOnt 1302, 2010 ONSC 1412, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 880
Date

Heard: October, 2009
Judgement: March, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Access Legal Services Professional Corporation; Mundulai
Defendant: Padjen

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Aliamisse O. Mundulai
For Defendant: Jean-Paul Waldin

Judge/s

Then: Patricia C. Hennessy J.

Quick Facts

The defendant suffered a workplace injury and retained the services of the Paralegal
Corporation Access Legal Services to represent her in an appeal before the WSIB. Mr.
Mundulai was retained by the paralegal firm to present the plaintiff's case. His services
included a one day hearing. The appeal was successful. Ms. Padjen was awarded pension
arrears of $160,053.02, $72,245.01 for interest, $950.18 per month for ongoing disability
benefits. The plaintiff Corporation and Paralegal (Mr. Mundulai is now a lawyer but was a
paralegal at the time) sued Ms. Padjen for outstanding fees. This [CFA] is the main basis of
the claim.

Statute & Rules
Considered

N/A – see “Outcome” section

Contingency Fee
Agreement

N/A – see “Outcome” section

Issue/s with
Agreement

N/A – see “Outcome” section

Outcome

“At the time the alleged [CFA] is said to have been signed and performed, [CFAs] between
paralegals and their clients were considered void and prohibited by law (Tri Level….
Therefore even if the disputed agreement exists, it is void and of no effect.”
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Access Legal Services Professional Corp. V Padjen (2010 ONCA 669)
– SEE ONSC DECISION ABOVE
2010 CarswellOnt 7748, 2010 ONCA 669, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 426
Date

Heard: October 8, 2010
Judgment: October 8, 2010

Parties

Access Legal Services Professional Corporation and Aliamisse Mundulai
(Plaintiffs/Appellant)
Mirjana Padjen (Defendant / Respondent)

Counsel

Aliamisse Mundulai for himself
L. Leslie Dizgun for Access Legal Services Professional Corporation
Jan-Paul Waldin for Defendant / Respondent

Judge/s

H.S. LaForme J.A., R.A. Blair J.A., and R.G. Juriansz J.A.

Quick Facts

Client retained paralegal firm in connection with workers' compensation appeal. Paralegal
firm retained paralegal to represent client at appeal hearing. Client won appeal and was
awarded $160,053.02 for pension arrears, $72,245.01 for interest, and $950.18 per month for
ongoing disability benefits. Paralegal firm billed client $21,995.05 and she paid promptly.
About one year later, paralegal firm billed client for $73,473.18. Paralegal firm alleged client
had signed CFA providing for contingency fee of 30% of total amount recovered. Paralegal
firm and paralegal commenced action against client for payment of contingency fee. Client
served request to admit but paralegal firm and paralegal failed to respond. Client brought
motion for summary judgment dismissing action. Motion was granted. Deemed admissions
indicated paralegal firm was unlicensed at time and that client had not signed CFA. Paralegal
firm never sought leave to withdraw deemed admissions. Paralegal firm did not provide
evidence to establish basis for granting leave to withdraw deemed admissions. Original CFA
was never produced. Paralegal firm acknowledged in submissions that CFAs were void and
prohibited at relevant time. Paralegal admitted his retainer agreement was with paralegal firm
and not with client directly. No claim based on quantum meruit had been pleaded. Paralegal
appealed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Paralegal firm alleged client had signed CFA providing for contingency fee of 30% of total
amount recovered

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not client had signed a CFA with the paralegal firm

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed.
“This appeal is utterly devoid of any merit.” (para 1) … “We fix the costs of the abandoned
appeal against Access in the total amount of $7,000 inclusive of disbursements plus HST.”
(para 9) … “we fix the costs of the Mundulai appeal against Mr. Mundulai personally on a
substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $13,000 inclusive of disbursements and any
applicable taxes.” (para 10)

53

Aywas (Litigation Guardian of) V Kirwan (2010 ONSC 2278)
2010 CarswellOnt 4447, 2010 ONSC 2278, [2010] O.J. No. 2713, 190 A.C.W.S. (3d) 739, 99 C.P.C. (6th) 199
Date

Heard: March, 2010
Judgement: April, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Wadi Aywas, by his Litigation Guardian Selma Hanna; Selma Hanna; Dina Aywas;
Raad Aywas; Rafid Aywas; Dalya Aywas; Lina Aywas; minors, by their Litigation
Guardian: Zena Aywas and Ramey Aways
Defendant: Kirwan

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Hector H. Emond, Asfrah Syed
For Defendant: Not listed on Westlaw

Judge/s

Then: Charles T. Hackland J.

Quick Facts

P. (then 47 y.o.) was a pedestrian and hit by the D.'s vehicle:"[P.'s] post accident course has
been very unusual. He has suffered daily severe headaches, sleep disruption, balance
problems, reduced memory and concentration, depression, anxiety and post traumatic stress
syndrome... He has not been employed since the accident." Parties brought application for
[A] court approval of tort settlement, statutory accident benefits (SAB) settlement, and [B]
solicitor's CFA claimed on both settlements.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Family Law Act, ss. 42, 61; Insurance Act, Substitute Decisions Act

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: "'35% of the settlement funds obtained' both in tort and accident benefits [SAB]."
Settlement: $550k

Issue/s with
Agreement

B. Whether or not a CFA, in the case of an incapable person, is binding on the Court.

Outcome

Held: Application granted in part. 25% for the tort and 15% for the SAB
A. “I agree with [P.’s] counsel's assessment of the risk of proceeding to trial [with the
principal disability being psychiatric in nature and the P. not having suffered a head injury]
and I consider this settlement [$550k] to be fair and prudent in the circumstances.”
B. "The Court will allow a fee in the amount of 15% of the SAB's lump sum settlement plus
the fees of [$36k] previously deducted on the monthly benefits received of [$366k]. The tort
[CF%] is reduced to 25% which fairly compensates the solicitors for the work done.” “A
[CFA] in the case of an incapable person is not binding on the Court, but is certainly a matter
of importance to be considered as a matter of client expectations” “I regard this as a good
settlement in a matter of average complexity. The risk assumed by the solicitors was
moderate and related mainly to the causation aspects of the plaintiff's injuries. I do not think
that applying the same contingency fee to the SAB's settlement as to the tort settlement is
generally appropriate, although each case must be considered individually.”
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Young (Litigation Guardian of) V Hinks Estate (2010 ONSC 2067)
2010 CarswellOnt 2718, 2010 ONSC 2067, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 78, 56 E.T.R. (3d) 92
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: April, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Shawna Young (by her Litigation Guardian Glynn Young); Pamela Young
Defendant: Smitiuch (Litigation Administrator of Marion Hinks Estate); Goodwin; Cessco
Enterprises

Counsel

For Plaintiff: D.V. Orlando
For Defendant: Not listed on QL

Judge/s

Then: Sproat J.

Quick Facts

In 1997, minor plaintiff (then 3 y.o.) suffered brain injury after collision in car driven by her
aunt — Aunt's liability was clear. MOTION for approval of solicitor fees, inclusive of GST
in the amount of $162k plus disbursements, inclusive of G.S.T. in the amount of $8k.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement

15% CFA: “The retainer agreement entered into by the Litigation Guardian … provided that
if successful in the tort action the fee charged would be the costs recovered from the
defendants plus 15-20% of the damages plus interest on damages.”
Settlement: "The case was settled for what essentially amounted to the policy limit that had
been offered "early on". The total settlement inclusive of costs, interest, and $50,000,
contributed by Goodwin, amounted to $651,000."

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. What fees are fair and reasonable in this case?
B. “In support of the [CFA], and the quantum of fees claimed, Mr. Orlando's affidavit makes
reference to the fact his firm carries a high level of disbursements and bears the cost of
disbursements incurred in a losing case." To what extent does this factor in to the strength of
his CFA?

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
A. “It is incumbent on Mr. Acri to justify the reasonableness of the [$67k] his firm claims in
relation to the tort claim and [$76k] in relation to the accident benefits settlement… I want to
see documents evidencing his retainer and dockets and understand exactly [what Mr. Acri
did on the case over 6 years]." "What, if any, litigation risk existed in relation to the past
attendant care claim? In this regard, I want to review all correspondence between counsel
touching on the issue of liability, the quantum of the claim and the settlement of the claim."
B. "What, if any, weight can I properly attach to paragraph 50 of Mr. Orlando's affidavit filed
in the tort regarding action regarding "losing cases" [the fact that the firm has to pay
disbursements for losing cases] in the absence of some supporting documentation?"
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MPampas V Steamatic Toronto Inc. (2010 ONCA 373)
2010 CarswellOnt 3385, 2010 ONCA 373, [2010] O.J. No. 2099, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 562
Date

Heard: May 19, 2010
Judgment: May 20, 2010

Parties

John Mpampas, Suzanne King and Nicolas Mpampas (plaintiffs), Appellant
Steamatic Toronto Inc. and Gerling Global General Insurance Company, Defendants
BETWEEN John Mpampas and Suzanne King Appellant (plaintiffs) and Andrew Marcus,
Honda Canada Finance Inc., Viki Doidge and Toyota Credit Canada Inc. Defendants
BETWEEN John Mpampas Appellant(plaintiff) and Guarantee Company of North America
Defendant

Counsel

John Mpampas for Appellant / Respondent by way of Cross-Appeal, for himself
Eric Freedman for Respondent / Appellant by way of Cross-Appeal, Joel Freedman

Judge/s

Armstrong J.A., Goudge J.A., and Sharpe J.A.

Quick Facts

Client retained lawyer as legal counsel on three personal injury matters. Parties entered into
CFA. Some legal work was done and settlement offers were being discussed. Lawyer was
removed from record on his own motion. Lawyer brought successful motion for charging
order for his unpaid account under s. 34 of Solicitors Act. Charging order was granted for two
of client's three actions. Motion judge found that preconditions were satisfied that fund or
property was in existence at time order was granted, property was "recovered or preserved"
through instrumentality of solicitor, and that there was some evidence client could or would
not pay fees. Motion judge held that lawyer preserved client's right to sue, which was chose in
action and therefore property. Motion judge concluded that client could not pay lawyer's fees
other than out of judgments or settlements. Client appealed. Cross-appeal by lawyer from
costs award (no costs awarded).

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed. Costs awarded to the respondent fixed at
$3000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.
“We see no error in the reasons of the motion judge. The charging orders over any settlement
funds were properly issued. The respondent acknowledges that any claim that the solicitor get
off the record without just cause can be taken into account by the assessment officer in
determining what fees are reasonable.” (para 1) And, motion judge acted within his discretion
in awarding no costs.
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Alves v. Azevedo & Nelson Barristers & Solicitors (2010 ONSC 2853)
2010 CarswellOnt 3348, 2010 ONSC 2853, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 76
Summary

Only one mention of CFA and CFA not considered: Mr. "Alves alleged that he had entered
into a [CFA] with the defendant law firm, Azevedo & Nelson ("Azevedo"), to pursue his tort
and SABs claim."

Skocir v. Premier Fitness Clubs (Yorkdale) Inc. (2010 ONSC 4636)
2010 CarswellOnt 6285, 2010 ONSC 4636, [2011] W.D.F.L. 311, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1068
Summary

The only mention of CFA: "In my view, the amount suggested by the solicitor for the
defendant bears no semblance to reality given the history of this case and I reject it. Most of
the time spent up to and including the trial before me is now wasted and unrecoverable. In
addition, the fees expended trying to execute on the judgment are completely wasted. The
existence of a CFA with the Plaintiff is irrelevant to my consideration of the costs the plaintiff
is entitled to as a result of the conduct of the defendant, in my opinion."
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Jean Estate v. Wires Jolley LLP (2010 ONSC 4835)
2010 CarswellOnt 6817, 2010 ONSC 4835, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1062, 324 D.L.R. (4th) 140, 61 E.T.R. (3d) 258

Judge/s

Heard: June, 2010
Judgement: September, 2010
Plaintiff: Applicants: Wong, Estate Trustee of Estate of Jean
Defendant: Respondent: Wires Jolley LLP
For Plaintiff: Glenn A. Hainey, Christopher Stanek
For Defendant: Paul Michell, James Renihan
Then: A.D. Grace J.

Quick Facts

Previous action was an arbitration.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act: s.28(1); Reg 195/04: s.15; Rules of Civil Procedure: R. 3.02; Arbitration Act

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA (note this is really not a normal Personal Injury or Class Action case): "The arrangement
was not outlined in a single document. Its terms are to be drawn from a proposal of Wires
Jolley and subsequent communications. While the parties seemed to agree the fee was to be
equal to ten per cent of the net value of the estate's assets, the valuation date is the subject of
disagreement."
Settlement: "Net proceeds of [$20.5M] were generated after the settlement of protracted,
world-wide litigation."

Issue/s with
Agreement

"The issue is whether Wires Jolley should be paid a contingency fee of [$2.05M] as ordered
by the Honourable Fred Kaufman, Q.C., who acted as arbitrator"

Outcome

Held: Application dismissed.
"The arbitrator did consider the relevant factors. A reading of the reasons in their entirety
evidence the fact the Arbitrator considered the time and effort required and spent, legal
complexity, the degree of responsibility assumed, the monetary value of the matters at issue,
the importance of the matters to the clients, the degree of skill and competence demonstrated
by Mr. Wires, the results achieved, the ability of the client to pay and to the extent he could,
the clients' expectations as to the amount of the fee. While my determination of what was
appropriate may not have accorded with the Arbitrator's, I am not in a position to say it was
unreasonable"

Date
Parties
Counsel
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Choi v. Choi (2010 ONSC 4800)
2010 Carswell Ont 6352, 2010 ONSC 4800, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 420
Date

Heard: August, 2010
Judgement: September, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Hijung Choi and Yea Lim Choi (by her Litigation Guardian); Hijung Choi
Defendant: Doo Hyun Choi; Roy Foss Motors; Roy Foss Leasing; Betty Ammirato;
Francesco Ammiratio; Ka Man Cheng; Siu Hing Leung; (Third-party: Newmarket Honda)

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Mr. J. McLeish
For Defendant: Mr. S. Moore for Defendants, Doo Hyun Choi, Roy Foss Motors Limited, No
one for Third Party

Judge/s

Then: M. Fuerst J.

Quick Facts

The plaintiff Yea Lim ("Annie") Choi (then 9) suffered catastrophic injuries as the result of a
motor vehicle collision that occurred during a family outing. MOTION for approval of the
settlement and legal fees of Annie's tort claim.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure: R 2.08(3), R. 7.08; Insurance Act

Contingency Fee
Agreement

15% - 20% CFA: "[P.] entered into a CFA to pay the law firm costs received from the
defendants plus 15% to 20% of damages."
Settlement:"The settlement totals $14.4M … approximately [$3.6k] be paid to Annie's case
manager for outstanding fees; [$1M] be paid to the law firm for partial indemnity costs and
disbursements inclusive of GST; and [as sought under a CFA, a further [$1.6M]" "On the
materials before me, I cannot find that Mrs. Choi is a financially sophisticated person, as was
the litigation guardian (and her spouse) in the 2007 decision Cogan..."

Issue/s with
Agreement

B. What fees are fair and reasonable taking into account the existing CFA?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. 7% + 7% of disbursements with no time docket provided to court by
solicitor.
A. I am satisfied that the amount of the settlement itself is in Annie's best interests."
B. "I allow fees to the law firm under the [CFA] in the amount of [$1M], which is in addition
to the sum of $1 million for costs and disbursements. The law firm therefore will receive a
total of [$2M]." "I have considered the factors set out in both cases of Cogan… which
incorporate those set out in the commentary to Rule 2.08(3) of the [Rules]: The risk that this
action would be unsuccessful was minimal... Unlike the situation in both Cogan… this was
not a complex case, nor is it suggested that the settlement resulted from the lawyer's
persuasive advancement of some unique or novel legal argument.... The amount of
disbursements actually carried by the law firm to the point of settlement, just under[$140k]
was not large... no dockets were kept by those who worked on the file, which would have
permitted me to assess the reasonableness of the fee in light of the time expended" Mr.
Orlando swore in his affidavit, and both [P. lawyer] and [D. lawyer] told me that based on
what is known at this time, the monthly tax free amount paid from the structure will be
sufficient to address Annie's ongoing needs [but possibly not the purchase of a more suitable
home by Annie’s mother]." "The prospect that the legal fees claimed might encroach on the
amount needed to cover Annie's needs [expert hired by P. estimate present value of $17M $23M] is a factor I must consider."
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Attis v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (2010 ONSC 4508)
2010 CarswellOnt 6727, 2010 ONSC 4508, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 745, 323 D.L.R. (4th) 309
Date

Heard: July, 2010
Judgement: September, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Attis; Tesluk
Defendant: Ontario (Minister of Health/AG)

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Samuel L. Marr for Plaintiff, S. Joyce Attis; A. Tesluk, Plaintiff for herself
For Defendant: Paul J. Evraire, Shain Widdifield, John Soldatich for Defendant / Moving
Party, Attorney General of Canada
Sandra L. Secord for Respondents, John B.J. Legge, Legge & Legge, Barristers and Solicitors

Judge/s

Then: Cullity J.

Quick Facts

N/A - see "Contingency Fee Agreement" section for explanation

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act: ss. 28.1(12)(c), 28.1(12)(d), 28.1(12)(e); Reg 195/04: s.3; Rules of Civil
Procedure: ss. 15.02, 57.07, 59.06(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement

This is more of a case about payment of the D.'s costs, and there is only one mention of CFA:
"The following chronological summary of relevant facts that led up to the present dispute may
be helpful: ... 2. February 5, 2000 — Ms Attis and Ms Tesluk execute retainer agreements
which contain no references to potential liability for the defendant's costs, and provide for a
percentage contingency fee for Mr Legge's firm."

Loreto v. Little (2010 ONSC 4764)
2010 CarswellOnt 6854, 2010 ONSC 4764, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 643
Summary

CFA, as between a solicitor and client, not at issue here: "Frank Loreto is a lawyer. He had a
thriving practice. It operated as a sole proprietorship. Frank Loreto had no partners. The
lawyers who worked with him were employees. At some point, Frank Loreto indicated that he
was prepared to take on partners…” "Mr. Justice Belobaba pointed out that the retainers were
based on contingency billing rather than time spent. There is no disagreement about this. The
affidavit sworn by the lawyer acting for Frank Loreo says: "Frank had a contingency fee
arrangement with his personal injury clients".
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Séguin v. Van Dyke (2010 ONSC 6636)
– see further reasons below in (2013 ONSC 6576)
2010 CarswellOnt 10279, 2010 ONSC 6636, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 53
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: October, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Applicant: Seguin
Defendant: Respondent: Van Dyke

Counsel

For Plaintiff: For Applicant: William J. Sammon
For Defendant: For Respondent: John Cannings

Judge/s

Then: Martin James J.

Quick Facts

"Donna Seguin is a former client of Frank Van Dyke, barrister and solicitor. Mr. Van Dyke
represented Ms. Seguin in a personal injury action. His fees were based on a Contingency Fee
Agreement ("CFA"). The action was settled at mediation. The agreed settlement sum
consisted of a global amount that did not specifically identify the amount payable for the
plaintiff's claim, legal costs or pre-judgment interest." Ms. Seguin commenced an application
seeking a declaration that the CFA is unenforceable and for an order that
Mr. Van Dyke's account be assessed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act: ss.23, 28.1, 29.1

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: Very limited detail on CFA, i.e. "[Mr. Seguins legal fees] were based on a Contingency
Fee Agreement ("CFA"). "
Settlement: "The tort action was ultimately settled during mediation in the fall of 2009. At
that time the plaintiff accepted an offer of $340,000 "all in."" "The agreed settlement sum
consisted of a global amount that did not specifically identify the amount payable for the
plaintiff's claim, legal costs or pre-judgment interest."

Issue/s with
Agreement

Should the CFA be enforced or set aside (s.23 of SA)? "This would leave the enforceability of
the CFA to be the only question determined by the application. In my view, this issue is
sufficiently discreet from the issues raised by the action that the two proceedings need not be
tied together in some fashion at this time or that the issues raised by the application ought be
rolled into the action."

Outcome

Held: I am not persuaded that there is sufficient basis to grant the relief sought by the
moving party.
"It is contrary to the Solicitors Act for CFAs to provide for fees to be calculated on an award
of costs except where a special application is made to the court under Section 29.1. It appears
in this case that the relevant provisions of the Solicitors Act have not been complied with."
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Séguin v. Van Dyke (2013 ONSC 6576)
– see above also
2013 CarswellOnt 15252, 2013 ONSC 6576, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1015
Date

Heard: October, 2013
Judgement: November, 2013

Parties

Applicant: Séguin
Respondent: Van Dyke (lawyer)

Counsel

For Applicant: William Sammon
For Respondent: John Cannings

Judge/s

Then: Paul F. Lalonde J.

Quick Facts

"Donna Séguin (DOB 25th May 1962) is married to Leo Séguin. They have three daughters,
Tammy (31), Julie (23), and Jenna (21), and two grandchildren, Cameron (9) and Sara (4).
Ms. Séguin was involved in a motor vehicle accident on October 20, 2006, with Lianne
Chaput, from which she sustained catastrophic injuries." MOTION by Ms. Séguin seeks a
declaration that the CFA is unenforceable and void, as well as an order requiring Mr. Van
Dyke to repay immediately, and with interest, the 33.3% contingency which he charged on
costs, including disbursements and HST.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, ss.23, 24, 28, 28.1 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04

Contingency Fee
Agreement

I am including the full CFA agreement to show that, aside from the inclusion of costs within
the CFA (the issue dealt with in this motion), the CFA seems to comply with the other
requirements (e.g., in writing, sets out the % and has an example calculation).
Ms. Séguin entered into a Contingency Fee Agreement with Mr. Van Dyke dated May 11,
2007. The following are the relevant provisions of the Agreement:
(a) No Trial
It is agreed that with respect to the Action, it is a civil proceeding, the final account for
services (excluding disbursements and G.S.T.) with respect to the Action is to be contingent
on FVD securing a settlement. The fee shall be 33.3% of the settlement amount, including all
amounts received for costs and disbursements received in relation to the civil proceeding.
This estimate includes hourly rates and a premium based on results achieved.
Example #1: Award - $10,000.00 (all inclusive of costs and disbursements)
Fee (33.3%) - $3,330.00 plus disbursements and G.S.T.
Example #2: Award - $150,000.00 plus costs of $30,000.00 plus disbursement of $5,000.00
Fee (33.3%) - $61,605.00 plus disbursements and G.S.T.
(b) Trial
It is agreed that with respect to the Action, if the matter proceeds to trial, FVD will be entitled
to receive 100% of any costs awarded by the Court in addition to 33.3% of the amount
awarded for damages by the Court.
Example: Damages Awarded $450,000.00 plus costs of $75,000.00
Fee: $224,850.00 ($450,000.00 × 33.3% + $75,000.00)
Recommended Settlement
13. In the event that I recommend a settlement for acceptance but you choose to proceed
further in the proceeding, you will be obligated to pay FVD 35% of the settlement proposed,
plus disbursements and G.S.T. and thereafter will retain myself on the basis of an hourly rate.
You acknowledge that my hourly rate is $200.00 per hour.
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"In the present motion before the Court, Ms. Séguin seeks a declaration that the CFA is
unenforceable and void, as well as an order requiring Mr. Van Dyke to repay immediately,
and with interest, the 33.3% contingency which he charged on costs, including disbursements
and HST. Ms. Séguin posits that this amounts to $22k."
Issue/s with
Agreement

Is the CFA so flawed as to render it unenforceable?

Outcome

Held: Application granted.
"In the case at bar, I am concerned with an agreement which, on its face, breaches the
Solicitors Act." "Beaudoin agreed that a CFA could survive if the deficiencies were minor or
of a technical variety. At para. 122, he states: Justice Aston differentiated between "minor" or
"technical' breaches and "significant" ones. This implies that a CFA may be enforced
regardless of certain breaches. One can accept this analysis when one looks at the list of
deficiencies ... In Laushway, the judge was faced with minor deficiencies. In the case at bar,
the breach is fundamental and not technical...”

Additional
Reasons given in
[#06] Seguin v.
Van Dyke (2013
ONSC 7759):

Dealing with costs in the above motion: "The Respondent did not reasonably expect that costs
of this motion would be over $20,000.00. The Respondent's own costs are $13,467.91.
Furthermore, the costs for the two previous motions between the parties were assessed at
$6,500.00 and $8,000.00 plus HST. Having considered the costs as claimed and the factors
enumerated in Rule 57.01, I find that a fair and reasonable award of costs is $10,000.00. I
order that the Applicant shall have her costs of the motion fixed in the sum of $10,000.00 plus
HST, payable by the Respondent within 30 days."
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Dolan (Litigation Guardian of) v. Reid (2010 ONSC 6608)
2010 CarswellOnt 10415, 2010 ONSC 6608, 198 A.C.W.S. (3d) 608
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: November, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Applicant: Dolan (Litigation Guardian of)
Defendant: Respondent: Reid

Counsel

For Plaintiff: For Appicant: Robert Deutschmann
For Defendant: No one

Judge/s

Then: G.E. Taylor J.

Quick Facts

"On October 27, 2007 [then 11 y.o.], Kassandra was at the home of Winston and Paula Reid
visiting with their daughter, Rachel. Kassandra was to spend the night with Rachel at the Reid
home. Kassandra fell asleep on the couch while watching TV. She awoke to find the Reid's
Springer Spaniel/Labrador Retriever dog staring directly into her face. Without warning or
provocation the dog bit Kassandra in her face causing injury to her right cheek and lip."
APPLICATION by litigation guardian of infant plaintiff for approval of settlement reached in
personal injury action approval of 20% counsel fee.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement

20% CFA: "the amount to be paid to Kassandra's solicitors was based on a [CFA] signed by
Lisa Dolan, providing for fees to be calculated on the basis of a 20% contingency."
Settlement: of $75k

Issue/s with
Agreement

Are counsel’s fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Application granted. 7% + disbursements of [$1.4k]
"I am prepared to approve solicitor's fees of [$5.5k] plus disbursements of [$1.4k] plus
applicable taxes." "Based on my review of the client ledger, I conclude that this file was not
one involving a significant degree of complexity. I disagree with Mr. Deutschmann's
assessment that the risk undertaken by him was moderate. Liability was clear. After a demand
letter was forwarded to the Reids it was apparent that they were insured [thus able to pay]."
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394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek (2010 ONSC 7238)
2010 CarswellOnt 9939, 2010 ONSC 7238, [2010] O.J. No. 5692, 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 959
Summary

Only mention of contingency fee: "However, if that was the arrangement, it should not
disentitle Mrs. Purvis to recover costs payable by the opponent. This approach is common for
contingency fee and pro bono retainers."

Broesky v. Lüst (2011 ONSC 167)
2011 CarswellOnt 188, 2011 ONSC 167, 199 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1333, 330 D.L.R. (4th) 259
Quick Facts

Lack of written agreement is the only real issue here "There are significant factual disputes
with respect to the retainer. The Plaintiff says that during the initial telephone call … she
made it clear to the Defendant that she wanted to retain him on all matters arising out of the
motor vehicle incident ..." "There were many other factual issues raised in the hearing... she
maintained that she and the Defendant discussed a 20 percent contingency fee arrangement
during their first telephone call in August 2001. There is no note of this in the Defendant's
file."

Billings (Litigation Guardian of) v. Lanark Mutual Insurance Co. (2011
ONSC 2564)
2011 CarswellOnt 3008, 2011 ONSC 2564, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 635
Judge/s

Then: Beaudoin J.

Quick Facts

"... after 6 weeks of trial and one week of deliberations, a jury returned a verdict on favour of
the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs had brought a claim against their insurers Lanark after a fire
destroyed their home and contents. The Defendant Insurer denied their claim on the basis of
arson." case is more about the indemnity scale and pretty well the extent of the discussion on
the CFA agreement is as follows: "I disagree with his submission that hourly rates are
irrelevant in assessing the reasonableness of a CFA. Information about the actual hourly rates
is an important litmus test in assessing the reasonableness of a claim for cost."

Statute & Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure: R.49, R.57, R.57.01

65

Ledroit v. Rooplall (2011 ONSC 2751)
2011 CarswellOnt 2892, 2011 ONSC 2751, [2011] O.J. No. 2022, 202 A.C.W.S. (3d) 178
Date

Heard: April, 2009
Judgement: May, 2011

Parties

Client Moving Party: Rooplall
Responding Party: Ledroit, Solicitor

Counsel

For Defendant: G. Schible
For Solicitor: K. Souch

Judge/s

Then: Daley J.

Summary

"The client had instituted an action against a physician alleging sexual abuse. The client was
represented by another solicitor up until July of 2009, at which time she retained Ledroit to
continue on with the action on her behalf."
This case is more about a dispute with respect to what retainer applied, and not about the fee
charged: "The solicitor contends that his initial [CFA] retainer, as discussed below, was
terminated with the client and a new retainer agreement was entered into on the day the
client's action was scheduled to proceed to trial.": "On July 27, 2009 the client entered into a
Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement ("CFRA") with the solicitor on the basis that he would
receive 25% of the amount recovered if the action settled before trial plus the costs
contribution from the defendants." "The solicitor advised the client on January 4, 2010 [the
date scheduled for trial] that he was terminating the CFRA [because she had been dishonest
and the lawyer discoverd that dishonesty on the date of the trial] and giving the client two
options, namely: (a) to retain a new lawyer or (b) to retain him on different terms, namely,
that the solicitor would be paid for all work done to date and thereafter on an hourly rate basis
regardless of success ["total fees through to the completion of trial in the sum of [$260k] plus
disbursements and taxes."]."
Settlement: "Following the new retainer agreement, and prior to the trial commencing, the
solicitor engaged in settlement negotiations with the defendant's counsel on behalf of the
client. On the afternoon of January 4, 2010, she accepted an offer to settle her action in the
all-inclusive sum of [$275k] "
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Karkar v. Karkar (2011 ONSC 2550)
2011 CarswellOnt 5171, 2011 ONSC 2550, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 156
Summary

Only mention of CFA: "The applicant seeks an order granting her interim disbursements in
the amount of $25,000.00 on the grounds that she has no income other than the support
payments made by the respondent, she does not qualify for legal aid, and her lawyer is not
prepared to proceed to trial on contingency."

Ontario (Public Guardian & Trustee) v. Charland (2011 ONSC 2961)
2011 CarswellOnt 4009, 2011 ONSC 2961, 202 A.C.W.S. (3d) 474
Judge/s

Then: Moore J.

Summary

"The matters in issue in these actions arise from a motorbike/motor vehicle collision that
occurred on September 12, 1998. At that time, Joshua was...13... As a result of the collision,
Joshua was thrown approximately 50 feet and landed on a gravel road. He suffered
catastrophic brain injuries with resulting obvious and debilitating cognitive and physical
impairments." This case does not involve a CFA, but provides a nice ovetview of the Cogan
factors: "Although legal fees are not sought in this matter on the basis of a [CFA], I have
considered the factors that moved Smith J in the Cogan case" "Having referred to the Cogan
factors and those outlined in rule 57, Hackland J. allowed a fee equivalent to 15% of the
settlement of accident benefits claims and 25% for fees in the tort settlement before him in the
Aywas case. In that case, the retainer agreement called for a 35% contingency fee on both tort
and accident benefits claims and the legal expenses claimed equated to a premium of
$142,195 over docketed time of $226,350. His Honour saw a good settlement in a matter of
average complexity. The risk assumed by counsel was determined to be moderate and related
mainly to the causation aspects of the plaintiff's injuries. He determined not to apply the same
contingency fee to accident benefit and to tort-based settlements."
Settlement: "... payment by defendants of [$2.21M], inclusive of all claims of all claimants for
damages, interest and costs." "The net settlement funds remaining after deducting legal fees
and associated taxes in the accident benefits settlement becomes [$1.06M]. Disbursements
will be deducted and paid from that sum, leaving a new net of [$1.01M] for distribution."
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Laushway Law Office v. Simpson (2011 ONSC 4155)
– see ONCA decision below
2011 CarswellOnt 6238, 2011 ONSC 4155, 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 857, 336 D.L.R. (4th) 632
Date

Heard: February - September, 2010
Judgement: July, 2011

Parties

Solicitors: Laushway Law Office ("LLO"); Barry Laushway
Client: Simpson

Counsel

For Solicitors: John J. Cardill
For Client: Himself

Judge/s

Then: Robert N. Beaudoin J.

Quick Facts

"Simpson was injured in a motor vehicle accident... Although trained as a lawyer, Simpson
was not in practice at that time. Acting as his own counsel, he commenced legal proceedings
in Kingston … to recover damages resulting from the injuries he sustained in the accident
against the tort defendant..." "This is an assessment of a solicitor's account between the
Laushway Law Office ("LLO") sought by their former client Robert Burton Simpson
("Simpson"). The final account was in the amount of [$172k] and was based on a contingency
fee agreement ("CFA")."

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, ss.16, 24, 28.1; Contingency Fee Agreements O. Reg 194

Contingency Fee
Agreement

33% CFA: "P. retained a Kingston lawyer, John Zuber ("Zuber"), to conduct the litigation on
his behalf ["the agreement with Zuber allowed for an estimated 33% of any award including
damages costs and disbursements"]… there was a breakdown in the relationship with Zuber
and Simpson sought new counsel. In May of 2005, he retained the [law firm] LLO to act on
his behalf..." "On March 1, 2006 Simpson formally entered into a new CFA with LLO [,
which provided that] legal fees would be 30% of the total amount recovered for the claim and
that the client would be responsible for the disbursements over and above the 30%."
Settlement: "The applicant's claim was settled at a pre-trial conference held in November
2007 for a total payment of $751k plus assessable disbursements. Simpson's claims had been
settled at $650k and the defendants agreed to pay 15% costs on that sum."

Issue/s with
Agreement

Is the CFA valid and enforceable, i.e. does it comply with the relevant provisions of the SA
and is it reasonable?
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Outcome

Held: CFA is valid and enforceable.
"In jurisdictions in which CFAs are subject to review by the court, the lawyer must bear the
onus of demonstrating that the fee is reasonable, … The reasonableness of the fee should of
course be assessed by reference to the risk as it appeared at the time the assessment was
negotiated, and not as of the time of the assessment, when it may falsely appear with the
benefit of hindsight that the risk of failure was minimal all along" "I conclude that a CFA that
does not meet the requirements of O. Reg 195/04 is not inherently void or voidable. The terms
of the CFA and any breaches must be examined to determine whether they are "minor" or
"technical" or if they are "significant". ..."
"[in this case], There was substantial risk to the Solicitors, as chronic pain files are by their
very nature risky. Further, the likelihood of success was in doubt due to Simpson's nature. It
was repeatedly stated by several individuals that Simpson was not going to be credible or
likable on the stand, and there was a good chance that this would affect the amount awarded
to him."

Additional
Reasons given in
[#135]
Laushway Law
Office v.
Simpson (2011
ONSC 5759)

"An important issue to be decided was the validity of the CFA entered into between RBS and
LLO... [in the previous proceeding (2011 ONSC 4155),] Following six days of hearing, I
concluded that the CFA entered into between RBS and LLO was valid and enforceable and
that, in any event, the fees charged by LLO were fair and reasonable on a quantum meruit
basis. ..." "In this case, the solicitors had actually been paid their account. … Moreover, there
was more in issue than the quantum of the fees charged by LLO. RBS wanted to test the
validity of the CFA and [another Justice (not Beaudoin)] directed that this issue be dealt with
at trial."
"The first [issue] was whether the [CFA] was void or voidable insofar as it did not comply
with the regulations under the Solicitors Act. The second issue addressed any potential
negligence on the part of the solicitors in failing to amend their statement of claim in time
thereby triggering a postponement of the trial date." "In my view, the fair and reasonable
result in this case would be to allow the solicitors their costs on a partial indemnity basis for
all of their time up to and including the first three days of the trial and to award them costs on
a substantial indemnity basis thereafter since the client's conduct during the last three days
was so outrageous as to be deserving of sanction … His repeated attacks on the integrity of
the solicitors and their counsel in his costs submissions are completely unacceptable.")"

69

Laushway Law Office v. Simpson (2013 ONCA 317)
– see ONSC decision above
2013 CarswellOnt 5534, 2013 ONCA 317, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 11
Date

Heard: April 12, 2013
Judgment: May 10, 2013

Parties

Laushway Law Office, Barry D. Laushway (solicitors), Respondents/Responding Parties
Robert Burton Simpson (client), Appellant/Moving Party

Counsel

Robert Burton Simpson, for himself (trained as a lawyer)
John J. Cardill, for Responding Parties

Judge/s

John Laskin J.A., In Chambers

Quick Facts

Moving party, Simpson was injured in a car accident in 1997. Eventually he retained Barry
Laushway of the Laushway Law Office (LLO) to represent him. Simpson and LLO entered
into a CFA. Simpson, now moving party, asked for order to further extend time for perfecting
appeal from judgment. He had already been granted two lengthy extensions. See ‘CFA
Breakdown’ for more details…

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Under the parties’ CFA, LLO was to be paid legal fees equal to 30% of any recovery.
In November 2007, Simpson's claim was settled at a pre-trial conference for $750,000 plus
disbursements. After some adjustments to settle the claims of ODSP and Ontario Works,
Simpson received the net amount of $516,473.64, and LLO received a net fee of $138,456.24.
At the time of this motion, the fee has been paid, and subject to these proceedings, LLO has
the funds. Simpson then challenged the enforceability of the CFA. In November 2008,
McLeod-Beliveau J. ordered a hearing of that issue. Shortly after, Barry Laushway died. At
the hearing on July 4, 2011 Beaudoin J. found the CFA to be enforceable, and in the
alternative would have upheld the amount claimed on quantum meruit basis.

Issue/s with
Agreement

No issues with agreement on this motion. Simpson is looking for an extension on his appeal
of Beaudoin J.’s decision that the CFA is enforceable.

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
Simpson had not shown any merit in proposed appeal. The reasons of trial judge were
thorough and appeared to be well reasoned. Although he found that CFA was enforceable,
even if it was not enforceable, he also found that fee received by law firm was fully justified
on quantum meruit basis. Simpson’s' general and conclusory contentions in notice of motion
did not raise any arguable ground of appeal arising from reasons.
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Miller (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bender (2011 ONSC 4379)
2011 CarswellOnt 6645, 2011 ONSC 4379, 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 80
Date

Heard: July, 2011
Judgemet: July, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff/Applicant: Brayden Miller and Alicia Miller, by their Litigation Guardian; Caroline
Miller; Amber Miller
Defendant/Respondent: John Bender; Mark Bender; Intact Insurance

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Robert M. Ben
For Defendant: No one

Judge/s

Then: Turnbull J.

Quick Facts

a tort action and an accident benefits claim (no further detail provided in the case). "Counsel
for the plaintiffs brought two applications... for [A] approval of the settlement of the tort
action and the accident benefits claims and [B] approval of the Management Plan proposed
by Brayden's parents."

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, s.28.1 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: "I have had a chance to review the retainer agreement ... It raises a number of questions
for the court to consider. It provided that the fees would be comprised of the partial
indemnity costs recovered by the plaintiffs plus 15-25% of the total recovery made by the
plaintiffs."
"The fees sought are approximately [$585k] (" [$517k] by Thomson Rogers and
approximately [$72k] by the former solicitors for the plaintiffs, Giffen Lee."
Settlement: "[$1.08M] in the tort action and [$1.25M] in the Accident Benefit claim"

Issue/s with
Agreement

Are the solicitors’ fee reasonable and does it comply with the relevant provisions of the SA?

Outcome

Held: "It is ordered that the sum of [$250k] may forthwith be paid out of the proceeds of the
settlement to the plaintiffs' counsel Thomson Rogers as a partial payment [additional
documents are required: see below] of their fees for services rendered to the plaintiffs plus
the sum of [$65k] for disbursements incurred by them on behalf of the plaintiffs"
"In reviewing the Retainer agreement, it appears to me at first glance that it does not comply
with many of the requirements for such an agreement under the Solicitors Act. In particular,
section 28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act provides as follows:..." "Section 28.1(12) of the
Solicitors Act enables the Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations governing
contingency fee agreements and several aspects of those agreements. Pursuant to that
enabling power, Regulation 195/04 was passed and was in effect at the time that the plaintiffs
signed their retainer agreement with Thomson Rogers.The Retainer Agreement signed by the
plaintiffs and prepared by Thomson Rogers does not comply with the Regulation in many
respects... Because of my concern that the Retainer Agreement may violate the provisions of
the Regulation and the Solicitors Act, I have asked Thomson Rogers to provide additional
information to the court in affidavit form on that issue and on other issues such as dockets
showing time actually spent, the nature of the services provided and who provided the
services, the hourly billing rate applicable for each individual working on the file and such
other information as would be relevant in an assessment of costs."
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Consky v. Farooq (2011 ONSC 5148)
– see ONCA decision below
2011 CarswellOnt 8957, 2011 ONSC 5148, [2011] O.J. No. 3890, 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 152
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: August, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff: Consky
Defendant: Farooq

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Frank Feldman
For Defendant: Michael Czuma

Judge/s

Then: D.L. Corbett J.

Quick Facts

"It all started back on May 3, 1999. Mr. Farooq was a student pilot. He was injured when
another student pilot collided with him on the tarmac at a flight training school." "Mr. Farooq
claimed to suffer serious injuries in the accident. He alleged total and permanent disability.
On May 7, 1999, he retained Mr. Consky to claim for his losses." This is a MOTION to
oppose confirmation of the Report of Assessment Officer Boyd is dismissed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act,s.28.1

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: "Mr. Farooq had a fee agreement with Mr. Consky. Mr. Farooq says that he understood
the agreed fees would be 10% of the total settlement." notable but not super relevant: "Mr.
Consky expected to be paid his fees from the settlement proceeds. Mr. Farooq had other ideas.
He terminated Mr. Consky's retainer after settlement was agreed, but before it was
implemented. Then he tried to obtain the full settlement proceeds behind Mr. Consky's back.
Counsel for the defendant gave Mr. Consky notice. The funds were ordered paid into court,
and Mr. Farooq was ordered to pay costs for Mr. Consky's motion to protect his fees."
Settlement: $250k (plus costs of $54k)

Issue/s with
Agreement

"Was the Fee Agreement Illegal? If So, Did the Assessment Officer Err in Failing to Find the
Agreement Illegal?"
"Mr. Farooq argues that the fee agreement breaches s.28.1(8) of the Solicitors Act. That
provision prohibits contingency fee agreements that include both recovered costs plus an
additional fee payable to the solicitor (unless there are special circumstances and the
agreement is approved on joint application to a judge). Although this provision was not
enacted until 2004, some five years after the fee agreement was agreed, Mr. Farooq argues
that the litigation was not concluded until 2008, and thus s.28.1(8) applied at the time that fees
were calculated. Mr. Farooq argues that, in this event, s.20(3) of the Solicitors Act has the
effect of limiting Mr. Consky's entitlement to the costs portion of the settlement."

Outcome

Held: "The motion to oppose confirmation of the Report of Assessment Officer Boyd is
dismissed. The Report [to fix Mr. Consky's account at $76k] is confirmed, [thus,] the [CFA] is
now immaterial. "[as an aside,] the amendments to the Solicitors Act do not have
retrospective effect to existing fee agreements." "Total costs of $13,245 were awarded in Mr.
Consky's favour. Of these, $6,000 was for the costs of assessing the disbursements."
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Consky v. Farooq (2013 ONCA 393)
– see ONSC decision above
2013 CarswellOnt 7939, 2013 ONCA 393, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 269
Date

Heard: June 10, 2013
Judgment: June 11, 2013

Parties

Abdul Kasim Farooq, Appellant
Harvey S. Consky, Solicitor, Respondent

Counsel

Michael Czuma, for Appellant
Frank Feldman and Darrell Paul, for Respondent

Judge/s

Laskin J.A., Rosenberg J.A., Tulloch J.A.

Quick Facts

Appellant appealed confirmation of assessment of retainer agreement from Justice Corbett’s
decision in Consky v. Farooq (2011), 2011 ONSC 5148. Appellant claimed that
retainer agreement was a CFA that violated the Solicitors Act. Appellant sought to set aside
confirmation of assessment.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed with costs fixed at $7000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable
taxes.
Here is the entire substance of the Court’s decision:
“(1) We agree with Justice Corbett that the retainer agreement was not a contingency fee
agreement.
(2) Even if it was a contingency fee agreement, the Solicitors Act does not apply
retrospectively to it.
(3) The appellant disavowed the agreement and asked for an assessment of the fairness and
the reasonableness of the account. That is what he got.”
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Oakley & Oakley Professional Corp. v. Aitken (2011 ONSC 5613)
2011 CarswellOnt 12301, 2011 ONSC 5613, 209 A.C.W.S. (3d) 52
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: September, 2011

Parties

Applicant: Oakley & Oakley Professional Corp.
Respondents: Aitken and others

Counsel

For Applicant: Paul Harte
For Defendant: N/A

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

Formerly a class action of 99 individuals but those individuals separated into individual
actions: "who, in 99 separate actions, claim damages for medical malpractice against
gynaecologist, Richard Austin." APPLICATION “for permission to include in its contingency
fee agreements with the 99 clients any award of costs to the clients in their respective actions
against Dr. Austin. Because the award of costs would be in addition to the [CFAs] with the 99
clients, court approval is required. Under s. 28.1 (8), court approval is available in
"exceptional circumstances."

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, s.28.1(8)

Contingency Fee
Agreement

25% or 30% CFA: "Under the contingency fee agreements Oakley & Oakley agree to assume
the risk of both fees and disbursements [signed by each of the 99 clients]. The agreements
provide for a contingency fee of 25% or a contingency fee of 30% where it is anticipated that
a limitation period defence could be raised by Dr. Austin... As may be noted, the [CFAs]
provide for both a percentage of recovery plus any amount paid by Dr. Austin for costs"

Issue/s with
Agreement

Do these circumstances qualify as “exceptional” within the meaning of the SA, as to warrant
award of costs in addition to the CFA?

Outcome

Held: Application granted.
"The circumstances of the 99 medical malpractice actions viewed individually or viewed
collectively constitute exceptional circumstances that justify granting approval under s. s. 28.1
(8) of the Solicitors Act." "Generally speaking, medical negligence litigation is a challenging
area of civil litigation, and the 99 actions against Dr. Austin are all complex and difficult. This
type of litigation inevitably requires the parties to retain expert witnesses to testify about the
standard of care and whether there was negligence.... It appears that, but for ... [the lawyers']
agreement to enter into [CFAs], the individual plaintiffs would not have been able to advance
their claims."
"In Williams... involving a party under a disability, Justice Roccamo approved a contingency
fee of 28% plus any costs awarded or paid by the defendant. She held that counsel's
assumption of significant and unusual risk, together with complications arising from feuding
plaintiffs amounted to extraordinary circumstances that justified granting approval." "In
Cogan, ... , Justice Hackland agreed with Williams... but distinguished it from the
circumstances of Cogan, which was a complex obstetrical negligence case but one in which
the financial risk assumed by the lawyer under a [CFA] was moderated by the circumstance
that there were admissions of liability... Justice Hackland stated: 30. As to what constitutes
special [exceptional] circumstances...."
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Dryden v. Oatley Vigmond LLP (2011 ONSC 7303)
2011 CarswellOnt 14463, 2011 ONSC 7303, [2011] O.J. No. 5565, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 544
Date

Heard: November, 2011
Judgement: December, 2011

Parties

Moving Party: [Mr.] Dryden
Responding Party: Oatley Vigmond LLP

Counsel

For Moving Party/Himself: John Dryden
For Solicitor/Responding Party: Shenthuran Subramanian

Judge/s

Then: Michael G. Quigley J.

Quick Facts

"This litigation arose out of a 1997 motor vehicle accident. Mr. Dryden had previously
retained several solicitors before he came to Mr. Oatley."MOTION: "to set aside the Report
and Certificate of Assessment [which reduced the lawyers' CF % to 30%]"

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA "Mr. Oatley agreed to represent Mr. Dryden. He accepted the case on a contingency fee
basis"
Settlement: "The action was settled for [$285k] in respect of his claims and interest, plus
[$42.5k] for costs inclusive of sales tax, and [$47.5k] for disbursements. Following that
settlement, ... the solicitor's law firm rendered its account to Mr. Dryden for [$128k] for its
services... in accordance with the signed contingency fee retainer agreement"... That left Mr.
Dryden with a net settlement of [$225k]..."

Issue/s with
Agreement

"In her [Report and Certificate of Assessment], [the assessment officer] found that the [CFA]
that had been established between the law firm and Mr. Dryden was unjustified. Further, she
concluded that the [$128k] account that had been rendered to Mr. Dryden was excessive and
should be reduced by almost [$43k] [from the original $128k] to [$85k]."

Outcome

Held: "Mr. Dryden's application to oppose the certification of the Assessment Officer's award
is dismissed ..."
[the case doesn't really discuss the reasonableness and fairness of the fee]: "In considering my
jurisdiction relative to the approval or rejection of the Certificate of Assessment, it is
important to acknowledge that it is settled law that the court is to be concerned only with
questions of principle on an appeal from a Certificate of Assessment reached by an
assessment officer. I am not to be concerned with mere questions of amount, or the manner in
which the assessment officer has exercised her discretion, unless the amounts are so
inappropriate or the assessment officer's decision is so unreasonable as to suggest the
existence of an error in principle:"
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Merovitz Potechin LLP v. Cantor (2011 ONSC 79)
2012 CarswellOnt 456, 2012 ONSC 79, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 875
Summary

This case involves a former law firm employee alleging a constructive trust of the firm's CFA
agreements: "The personal injury work at MP was undertaken on a contingency fee basis. The
standard retainer agreement set out that there would be a fee of 30 percent of the client's total
recovery if MP was successful on the client's behalf. There is no issue that the wording of the
contingency fee retainer agreement was approved by MP." "The statement of claim seeks a
declaration that a constructive trust be imposed over a portion of the contingency fee
recovered by the defendants on the personal injury files transferred from MP to LM, once
[they are actually] settled."

Ahou (Guardian of Property) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. (2012 ONSC 1601)
2012 CarswellOnt 2931, 2012 ONSC 1601, 214 A.C.W.S. (3d) 372
Date

Heard: March, 2012
Judgement: March, 2012

Parties

Applicant: Ahou (Guardian of Property)
Respondent: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Counsel

For Applicant: Ms T. Romano
For Respondent: No one

Judge/s

Then: MacKenzie J.

Quick Facts

"Very briefly, Sara Ahou (born July 22, 1991) was a child of tender years, one month shy of
her sixth birthday when on June 8, 1997 she suffered significant injuries while riding her
bicycle... She suffered extensive injuries, both physical and mental, full particulars of which
are set out in the materials and are not in issue here. Suffice to say, they were sufficiently
serious to be fairly characterized as catastrophic." In pursuance of the settlement, MOTION
was brought under Rule 7.08 for approval of the settlement and the fees of $219k and the
disbursements of $37k all-inclusive, being sought by Counsel.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.57.01(1)

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: 20% "[Sara's] ... statutory guardian of property, ... entered into a retainer agreement
with the law firm (Counsel) ... to act on their behalf ... One of the terms of this agreement was
that the fees were to be "20% plus party to party costs, plus disbursements." The 1997 retainer
agreement predated the 2002 amendments to the Solicitor's Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, which
permitted contingency fees in the type of litigation here."
Settlement: "... settlement of all statutory accident benefits (SABs) claims.... The total
settlement amount is [$1.28M]"

Issue/s with
Agreement

Are counsel’s fees fair and reasonable, and in compliance with the R 57.01?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. 17%
"the minor plaintiff's guardian herein has no objection to the claim for fees and
76

disbursements." "In its report, the Public Guardian and Trustee has referred to current case
law from this court in which the rule of thumb for fees for plaintiffs' counsel in SABs claims
is about 15 percent of the amount of the settlement amount for such claims: see Aywas... In
response to Aywas, ... Mr. Gluckstein has cited two other cases dated from 2007 (i.e. three
years before the Aywas case in 2010) wherein the legal fees in relation to the accident benefits
claims were set at approximately 18% of the settlement of damages recovery in one case...
and 16% percent in the other case ...."
"These types of actions by their nature necessarily require counsel to take into account the
difficulty of ascertaining ultimate disability and impact of injuries to children of tender years.
Here counsel ... delivered services over an extended period of time, i.e. 13 years, should not
have the value of their services discounted by further debits against the amount of fees that
are in all other respects reasonable on their face and that take into account the Rule 57.01(1)
factors ... the spread from the "usual" 15 percent to the present rate of 17 percent can hardly
be described as unreasonable... in terms of the results achieved and recovery made for the
minor plaintiff."
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Henricks-Hunter (Litigation guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2013
ONSC 5245)
– see ONCA decision below
2013 CarswellOnt 11234, 2013 ONSC 5245, 231 A.C.W.S. (3d) 256
Date

Heard: July, 2013
Judgement: August, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Henricks-Hunter, by her litigation guardian, the Office of the Public Guardian and
Trustee
Defendant: 814888 Ontario Inc. carrying on business as Phoenix Concert Theatre; Sherbourne
Community Clinic

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Richard Shekter, for Plaintiff, Stephanie Marie Henricks- Hunter; J. Gardner
Hodder, for Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP; Sidney Peters, for Public Guardian and Trustee
For Defendant:

Judge/s

Then: Darla A. Wilson J.

Quick Facts

"Stephanie fell from a second storey balcony on October 27, 2005 while at a concert at the
Phoenix Concert Theatre. According to the evidence before me, she climbed on to a balcony
that had been marked "off limits" after having consumed a significant amount of alcohol. At
the time, she was 34 years of age. As a result of the fall, she sustained a severe traumatic brain
injury with associated serious cognitive deficits. She was deemed incapable of managing her
finances and person and the office of the PGT was appointed to manage her financial affairs
in 2006. Her parents retained authority over her person. Stephanie was at a long term care
facility in Toronto receiving 24 hour a day care until 2009 when she moved to Missouri where
her family resides." MOTION by law firm for order that Contingency Fee Agreement
between plaintiff through her litigation guardian, Public Guardian and Trustee and plaintiffs'
counsel be declared fair and reasonable in accordance with s. 24 of Solicitors Act.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, s 24.

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: "... for amounts recovered as net damages on behalf of Stephanie, the solicitor is
entitled to recover fees of 25% up to $2.5M dollars plus taxes and disbursements. Pursuant to
the CFA, the amount of party and party costs offered by the Defendant belongs to Stephanie."
Settlement: $2.05M

Issue/s with
Agreement

Should the legal fees determined under a CFA reflect the docketed time or should they be
based on the amount recovered for the client?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
A. "The offer of net damages for Stephanie of $1,799,420 represents about 20% of the
damages as assessed by HSH or 25% of the damages from the defence perspective." Clearly,
the damages of Stephanie would assess in the $7-$9 million dollar range; however, when
determining whether or not the results achieved were poor or stellar or something in between,
the Court must look at the facts of the case and the insurance monies available to respond to
the claim. In this case, the maximum funds that could be accessed from Phoenix pursuant to
the insurance policy were $2 million. As Mr. Shekter pointed out in his materials, the
settlement proposal for Stephanie is 91% of that policy." "In this case, the liability issue was
significant. In my opinion, this is a case where there could have been a finding at trial that
there was no liability on either Defendant. Independent counsel is of the view that a finding of
78

contributory negligence of Stephanie in the 75% range was not beyond the realm of
possibility. I agree. In all of the circumstances, I am of the view that the results achieved by
HSH for Stephanie were very good."
B. "On July 12, 2012, the Court of Appeal released its decision allowing the appeal. It stated
that there is a two-step process that must be followed when enforcement of a CFA is sought:
the fairness of the agreement must be assessed as of the date it was entered into; and the
reasonableness of the agreement must be assessed as of the date of the hearing [emphasis
mine]" time expended: " When the matter was initially reviewed by Justice Wilkins, he was of
the view that the materials submitted by the solicitors in support of the requested fees were
inadequate and he requested full particulars of docketed time and particulars of "undocketed
work". In refusing to approve the proposed fee he was mindful of the fact that the docketed
time on the file from lawyers and clerks was $236,676.80 and he added an additional
$88,323.20 in fees, approving a fee of $371,831.27 all inclusive. As the Court of Appeal
noted, this amount was determined "almost exclusively" by dockets and hourly rates... I am
guided by the comments of the Court of Appeal in Raphael Partners, where it was noted that
the determination of the proper fee in a CFA is not based on the value of the time spent, but
rather on the amount recovered for the client... As noted by the Court of Appeal in Raphael
Partners, at para. 54, "...the time spent by the solicitors...while a relevant factor, does not
control the question of whether the solicitors were entitled to the maximum fees charged
through enforcement of the fee agreement...""
Earlier Reasons
in HenricksHunter
(Litigation
Guardian of) v.
814888 Ontario
Inc. (2012
ONSC 4564)

Decision by Wilkins J on APPLICATION by lawyer for catastrophically-injured plaintiff to
have trial judge recuse himself over potential issue of bias.
A good case for what not to do when submitting a CFA to the court for approval: "The
solicitor's contingency fee agreement seeks a recovery of $516,000, or 100% of his
contingency fee, in a circumstance in which the Plaintiff is recovering approximately 15% of
the value of her case and of the settlement funds... (i.e., "The solicitor's affidavit made it quite
clear that the $2.05M [settlement] payment represented approximately 15% of the value of the
Plaintiff's case.")
[…]
In the absence of representation and given the obvious conflict of interest that the PG&T has,
having drafted the CFA and having supported it against Ms. Henricks-Hunter, all sorts of
other issues are clearly put into play, and those issues should properly be canvassed before the
Motions Judge determining the question of reasonableness [of counsel's fee]." "The issue of
reasonableness [of counsel's fee] as at the time of the settlement was sent back to the Motions
Court to be determined in that forum." "In the case at bar, there are so many other factors in
play that involve a great deal broader interpretation and a much wider view on the part of the
Court in order to ensure that in the overall picture, there is justice not just for the solicitor who
wants to recover 100% of his fees (100% of his contingency fee being [$516k], his docketed
time being [$234k], or such other fee as might be appropriate) ..." "The CFA sought to be
enforced against the lady under a disability was presented in the Court of Appeal as being
important to the justice system and access to justice. Needless to say, no evidence was ever
presented in this matter to show that the contingency fee in issue in any way, shape or form
contributed to Ms. Henricks-Hunter's access to justice or how the justice system was benefited
by the solicitor's recovery of a contingency fee, or how Ms. Henricks-Hunter was in any way,
shape or form advanced in her claims by reason of that agreement. In the endorsement set
aside by the Court of Appeal, a fund of $325,000 including taxes was made available to pay
the solicitor's fees, plus the disbursements incurred, which disbursements, on a closer view,
disclosed a significant number of office expenses and items such as "drinks" and "finding a
Tim Hortons restaurant."

And…
HenricksHunter

This other earlier decision by Wilkins J. does not discuss the fee % and focused on the
following question: "RULING to determine whether public guardian and trustee required
independent counsel for determination of reasonableness of CFA... In all these matters, a
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(Litigation
Guardian of) v.
814888 Ontario
Inc. (2012
ONSC 4252)

1000 year old duty of parens patria falls on the Court to act in the best interest of those who
cannot act for themselves, and in circumstances where the government authority whose job it
is to protect Stephanie's interests gets in conflict, independent counsel is required."

Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2012
ONCA 496)
– see ONSC decisions above
2012 CarswellOnt 8969, 2012 ONCA 496, [2012] O.J. No. 3207, 219 A.C.W.S. (3d) 683, 28 C.P.C. (7th) 227, 294
O.A.C. 333
Date

Heard: July 6, 2012
Judgment: July 12, 2012

Parties

Howie Sacks and Henry LLP, Appellant
Stephanie Marie Henricks-Hunter, Respondent

Counsel

J.G. Hodder, for Appellant
No one for Respondent

Judge/s

D. O'Connor A.C.J.O., J.C. MacPherson, Paul Rouleau JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Client was seriously injured in fall from catwalk at concert premises. Public guardian became
client's guardian of property and entered into a contingency fee
agreement (CFA) with appellant law firm on client's behalf. Action was settled for gross
amount of $2,050,000.00. Law firm sought $516,536.92 in accordance with CFA. Motion
judge fixed fees and disbursements at total of $371,831.27. Law firm appealed.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 24
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, s. 5(1)
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R. 7.08

Contingency Fee
Agreement &
Settlement
Breakdown

On March 2, 2006, the guardian entered into a CFA with the appellant on Stephanie's behalf.
Pursuant to that agreement, the appellant agreed to defer rendering an account to Stephanie for
disbursements or legal fees until a successful conclusion of her action. The CFA also
provided: (paras 4-6)
 appellant was to receive fees equal to 25% of any judgement or settlement up to $2.5
million, and 20% on any judgement or settlement in excess of that amount
 appellant was to receive 100% of all out-of-pocket expenses and disbursements
 respondent, Stephanie was to recover any partial indemnity costs awarded, and any
amount attributed to costs in any settlement or judgement would be excluded from the
application of the CFA
The claim was settled in October 2009 at mediation without the need for a trial. The gross
settlement amount was $2,050,000. (The liability insurance carried by Phoenix [the
defendant] had limits of $2 million.) Appellant requested $516,536.92 in fees from respondent
in accordance with their CFA.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Failure to consider CFA: Whether or not the motion judge erred in failing to consider
whether the CFA was “fair and reasonable” in accordance with the two-part test set out in s.
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24 of the Solicitors Act.
Failure to consider relevant factors: And, in the alternative, if the two-part test does not
apply to persons under a disability, then whether or not the motion judge's reasons were
inadequate, such that he failed to consider the relevant factors in arriving at an appropriate fee.
Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed
Matter remitted to motion judge for determination of the reasonableness of CFA in
accordance with appellate reasons. Motion judge erred in failing to consider whether CFA
should be enforced and by proceeding directly to determination of amount of fees without
regard to the existing CFA. The CFA was fair, but appellate court was not well placed to carry
assessment of reasonableness of CFA.
Followed: Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 164 O.A.C. 129, 24 C.P.C. (5th) 33, 61 O.R.
(3d) 417, 2002 CarswellOnt 3077, 218 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (Ont. C.A.)

81

Warnica v. Van Moorlehem (2012 ONSC 4241)
2012 CarswellOnt 9143, 2012 ONSC 4241, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 453
Date

Heard: May, 2012
Judgement: July, 2012

Parties

Applicant: Warnica
Respondent: Moorlehem

Counsel

For Applicant: Stephen J. MacDonald
For Respondent: Victor T. Bulger

Judge/s

Then: Michael G. Quigley J.

Quick Facts

"The solicitor, Moorlehem, represented Meagan Warnica in a tort claim she brought after she
was injured in a motor vehicle accident.... Meagan's claims and those of another passenger in
the vehicle were settled when the matter was mediated before trial, but there was only a
limited amount of insurance funds available to compensate both Meagan and the other
passenger of the vehicle because the City of Mississauga, who was allegedly at fault, would
not admit any liability without going to trial. A decision was made not to pursue the City for
damages for its alleged liability, given the costs risks associated with pursuing them alone.
The Warnicas decided to settle the case." APPLICATION by plaintiffs to refer account
rendered by their counsel [Moorlehem] for assessment.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, ss.8, 10, 11, 15, 28, 28.1; Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, ss.3,
5(1)

Contingency Fee
Agreement

30% CFA "... 30% of the settlement amount as the percentage based compensation that had
been agreed at the outset when he was retained."
Settlement: "Under [the] mediated settlement the two injured passengers had to share the
available [$1M] insurance limit. After costs, disbursements and the addition of a de minimis
without liability contribution by the City, Meagan Warnica's action was settled for the allinclusive amount of [$570k]"

Issue/s with
Agreement

Are the solicitor’s fees fair and reasonable given that…"It is obvious that the amount of fees
charged, along with disbursements and taxes, represent 37% of the entire amount that was
awarded to the applicant by way of settlement." "... Warnica and her family expected to
achieve greater success, were continually assured by the solicitor... that they had a very strong
case, and yet the amount of the award received was plainly inadequate to fully compensate the
applicant for the injuries she sustained and the damages that resulted."

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
"Fees and disbursements of in excess of $200,000 is handsome payment for pretrial work
where there is so little evidence of what was done. In my view, the solicitor needs to be at
least able to demonstrate what it is that he actually did to earn the 30% contingency fee he
claims. He has not done that. The appropriate mechanism to permit that to happen, and also to
ensure that he is paid a fair fee for the service he provided… is not to declare the agreements
void or unenforceable. Rather, it is to refer the matter for assessment to ensure that the fee [is]
commensurate to the service provided, and relative to the recovery achieved on behalf of the
client." “…[there are] special circumstances that justify the referral of the solicitor's account
for assessment... given the solicitor's failure to comply with either the contingency fee
requirements of the Solicitors Act or the court approval requirements of Rule 7 for persons
under disability, his possibly unjustified apparent elevation of the clients' expectations, the
effort seemingly applied to the case, and the absence of detail in his own accounts that even
begins to permit one to assess whether the clients got money's worth or not."
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McAndrew (Litigation Guardian of) v. Roberts (2012 ONSC 4712)
2012 CarswellOnt 10143, 2012 ONSC 4712, 220 A.C.W.S. (3d) 519
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: August, 2012

Parties

Plaintiff: Heather McAndrew, a Minor, by her Litigation Guardian Jane McAndrew;
Defendant: Todd Roberts and TAC Mechanical Inc.

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: Mr. Michael D. Smitiuch
For Defendants: Ms Patti Shedden

Judge/s

Then: J.C. Wilkins J.

Quick Facts

"...the Plaintiff, Heather McAndrew, a 14 year old who was injured in a motor vehicle
accident, sustaining a fracture of the right femur and a non-displaced facial bone fracture,
which are described as "linear fractures in the anterior wall of the right maxillary sinus and in
the right orbit," with significant soft tissue swelling." MOTION for the approval of an infant
settlement and of counsel's fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: "There was a contingency fee agreement entered into by the litigation guardian [%
unavailable]."
Settlement: " The proposed settlement of the action is $85,000 including damages, interest,
contribution towards legal fees, HST on costs and contribution towards disbursements."

Issue/s with
Agreement

Are counsel’s fees fair and reasonable under the CFA, such that the agreement is
enforceable?

Outcome

Held: Motion denied. Referred to Office of the Children’s Lawyer
“The material filed is inadequate with respect to the issues required to be addressed on an
application to enforce a contingency agreement." BUT "Having regard to the deficiencies of
the material and the report of the assessments of the damages as well as the deficiencies in
respect of the material that support the request to enforce the contingency fee agreement, this
matter is referred to the Office of the Children's Lawyer to review and report on all issues,
including the settlement, the contingency fee agreement's compliance with the statute and all
of the issues of fairness and reasonableness as referred to by the Court of Appeal in Raphael,
supra, and to conduct such investigation as may be necessary to satisfy those questions"
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Meady v. Greyhound Canada Transportation Corp. (2012 ONSC 5568)
2013 CarswellOnt 14103, 2013 ONSC 5568, [2013] O.J. No. 4634, [2014] W.D.F.L. 188, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 322,
55 M.V.R. (6th) 120
Quick Facts

Police officers placed SD on bus after earlier incident in which SD exhibited anxiety and mild
paranoia. SD told driver AD that people on bus wanted to hurt him and suddenly grabbed
wheel of bus, forcing it across highway where it rolled into ditch. Plaintiffs, passengers who
suffered injuries in accident, brought action against, inter alia, police officers and bus
company, alleging negligence in placing SD on bus. Action was dismissed. Dispute arose as
to costs. Defendant police officers brought application for costs totalling $790,363.93 jointly
and severally on partial indemnity basis to date of offer to settle and on substantial indemnity
basis thereafter. Defendant bus company brought application for costs totalling $1.22 million
jointly and severally on substantial indemnity basis.

Summary

Only mention of CFA: "He references the decision in Danso-Coffey v. Ontario, [2009] O.J.
No. 1136 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 8, where Hackland J. notes:
[T]he question of what constitutes an appropriate hourly rate for any claim for costs is to be
determined by referring to the criteria in rule 57.01 and not by the terms of the retainer
between counsel and his or her client. This is subject to the proviso that costs must not be
awarded in excess of counsel's hourly rate in non-contingency fee situations."

Kamboj v. Sidhu (2013 ONSC 2478)
2013 CarswellOnt 5752, 2013 ONSC 2478, [2013] O.J. No. 2149, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1002
Quick Facts

Only one mention of CFA: "It appears that Mr. Voudouris met with the plaintiff in February
2011 at which time the plaintiff signed a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement (the "Retainer
Agreement"). The Retainer Agreement was dated February 28, 2011 and covered all potential
claims the plaintiff may have had with respect to the September 2008 accident, including the
claims made in this action. However, at no time after the Retainer Agreement was signed, did
Mr. Voudouris serve a notice of appointment of lawyer. As far as the court record was
concerned, the plaintiff continued to be self-represented."
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Melvin (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Correctional
Services) (2013 ONSC 5432)
2013 CarswellOnt 11868, 2013 ONSC 5432, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 353
Quick Facts

Plaintiff was assaulted while being held in custody in jail. Plaintiff suffered serious closed
head injury. Plaintiff commenced action against provincial Crown and jail for damages for
negligence. Plaintiff's guardian of property was appointed as his litigation guardian. Crown
and jail agreed to settle for $750,000 and this amount was accruing interest. Plaintiff did not
want his settlement to be structured. Plaintiff brought motion through litigation guardian for
order approving settlement and his solicitors' fees.

Summary

Not a case involving a CFA: "The PGT appears to regard the requested fees as being in the
nature of a contingency fee. I agree with the solicitors that this is not a contingency
arrangement but rather is a fee for service case, based on time expended." "In 2003, when Mr.
Courtis was initially retained, he told Mr. Melvin that the fees that would be charged at the
end of the case would be the amount received for party and party costs (now partial indemnity
costs) plus somewhere between 15% to 25% of the total amount received. This was not a
contingency fee arrangement but rather an estimate at the outset of the case of the legal costs
that Mr. Melvin could expect to pay."
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Traffic Law Advocate (E.E.) Professional Corp. v. Yang (2013 ONSC 2887)
2013 CarswellOnt 6872, 2013 ONSC 2887, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 857
Date

Heard: May 15, 2013
Judgment: May 22, 2013

Parties

Traffic Law Advocate (E.E.) Professional Corporation, (plaintiff), Respondent
Guo Yang, Defendant, Appellant

Counsel

Miguel Maruszki, for Plaintiff / Respondent
Guo Yang, for himself

Judge/s

Herman J.

Quick Facts

Appellant was client of respondent paralegal firm. Firm brought action against client for
unpaid fees. CFA between parties was found to be illegal, but firm was entitled to fees on
quantum meruit basis. Firm was found to be entitled to $772.06 in fees. Client claimed that
firm should not have been able to amend pleadings during trial, to plead quantum meruit.
Client also claimed that hourly fee rate determined by judge was improper. Client appealed
from judgment of Small Claims Court on above grounds.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

"By written Retainer signed on July 24, 2006, the defendant retained TLAI for paralegal
services to pursue a claim for Accident Benefits (the "Retainer") ... The Retainer was a
contingency arrangement providing for remuneration for TLAI for its services at the rate of
20% of the sum of all benefits and expenses obtained on behalf of the defendant, plus GST. It
also provided that in the event that the Retainer was terminated then, the remuneration for the
plaintiff was to be based on a specified hourly rate set out in the Retainer." (from Small
Claims Court decision)

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Whether or not the Deputy Judge erred in law when he allowed TLA to amend its pleading
to add the cause of action of quantum meruit at the particular stage in the proceeding; and
B. Whether or not the Deputy Judge applied the wrong hourly rate ($200/hr) when he
determined the amount Mr. Yang owed TLA (in a different case he had applied a $100/hr
rate)

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed.
Given the finding that the client had accepted the bulk of the charges, the amount awarded
under quantum meruit was not unreasonable. Client claims that his acceptance of charges was
due to belief in the legality of the CFA did not change fair and reasonable amount to be
awarded. Determination of reasonable compensation was case-specific, and was not based on
hourly rate as client claimed but rather on full examination of facts. Small Claims court judge
made no error in principle.
Followed: Housen v. Nikolaisen (2002), 10 C.C.L.T. (3d) 157, 211 DLR (4th) 577
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Jane Conte Professional Corp. v. Smith (2014 ONSC 6009)
2014 CarswellOnt 14894, 2014 ONSC 6009, [2014] O.J. No. 5033, 246 A.C.W.S. (3d) 706, 329 O.A.C. 96
Date

Heard: October 8, 2014
Judgment: October 15, 2014

Parties

Josephine Smith (defendant), Appellant
Jane Conte Professional Corporation (plaintiff), Respondent

Counsel

B. Weintraub, for Appellant
A. Andreopoulos, for Respondent

Judge/s

Nordheimer J.

Quick Facts

In November 2009, defendant retained plaintiff law firm to assist in a personal injury claim
arising out of motor vehicle accident. Defendant signed
contingency fee retainer agreement prepared by plaintiff. Defendant later terminated
plaintiff’s services, and plaintiff firm submitted a final account amount to defendant. On
March 7, 2014, plaintiff commenced action in small claims court for amount of fees. On April
29, 2014, defendant brought motion to strike out and dismiss plaintiff's claim. Defendant's
motion was dismissed by deputy judge without reasons. Defendant appealed

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 3, 4, 16(2), 23, 24, 28, 29

Contingency Fee
Agreement &
Settlement
Breakdown

The appellant signed a Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement prepared by the respondent. The
Agreement provided that: (para 3)
 respondent would be paid 30% of the amount of the appellant’s recovery, together
with any costs awarded to the appellant
 if appellant terminates the respondent’s services, the appellant would have to pay for
the services provided up to that point based on the respondent’s hourly rates
Appellant terminated the respondent’s services and respondent issued a “final” statement of
account for $17,095.63. After some discussion with the appellant’s new counsel regarding the
amount of the account, the respondent delivered a new “final” account of $26,051.59 for their
services up until the point of termination.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Can CFA’s contain non-contingent components? I.e. Whether or not the CFA ceased to be
a CFA because it contained a provision providing for the application of hourly rates in
determining the client’s fee, where services are terminated. (paras 21, 22)
Jurisdiction: Whether or not Small Claims Court had jurisdiction to consider a claim made
by a lawyer based on a written fee agreement, including a CFA in particular
Was the CFA enforceable given the costs provision and failure to seek judicial approval?
Section 28.1(8) states that a contingency fee agreement that provides for the lawyer to receive
costs awards must be approved by the court and only under "exceptional circumstances".
Further, s. 28.1(9) expressly provides that a CFA, that contains such a provision regarding
costs, is unenforceable unless it has been approved by the court (the whole CFA, not just the
costs provision).

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed. Order of Deputy Judge set-aside and order granted dismissing the
proceeding in Small Claims Court.
S. 28.1(2) of the Solicitors Act states that CFA may extend “in whole or in part” to the
remuneration paid to the solicitor. Therefore, CFA’s may contain non-contingent components
of the fee arrangement.
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Small claims court had no jurisdiction to consider claim made by lawyer based on written
fee agreement, including contingency fee agreement. Pursuant to the Solicitors
Act, agreement between lawyer and client respecting amount and manner of payment was to
be determined by court in which legal work was done and, if work was not done in any court,
by Superior Court of Justice. In addition, the CFA had not been approved by court and was
prima facie unenforceable for its inclusion of the costs provision [per s. 28.1(8) and (9)].

Chen v. Singer, Kwinter LLP (2013 ONSC 6712)
2013 CarswellOnt 15023, 2013 ONSC 6712, 234 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1060
Date

Note: this is not really a fee approval case, but the court does uphold a CFA
Judgement: October, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Wei Chen
Defendant: Singer, Kwinter LLP

Counsel

For Plaintiff: for himself
For Defendant: Veronica Marson

Judge/s

Then: Frank J.

Quick Facts

"Mr. Chen was injured in a car accident in 2001. He retained Singer, Kwinter ... to act on his
behalf in prosecuting the personal injury action arising out of that accident. Singer, Kwinter
was the fifth law firm to go on record for Mr. Chen in that action." These are
APPLICATIONS arising out of Wei Chen's assessment of Singer, Kwinter LLP's
account for legal fees in a personal injury action settled on November 30, 2010. Mr. Chen
challenges the Report and Certificate of the Assessment Officer [assessed Singer, Kwinter's
account in the amount of $110,000] and Singer, Kwinter seeks confirmation of that Report
and Certificate.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, s.3

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: no physical copy of the agreement could be produced; “A focus of
Mr. Chen's impassioned submissions on this appeal was his denial of having entered into the
contingency fee arrangement that Singer, Kwinter maintains was entered into on March 5,
2010.”
Settlement: "Mr. Chen signed instructions directing Singer, Kwinter to settle this action for
$340k net of fees, disbursements and taxes totaling $110k. The fee component was $62k."

Issue/s with
Agreement

Should the alleged CFA factor into the determination of fair and reasonable fees, contra the
assessment officer’s finding?

Outcome

Held: Mr. Chen's application is dismissed; SK’s application granted.
“there is no basis on which this court can interfere with the assessment of the assessment
officer.”
On CFA: “…whether the terms of the March 5, 2010 retainer agreement, which provided for a
percentage payment to Singer, Kwinter, prevailed is irrelevant to the quantification of the
fees. The assessment officer did not rely on the retainer agreement. Instead, he
assessed Singer, Kwinter's account on the basis of quantum meruit.”
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Rops (Litigation guardian of) v. Intact Insurance Co. (2013 ONSC 7366)
2013 CarswellOnt 18789, 2013 ONSC 7366, 239 A.C.W.S. (3d) 348
Date

Heard: N/A
Judgement: December, 2013

Parties

Applicant: Rops, by his litigation Guardian Micheal Rops
Respondent: Intact Insurance Company

Counsel

For Applicant: B. Legate, K. Finley
For Defendant: No one

Judge/s

Then: L.C. Leitch J.

Quick Facts

"Aaron was injured when he was aged 11 in an all-terrain vehicle crash. He suffered what are
described as significant injuries that required three surgeries. The materials state that after
diligently pursuing rehabilitation, he continues to suffer from a limp, scarring, numbness in
his left thigh, pain, loss of mobility, instability, fatigue and loss of stamina." An
APPLICATION was filed on behalf of the plaintiff for an order approving the Contingency
Fee Retainer Agreement between Legate & Associates, LLP and Michael Rops… [et al.]

Statute & Rules
Considered

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, s.5(1)

Contingency Fee
Agreement

CFA: "...contemplates a base contingency of 30% and "increases according to the stage of the
litigation to reflect the greater risk and vastly increased costs going forward to trial", capping
at 40% if the claim settles any time after the pretrial."
Settlement: "Ultimately, the accident benefits claim was settled and the respondent insurer
will pay $14,500 to resolve the infant plaintiff's accident benefits claim."

Issue/s with
Agreement

Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable and in accordance with the SA?

Outcome

Held: Application dismissed.
"I note that in Henricks-Hunter at para. 21, the Court of Appeal commented that in that case it
was apparent that the contingency fee agreement in issue was fair when it was negotiated, and
it was noted "in particular, that when it was negotiated there was considerable uncertainty as
to the likely success of the claim and the extent of the investment that would be required of
the solicitors to bring the action to a favourable conclusion". It seems to me that similar
commentary cannot be made in relation to the accident benefits claim. Therefore, again, I am
not prepared to approve the Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement on this application."
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Soullière (Litigation Guardian of) v. Robitaille Estate (2014 ONSC 851)
2014 CarswellOnt 1505, 2014 ONSC 851, [2014] O.J. No. 639, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 795
Date

Judgment: February 5, 2014

Parties

Christopher Soullière by his Litigation Guardian Martin Soullière, Marcelle Robitaille, Rene
Soullière, and Elizabeth Soullière, Chantal Lefebvre, Plaintiffs
The Estate of Isabelle Robitaille and Guy Laberge, East Hawkesbury Township and The
Corporation of the United Counties of Prescott and Russell, Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of Ontario, Defendants

Counsel

Derek Nicholson, for Plaintiffs
Mark Charron, for Defendant, Corporation of the County of the United Counties of Prescott
and Russell

Judge/s

Toscano Roccamo J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff C became disabled after he was catastrophically injured in car accident. Lump sum
accident benefit of $208,551.00 was used to purchase and renovate home for C. In settlement
of tort action, $9 million would be paid to plaintiffs who would also keep $970,266, which
was their pro rata share of amounts paid into court by insurer of driver of vehicle in which C
was passenger. Settlement was based on notional discount of 50% of estimated value of
plaintiffs' claims given liability and litigation risks inherent in action. Counsel for plaintiffs
brought motion for approval of contingency fees in amount of $2,398,849.15 plus applicable
taxes (representing 15% of accident benefits and 25% of tort settlement, less $500,000
attributed to costs). In addition, counsel has sought an order for the payment of
disbursements, plus applicable taxes in the amount of $1,144.12, on top of the earlier order
(dated January 15, 2014) for the payment of $187,558.22 for disbursements incurred in these
proceedings.
Counsel spent an estimated 1,446.7 hours on the file to the date of this motion, for a value of
$407,336.55 before taxes. The contingency fees, therefore, result in a payment of
approximately $1,991,512.60 over and above the value of the docketed fees, after taxes are
considered. (para 8)

Statute/Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 28.1 [en. 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, s. 4]
Motion under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

Contingency Fee
Agreement

Christopher's litigation guardian, Martin Soullière, entered into a CFA on March 26, 2009.
The agreement provided for:
 30% contingency fee for the tort action
 15% contingency fee for the settlement of accident benefits.
In order to facilitate settlement, counsel agreed to adjust % in the tort claim to 25%, but
maintains that 15% would apply to the SAB settlement. Counsel also sought payment for
disbursements (see ‘Quick Facts’).

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not to approve counsel’s fees in accordance with the CFA? I.e. was the CFA
either unfair or unreasonable (per test and factors to consider in Raphael Partners v Lam)?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
Christopher's needs for attendant care and medical and rehabilitation expenses would be
adequate to give effect to the essential services he needs, after payment of the contingency
fees sought by counsel, and after deducting amounts for disbursements and trial expenses
addressed by my order of January 15, 2014. (para 15) While the contingency fees sought
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amount to over five times the time expended by counsel plus disbursements and taxes, this
alone would not render the fees unreasonable in the appropriate case (para 27) In this case,
there is little doubt that consideration of the other Raphael factors favours payment of the
fees sought by counsel. (para 28) The results in this case were undoubtedly enhanced by
counsel's willingness to prepare for and pursue a costly trial to its mid-point, with all its
attendant risks on liability. (para 29) I have little doubt that, absent counsel's willingness to
accept the risks, the social objective of providing access to justice for injured children and
parties under disability of limited financial means would not have been met. (para 32)
Followed: Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario Inc. (2012 ONCA
496); Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.)

Baines v. Linett & Timmis Barristers & Solicitors (2014 ONSC 2348)
2014 CarswellOnt 4769, 2014 ONSC 2348, 239 A.C.W.S. (3d) 784, 33 C.C.L.I. (5th) 128
Date

Heard: March 27, 2014
Judgment: April 14, 2014*

Parties

Eleanor Denise Baines, Plaintiff
Linett & Timmis Barristers & Solicitors, Defendant

Counsel

Eleanor Denise Baines, Plaintiff, for herself
Bruce Hutchinson, for Defendant

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Client retained law firm in 2000 to represent her in personal injury proceedings. In 2008,
client fired law firm after unsuccessful mediation. Self-represented client took action to trial
and was unsuccessful. Client blamed law firm for poor result at trial and sued law firm for
negligence, seeking damages and return of legal fees. Law firm brought motion for summary
judgment, seeking dismissal of action

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 20, 20.04, 20.04(2)(a), 20.04(2.1) and
(2.2).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA – no information as to what the alleged contingency fee agreement provided for.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Plaintiff, Ms. Baines claims that she understood that retainer was a CFA. Linett & Timmis
denies this understanding and a CFA is not confirmed by the written retainer agreement.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Action dismissed.
On CFA issue: “It […] is not necessary to decide the issue about the nature of the retainer,
because ultimately the summary judgment motion will turn on whether Ms. Baines can prove
damages.” (para 10)
Followed: Aguonie v. Galion Solid Waste Material Inc. (1998 – Ont CA); Combined Air
Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch (2014 SCC 7)
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St. Jean v. Armstrong (2015 ONSC 13)
2015 CarswellOnt 199, 2015 ONSC 13, [2015] O.J. No. 131, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 313
Date

Heard: December 18, 2014
Judgment: January 14, 2015

Parties

Cindy St. Jean, Claude Pothier and Adam Pothier, a minor by his Litigation Guardian Claude
Pothier, Plaintiffs
Richard Armstrong, Co-op Taxi and Marcel Desjardins, Defendants

Counsel

Erin Cullin, Lindsay McNicholl, for Plaintiffs
No one for Defendants

Judge/s

Robert G.S. Del Frate J.

Quick Facts

Minor plaintiff, when riding bicycle, was involved in collision with defendant's vehicle.
Plaintiffs retained law firm to bring action against defendants. Parties entered into settlement
agreement with defendants. Plaintiffs brought motion for approval of agreement and costs,
and for sealing order on the basis of solicitor-client privilege.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Motion pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 7.08.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFAs signed by Pothier on August 1, 2006 and January 30, 2014, which provide:
 1/3 of damages awarded in the accident benefits (AB) claim
 latter agreement expands the original agreement by explaining that the fees on the
tort action and the AB claim would be subject to the one-third amount.
 if retainer terminated, then client liable for "reasonable legal fees" will be calculated
based upon the number of hours or work performed for the Client as a percentage of
the total work required to complete the file + disbursements
This results in fees of $466,000, HST of $37,280 and disbursements of $84,510 for a total of
$587,790.
“It appears somewhat unusual that the CFA would be executed in excess of two years after
the firm was retained and that an additional CFA would be asked to be signed after both
claims had been resolved.” (para 44)

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Whether or not to approve counsel’s fees in accordance with the CFA? I.e. was the CFA
either unfair or unreasonable (per test and factors to consider in Raphael Partners v Lam)?
B. Would disclosure of CFA infringe on S-C privilege?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted in part.
“In my view, knowing that the accident benefits had been lumped out without the usual steps
in litigation and that there was no financial risk to the firm, a fee of one-third of the lumped
out sum is not fair or reasonable (for the AB claim) […] However, on the tort action, in spite
of the delay in signing the CFA as stated previously, with or without the CFA, the one-third
being requested by the law firm is reasonable.” (paras 46, 47) “Accordingly, fees for the AB
claim will be fixed at $170,000, inclusive of HST, and fees for the tort action will be fixed at
$183,333, inclusive of HST, for a total of $353,333 [and] Disbursements are fixed at
$84,510, inclusive of HST.” (paras 52, 53)
As regards the second element of the motion, request for sealing ordered denied. There was
no evidence establishing that disclosure would infringe on solicitor-client privilege. Facts of
this case were not unusual. Infringement of privilege regarding CFA was minimal, if at all.
All other information about accident and plaintiff's treatment would be public information in
92

view of pleadings already filed. There was nothing extraordinary to justify such order.
Followed: Adler (Litigation Guardian of) v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
(92 OR (3d) 266 (Ont SCJ); Henricks-Hunter (Litigation Guardian of) v. 814888 Ontario
Inc. (2012 ONCA 496); Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.);
Symington (Litigation guardian of) v. Adam (March 7, 2008), Doc. 05-0080, 0186-0 (Ont.
S.C.J.)
Additional
Reasons given in
St. Jean v
Armstrong
(2015 ONSC
1049)

Parties made submissions regarding costs. Issue of costs was already adjudicated and slip
rule under R. 59.06(1) CFA did not apply. CFA award was appropriate in tort action and
provided that HST would be over and above any award for costs. Trial judge exercised
discretion and included HST in assessment of costs.
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Erickson & Partners v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care)
(2014 ONSC 4339)
– see ONCA decision below
2014 CarswellOnt 10770, 2014 ONSC 4339, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1019, 38 C.C.L.I. (5th) 83
Date
Parties

Counsel
Judge/s

Heard: April 1, 2014
Judgment: July 21, 2014
Erickson & Partners, Applicant
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care),
Respondent
Brian Babcock, for Applicant
Rita V. Bambers, Sonal Gandhi, for Respondent
J. deP. Wright J.

Quick Facts

Applicant solicitors were retained to represent plaintiffs in two actions for damages for
personal injuries pursuant to CFAs. By operation of s. 39 of reg. 522 under Health
Insurance Act, solicitors also represented respondent provincial government, Ministry of
Health and Long Term Care or Ontario Health Insurance Plan, in subrogated claims for
amounts paid under Plan. Legislation provided that, in return, whether litigation successful or
not, Plan required to pay proportion of taxable costs. Solicitors and Plan disagreed on how
Plan's obligation to pay costs should be calculated. Solicitors applied for declaration
that CFAs complied with s. 28.1 of Solicitors Act and for directions concerning proper
interpretation of s. 39 of reg. 522.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s 61.
Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 1 “insured person”, 30, 30(1).
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 28(1), (6), (8), (11).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFAs provided for:
 fee of 25% of damages recovered by judgment or settlement
 + % of damages equal to amount awarded as costs
 + amount awarded as disbursements
 + any disbursements not recovered
 + HST on all of the above

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. The enforceability of their CFAs with the injured plaintiffs, i.e. Does the CFA comply
with the Solicitors Act and Regulation? and…
B. The proper manner of dividing, between the injured party and the Plan, responsibility for
payment under those agreements.

Outcome

Held: Contingency found not to be enforceable.
A. No. By including recovery for percentage of costs awarded, without court approval and
without including certain compulsory statements, CFAs failed to comply with s. 28 and ss.
2(5) and 3(3)(i) of the Regulation 195/04.
B In determining plan's obligation to pay proportion of taxable costs, taxable amount of
solicitors' fees should be ascertained by agreement of all parties, including plan, or
assessment, full breakdown given at para 61.
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Erickson & Partners v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care)
(2015 ONCA 285)
– see ONSC decision above
2015 CarswellOnt 6169, 2015 ONCA 285, 125 O.R. (3d) 762, 253 A.C.W.S. (3d) 196, 334 O.A.C. 74, 49 C.C.L.I.
(5th) 187
Date
Parties

Counsel

Heard: April 1, 2015
Judgment: April 27, 2015
Erickson & Partners (applicant), Appellant
Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care),
Respondent
Brian A. Babcock, for Appellant
Rita V. Bambers, Sonal Gandhi, for Respondent

Judge/s

K. Feldman, M.L. Benotto, David Brown JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Applicant solicitors were retained to represent plaintiffs in two actions for damages for
personal injuries pursuant to CFAs. By operation of s. 39 of reg. 522 under Health Insurance
Act (ON), solicitors also represented respondent provincial government, Ministry of Health
and Long Term Care or Ontario Health Insurance Plan, in subrogated claims for amounts
paid under Plan. Legislation provided that, in return, whether litigation successful or not,
Plan required to pay proportion of taxable costs. Solicitors and plan disagreed on how plan's
obligation to pay costs should be calculated. Solicitors' application for declaration
that CFAs complied with s. 28.1 of Solicitors Act and for directions concerning proper
interpretation of s. 39 of reg. 522 resulted in finding that contingency was not enforceable…
Trial judge found that by including recovery for % of costs awarded, without court approval
and without including certain compulsory statements, CFA failed to comply with s. 28.1.
Trial judge also found that:
 in determining plan's obligation to pay proportion of taxable costs, taxable amount of
solicitors' fees should be ascertained by agreement of all parties, including Plan, or
assessment.
 amount of recovered costs attributable to Plan should be ascertained by multiplying
Plan's share of damages and interest by amount of costs recovered and divided by
amount of damages and interest personally recovered by insured.
 amount of recovery made on behalf of Plan was sum of Plan's share of damages and
Plan's share of costs receivable.
 Plan's share of taxable costs could then be determined by multiplying amount of
recovery made on behalf of Plan by amount of taxable costs divided by total amount
recovered.
Law firm appealed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, ss 11(1), 30, 30(1), 31, 31(1), 33
Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 552, ss 39(6) and (7)

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA between appellant solicitors and plaintiffs in original claims provided for fee of 25% of
damages recovered by judgment or settlement + % of damages equal to amount awarded as
costs + amount awarded as disbursements + any disbursements not recovered + HST

Issue/s with
Agreement

This appeal concerned the proper calculation of the Plan's portion of costs in the scenario
where the insured person makes a recovery in the action, through the interpretation of s.
39(6) of the Health Insurance Act regulation.
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Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed. Respondent awarded costs in the amount of $7,500.
Where an insured person makes a recovery, the amount of costs obtained by judgment or
settlement should be deducted from the total costs of the insured person's lawyer, and the
Plan's proportionate share of the taxable costs otherwise payable by the insured person
should be calculated as follows:
Costs x

recovery made on behalf of the Plan (Plan's damages + pre-judgment
interest) total recovery of the insured person (including Plan's damages + all
pre-judgment interest) (para 33)

Followed: Mason (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario (Ministry of Community & Social
Services) (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 604
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Davis v. Cox-Kikkajoon (2015 ONSC 1946)
2015 CarswellOnt 4294, 2015 ONSC 1946, 251 A.C.W.S. (3d) 690
Date

Heard: March 19, 2015
Judgment: March 25, 2015

Parties

Jerome Davis, Applicant
Heikki Cox-Kikkajoon and Boland Howe LLP, Respondents

Counsel

Applicant, for himself
Heikki Cox-Kikkajoon, for Respondents

Judge/s

R.D. Gordon R.S.J.

Quick Facts

Client hired number of different law firms to represent him in relation to injuries he sustained
when struck by motor vehicle. Client entered into CFA retainer with latest law firm (Boland
Howe LLP). Tort claim was settled. Law firm sent its account and cheque to claimant for
balance of settlement funds. Client brought motion: 1) for determination of validity of CFA;
2) order compelling law firm to produce full and detailed disclosure of all disbursements of
settlement funds; 3) order compelling full disclosure of all documentation relating to motor
vehicle accident by insurer; 4) and order to determine if threshold was met with respect to
injuries suffered by client in accident law firm brought cross-motion to have client declared
vexatious litigant

Statute/Rules
Considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 140
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 24
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 5, 6.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Details of CFA not provided

Issue/s with
Agreement

Sole issue with CFA: Is the CFA “fair and reasonable” given that it did not include the
required statement that Mr. David retained the right to make all critical decisions regarding
the conduct of the matter?

Outcome

Held: Both motions dismissed.
“If I were to accept that Mr. Davis was unaware of his ability to make critical decisions
regarding the litigation, I would agree that the failure to include the required provision in the
CFA would be fatal to it. However, the evidence before me is quite clear that Mr. Davis was
fully aware of his right to control this litigation and his retainer with Boland Howe LLP.”
(para 21) Issue of the reasonableness of the CFA fees remitted back to assessment officer.
Followed: Lukezic v. Royal Bank (2012 – Ont CA)

97

Umbach (Litigation guardian of) v. Wilmot (Township) (2014 ONSC 2995)
2014 CarswellOnt 6331, 2014 ONSC 2995, 240 A.C.W.S. (3d) 838, 60 C.P.C. (7th) 188
Date

Judgment: May 14, 2014

Parties

Timothy Andrew Umbach, by his Litigation Guardian, Lynda Umbach, Dale Umbach and
Lynda Umbach, Plaintiffs
The Corporation of the Township of Wilmot, Defendant

Counsel

Charles E. Gluckstein, for Plaintiffs
James H. Bennett, for Defendant

Judge/s

C. Stephen Glithero J.

Quick Facts

On September 23, 2008, at the age of 17, plaintiff injured driver lost control of his vehicle
while negotiating curve on gravel road in defendant township, resulting in severe brain injury
and death of his passenger. Injured driver, though his litigation guardian, and his parents
brought action for damages for personal injuries. After mediation, parties agreed to settle for
$1.5 million comprising damages of $1.25 million, interest of $161,500 and disbursements of
$88,500. Pursuant to CFA, injured driver's counsel was to receive 33 per cent of settlement for
fees, being $466,125, although counsel agreed to forego HST, resulting in total fees of
$412,500. During hearing, counsel agreed to further reduce his fees to 25 per cent of
settlement, being $312,500 plus $40,625 HST. Injured driver and parents brought motion for
approval of settlement

Statute/Rules
Considered

Motion under Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R. 7.08

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

The amount claimed in motion material was 33% of the $1,250,000 damages for the tort claim
equalling $412,500. The HST on that amount was waived by counsel, representing a saving to
the plaintiff in the amount of $53,625. In submissions, Mr. Gluckstein (counsel) indicated he
would be prepared to reduce fees to 25% + HST, this option would afford the plaintiff further
savings from the first option (33% - HST) of $59,375. (see ‘Quick Facts’)
CFA was not court approved and thus was not binding on Glithero J. in his decision.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not the proposed legal fees ought to be approved as claimed on a contingency fee
basis?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“These plaintiffs would not have had access to litigation were it not for the [CFA]. Similarly
the cost of disbursements would have been crippling, and likely impossible if the matter
extended through a trial. The social objective of providing access to justice was enhanced here
by counsel's willingness to do the case on a contingency fee basis with its inherent risks […]
the claim for fees as modified during the hearing before me is fair and reasonable” (para 40,
41)
Followed: Aywas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Kirwan (2010 ONSC 2278); Lau (Litigation
Guardian of) v. Bloomfield (2007) (Ont SCJ)
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Zhau (Litigation guardian of) v. 2100950 Ontario Inc. – additional reasons
to judgement in (2015 ONSC 785)
2015 CarswellOnt 2331, 2015 ONSC 1093, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 703
Date

Judgment: February 18, 2015

Parties

Brian Zhau, a minor by his litigation guardian, Anthony Ngai, and Wendy Tan, Plaintiffs
2100950 Ontario Inc., operating as Congee Queen, Cho Design Inc., Lonna Wai-Fong Cho,
Joe Cho, Tran Dieu and Associates Inc., ISI Contracting Limited, Defendants

Counsel

P. Michael Rotondo, for Plaintiffs
Ramon V. Andal, for Defendant, Congee Queen

Judge/s

Spies J.

Quick Facts

Minor plaintiff suffered injury to wrist and hand at restaurant operated by defendant when he
pushed open door that led to washroom and window in frame of door fell onto him.
Defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $225,000, all-inclusive and plaintiffs brought motion for
court approval of settlement. Motion was granted. Structured settlement was ordered in
amount of $110,000. Minor plaintiff was to be provided with annual payments of $15,000
once he turned 18, payable for four years and lump sum of remaining amount was to be paid
out at age 25. CFA was not provided at that time, and court determined it was not in position
to determine what amount should be approved for legal fees and disbursements of law firm.
Lawyer provided supplementary affidavit. This was an application to deal with outstanding
legal fees and disbursements.

Statute/Rules
Considered
Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Issue/s with
Agreement
Outcome

NA
CFA signed by Mr. Ngai and dated March 26, 2010. Allegedly the same as the CFA signed by
Wendy Tan at the start of the action, but that agreement could not be found. CFA provides:
30% of any settlement or recovery for its fees
 + GST
 + costs and expenses (disbursements)
The CFA was not relied upon to support the firm’s claim for fees. Fees claimed based on
hourly rates provided in the CFA, which states that if services of firm are terminated, they are
to be paid $250/hour for lawyers and $85/hour for law clerks. This provision in CFA does not
formally apply but goes to the expectations of the clients. In total, the firm has asked for
$58,268.83 in fees plus HST.
NA
Held: Settlement approved.
“I am satisfied that the time spent by Mr. Rotondo and his law clerks and paralegals was
reasonable and that it is justified. Assuming his hourly rate of $250 and $85 for his law clerks,
which rates I find to be reasonable, the time spent justifies the fees claimed and does not
include a premium. Accordingly, I approve of the fees plus HST as requested.” (para 10)

99

Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP v. Chen (2015 ONSC 2501)
2015 CarswellOnt 5700, 2015 ONSC 2501, 253 A.C.W.S. (3d) 94
Date

Heard: April 18, 2015
Judgment: April 21, 2015

Parties

Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP and Singer Kwinter, Applicants
Wei Chen, Respondent

Counsel

David Levy, for Applicant, Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP
Alfred Kwinter, Veronica Marson, for Applicant, Singer Kwinter
No one for Wei Chen

Judge/s

G. Dow J.

Quick Facts

Applicant law firm Howie, Sacks & Henry LLP (H) represented respondent in claim for
accident benefits following motor vehicle accident. In 2007, action was settled on
respondent's instructions. In 2012, respondent filed unsuccessful complaint against H with
provincial law society about quality of service he received. Respondent also commenced
action against H to assess accounts for tort claim. That matter was adjourned and respondent
appealed adjournment. Respondent switched counsel again and retained applicant law firm
Singer Kwinter to represent him in tort action arising out of motor vehicle accident pursuant
to CFA. Tort action was settled on respondent's instructions in November 2011 at pre-trial
conference. Despite fact that Alfred Kwinter had reduced amount of fees owing under CFA,
respondent sought assessment of their account. Assessment officer allowed entirety of
Kwinter account. Respondent opposed confirmation of certificate of assessment and brought
motion. Motion was dismissed as was respondent's attempts to appeal. Respondent also
brought two actions against Kwinter for solicitor's negligence in relation to tort action. Both
actions were dismissed although respondent had filed for leave to appeal dismissal of one
action. Applicants requested order declaring respondent to be vexatious litigant.

Statute/Rules
Considered
Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 140.
As part of achieving a settlement satisfactory to Wei Chen, Alfred Kwinter agreed to reduce
his fees from that available through the CFA (which would have been about $141,000) to
$70,000 + $40,000 for disbursements (of which $25,534.53 was being paid to the previous
firm that had acted for Wei Chen, McLeish Orlando LLP – that firm had agreed to waive any
claim for legal fees).

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – decision focussed on respondent’s vexatious behaviour and not the CFAs at play.

Outcome

Held: Application granted. Chen ordered to pay costs in the amount of $1,500 to Applicants.
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Russo (Litigation guardian of) v. Seligman (2015 ONSC 3019)
2015 CarswellOnt 7770, 2015 ONSC 3019, 254 A.C.W.S. (3d) 552
Date

Judgment: May 12, 2015

Parties

Benito Russo, by his Litigation Guardian, Frank Russo, Plaintiff/Moving Party
Dr. James Seligman, Defendant

Counsel

Joel McCoy, for Plaintiff

Judge/s

Molloy J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff retained counsel in relation to malpractice claim arising from surgery on his shoulder
in 2004, when he was 74 years old. Statement of claim was issued in 2008. Plaintiff's son was
appointed as litigation guardian in 2012, as plaintiff then suffered from dementia. Matter was
settled for $52,500 all inclusive, of which $1,800 was to go to Ministry of Health for its
subrogated claim. Plaintiff had entered into CFA with solicitors, Bermanis Preya, at the time
he first retained the firm, and was later billed $22,950 for legal services. After payment of
OHIP claim, plaintiff was to receive $27,500. Litigation guardian approved counsel fees and
brought motion for approval of settlement

Statute/Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15 (generally)

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

The retainer CFA is dated on the 15th day of “an illegible month” in 2007. It provides that the
fee will include:
 the amount of party and party costs contributed by the defendant
 disbursements
 and that fees which will not exceed 30% of the gross amount received for damages
and interest, over and above party and party costs.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Including $7,000 toward party costs (which the judge is sceptical of) the amount of the fees
charged exceeds 30% of the gross settlement proceeds, thereby violating the retainer CFA,
that is unless the $7000 figure is deducted from the settlement amount.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“I have serious concerns that the contingency fee agreement in this case is not compliant with
the legislation, and may be invalid.” (para 13)
Further, the proposed settlement involved payment of money to plaintiff who was said to be
mentally incapable, with no provision for how money was to be used and who would have
control over it. Settlement was approved and defence counsel could obtain order dismissing
action after payment of settlement funds into court to credit of action, less $1,800 to be paid
directly to OHIP for its subrogated claim, for total of $50,700. Given concern that best
interests of incapable plaintiff might not be protected, copy of endorsement was directed to be
sent to Public Guardian and Trustee and to Law Society of Upper Canada. Counsel for
plaintiff was directed to obtain appointment for motion for directions on notice to Public
Guardian and Trustee.
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Romero v. Turnbull (2015 ONSC 3638)
2015 CarswellOnt 12707, 2015 ONSC 3638, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 470, 74 C.P.C. (7th) 389
Date

Heard: May 26, 2015
Judgment: June 4, 2015

Parties

Custodio Moreno Romero, Plaintiff
Max Turnbull, Defendant

Counsel

K. Arvai, for Plaintiff / Moving Party
S. Li, for Responding Party, Patey Law Group

Judge/s

B.W. Miller J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff retained defendant solicitor (Patey Law Group) to represent him in action for
damages arising from motor vehicle accident (on August 29, 2010) and signed CFA.
Following breakdown in solicitor-client relationship, defendant requested Mr. Romeo to
obtain new counsel and dismissed Romero as a client in January 2015. Plaintiff agreed to pay
defendant's fees and disbursements, subject to assessment, out of any settlement or litigation
proceeds from action. Defendant asserted solicitor's lien for payment of fees and
disbursements incurred on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff brought motion for order requiring
defendant, his former solicitor, to deliver his files to his new solicitor (Karl Arvai Professional
Corporation).
Patey is content with Arvai's undertaking with respect to fees, but takes the position that either
Mr. Romero or Arvai should pay the disbursements incurred by Patey to date, in the amount
of $4,358.56, as well as a $300 file duplication charge.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 15.03(4) and (5).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA executed on February 18, 2011, which includes provisions that state the following:
 in the event of termination of services, “ I agree to your hourly fees for all work
conducted on my matter, plus disbursements, plus H.S.T. on all services performed up
to the date of termination of your services”
 Patey reserves the right to charge full hourly rate in the event that client wishes to
continue litigation against their recommendation, and/or where the client has
misrepresented their claim, and/or where the client withdraws their claim at any point
prior to settlement, and/or the client becomes noncompliant with reasonable requests
 “I agree to pay to you your proper processing fees and disbursement plus H.S.T. on
all services performed and to pay an interest penalty of 2% per month/ 24% per
annum on all overdue accounts.”
 “I acknowledge having read and received a copy of this retainer and that I am liable
for payment of your fees and disbursements incurred in this matter.”
“Arvai has advised that although it is willing to fund Mr. Romero's disbursements going
forward, it is not prepared to pay the disbursements incurred to date, and will not take on Mr.
Romero as a client if it is required to do so.” (para 9)

Issue/s with
Agreement

Does the former solicitor (Patey) have the right to withhold sending their former client’s files to
new counsel until they are paid?
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Outcome

Held: Motion granted with costs payable to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000 inclusive of
disbursements and HST. Patey must deliver files to Arvai within 30 days and Arvai is to pay
reasonable copying fees to Patey in the amount of $300.
As regards the CFA, there is nothing in the agreement that requires payment of disbursements
on an on-going basis, or on demand. Further, CFA does not address termination by Patey,
only by the client, and does not speak at all to when payment is due in the event of client’s
termination. “On reading the Retainer Agreement it would be reasonable for Mr. Romero to
believe, as he evidently did, that changing lawyers (at the instance of either party) would not
generate an account that would be immediately payable.” (para 20)

Additional
Reasons given in
(2015 ONSC
5159)

Romero v. Turnbull (2015 ONSC 5159) – additional reasons to the above
Subsequent to earlier reasons, Arvai wrote to Miller J bringing to his attention – “quite
rightly” - that Miller J had not had the benefit of his submissions on costs and had not taken
into account an offer to settle that the plaintiff had made.
Held: “Taking the plaintiff's offer into account, in conjunction with the factors enumerated in
Rule 57.01, particularly the amount of costs that a party could reasonably be expected to pay,
the complexity of the issues, and the quantum involved, I fix the costs of this motion at $1,500
plus $378.59 in disbursements plus HST.” (para 9)
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Gnys v. Narbutt (2015 ONSC 4407)
2015 CarswellOnt 11214, 2015 ONSC 4407, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 120
Date

Heard: June 26, 2015
Judgment: July 22, 2015

Parties

Valerie Gnys carrying on business as Health Services Recovery Network, Plaintiff
Marta Narbutt, Defendant

Counsel

Shawn Knights, for Plaintiff
Margaret Hoy, for Defendant

Judge/s

R.J. Nightingale J.

Quick Facts

Debtor retained solicitor in 2004 to pursue claim for damages arising from motor vehicle
accident. Debtor sought litigation loan in 2008, and solicitor's law firm arranged one from
creditor. Principal amount was $10,000, with interest at 18% compounded monthly. Interest
rate was somewhat less than what other litigation loan providers charged. Debtor was not
informed that creditor was owned by solicitor's spouse. Second loan for $2,500 was arranged
on same terms to cover cost of medical report. Third loan for $1,000 was arranged on same
terms about two months later. Debtor changed solicitors in late 2009 and received about
$306,000 in 2011. Debtor paid solicitor's account but never repaid loans. Plaintiff loan
company brought action against defendant, former client/debtor for payment of amounts
owing.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Defendant, Marta Narbutt had no money for a retainer and her litigation guardian signed
a CFA with the law firm, providing for:
 1/3 of recovery, with the Defendant receiving credit for costs paid by the respondible
party
 Defendant was to be responsible for disbursements, regardless of the outcome in the
case

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – no issues with CFA, decision focused on issues around the outstanding payment of loans.

Outcome

Held: Action allowed.
“…the Plaintiff shall have judgment against the Defendant for the principal amount of the
loans of $10,000 and $1000 respectively and lender fees thereon together with interest at the
annual rate of 18% calculated monthly with an effective annual rate of interest of 19.5%
calculated from the date of those loan advances. The Plaintiff shall also have judgment against
the Defendant in the principal amount of the loan of $2500.” (paras 105-106)
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John Doe v. MacDonald (2015 ONSC 4850)
2015 CarswellOnt 12134, 2015 ONSC 4850, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 724
Date

Heard: July 21, 2015
Judgement: August 10, 2015

Parties

John Doe, Applicant (name kept confidential per the terms of the settlement)
Andrea Macdonald and the Barrister Group, Respondents

Counsel

Greg M. Frenette, Jessica Lam, for Applicant
Andrew J. MacDonald, for Respondents

Judge/s

M.D. Faieta J.

Quick Facts

In summer of 2006, J (applicant) orally retained lawyer, A (respondent), to represent him in
veterinary malpractice action following death of his dog. J is on a public disability pension
and does not have the ability to pay for legal services. J thought that A was providing his
services on a pro bono basis. Action was settled in February 2014 for undisclosed amount. In
April 2014, A issued final invoice to J in amount of $34,000 on contingency fee basis. J
brought application under s. 23 of Solicitors Act for declaration that A's services were
rendered on pro bono basis and for related relief.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, ss 3, 23, 28.1.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

A (respondent) stated: “There was never a discussion of a percentage of proceeds as a basis
that I was requiring to be paid and it was not a contingency agreement in that typical sense.”
(para 26) – decision provides further back and forth correspondence between A and J
Agreement was never put in writing per requirement of Solicitors Act.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Central question to application: Whether or not Andrew's services were provided on a pro
bono or contingency basis.
A (respondent) provided evidence of correspondence with J and J’s mother, as well as
payment of $7,939.80 in trust by J’s mother on March 10, 2011 as evidence that they were
engaged in a fee agreement.

Outcome

Held: Application granted. Relief granted. A ordered to pay costs to J in the amount of
$1,684.57.
There is presumption in Ontario that oral retainer is made on terms advanced by client. A
(respondent) had not discharged heavy onus on him to satisfy court that his version of terms
of retainer should be accepted over that of his client.
Payment of $7,939.80 in March 2011 to A in trust by J's mother was not evidence that this
was payment for fees. J's explanation was that this payment was for anticipated
disbursements, and if A was retained on contingency basis, it did not make sense that this
was payment for work to date.
Followed: Griffiths v. Evans (1953 – Eng CA); Rye & Partners v. 1041977 Ontario Inc.
(2004 – Ont CA)
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Sawah v. Warren (2015 ONSC 5373)
2015 CarswellOnt 13173, 2015 ONSC 5373, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 644
Date

Heard: August 17, 2015
Judgment: August 26, 2015

Parties

John Sawah, Plaintiff
Tyler David Warren (lawyer) and Sheetal Jhuti (paralegal) c.o.b. as SBJ Consulting Services,
Defendants

Counsel

Ben Hahn, Ethan M. Rogers, for Plaintiff
Brian A. Pickard, for Tyler David Warren
David S. Lipkus, for Sheetal Jhuti

Judge/s

Gray J.

Quick Facts

Client suffered injuries in motor vehicle collision, and signed retainer agreement with
paralegal authorizing her to represent his interests on claim for statutory accident
benefits. Agreement was for contingency fee of 25 percent on any award or settlement.
Statement of claim in connection with tort claim was filed by lawyer. Paralegal advised client
of offer to settle tort claim in all-inclusive amount of $18,000, and client signed full and final
release. Settlement funds in amount of $22,500 were advanced to lawyer and paralegal shortly
thereafter. Client alleged that paralegal advised him of settlement of statutory accident
benefits in amount of $6,000, but client refused to sign release. Client contacted insurer who
provided documentation showing offer to settle was for $15,000. Client brought action for
actual and punitive damages against lawyer and paralegal for fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty. Client brought motion for summary judgment.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA retainer signed January 7, 2009 between plaintiff and defendant provided for:
 25% on any award or settlement (lower than counsel’s usual rate of 30%)
 + disbursements
No copy of CFA retainer could be produced by either party.

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – see issues re: fraud and breach of fiduciary duty set-out in ‘Quick Facts’

Outcome

Held: Motion for summary judgement dismissed. Matter must proceed to trial.
Releases regarding tort claim were suspicious, however evidence did not show that lawyer
was responsible for or aware of such, and trial would be required to determine this. Evidence
against paralegal was compelling, and it was clear that she falsely represented settlement
amounts. Since matter was to proceed to trial anyway, no finding of fraud was made against
paralegal.
Followed: C. (R.) v. McDougall (2008 SCC 53); Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v.
Flesch (2014 SCC 8)
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Mishan v. York Central Hospital (2015 ONSC 6369)
2015 CarswellOnt 16276, 2015 ONSC 6369, 259 A.C.W.S. (3d) 578
Date

Judgment: October 19, 2015

Parties

Peter Mishan, Kathy Mishan, David J. Mishan, Adam M. Mishan, Sarah L. Mishan, and
Naomi B. Mishan by her litigation guardian Peter Mishan, Plaintiffs
York Central Hospital, Nurse Candy Wong, Nurse Nana Vadachkoriya, Nurse Michelle Van
Der Valk, Nurse Janese Langley, Dr. Darryl J. Gebien and Dr. John A. Hayami, Defendants

Counsel

Miles Obradovich, for Plaintiffs
Kate Crawford, for Defendants

Judge/s

Darla A. Wilson J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff patient and family brought action against nurses, physicians and hospital for damages
arising from negligent treatment. Patient no longer wished to pursue claim because he was not
prepared to fund expert neurological opinion. Lawsuit had been at standstill for more than five
years. Patient brought motion for approval of dismissal of claim.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“In my view, if lawyers are not prepared to take these difficult professional negligence cases
on a CFA basis, recognizing they may have to absorb the legal fees and disbursements if no
supportive expert opinion can be secured, the Plaintiff ought to be referred out to counsel who
will take the case on such a basis.” (para 11)
However, given passage of time (5 years) and circumstances in which patient could not fund
necessary expert opinion, action was dismissed. It was not possible on evidence to make
finding about merits of claim or to determine whether it was in best interests of minor child to
dismiss action.
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Livent Inc. (Receiver of) v. Deloitte & Touche (2016 ONCA 11)
2016 CarswellOnt 122, 2016 ONCA 11, 128 O.R. (3d) 225, 24 C.C.L.T. (4th) 177, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 31
C.B.R. (6th) 205, 342 O.A.C. 201, 393 D.L.R. (4th) 1
Date

Heard: March 23-26, 2015
Judgment: January 8, 2016

Parties

Livent Inc., Through its Special Receiver and Manager Roman Doroniuk, Plaintiff
(Respondent/Appellant by Cross-Appeal)
Deloitte & Touche and Deloitte & Touche LLP, Defendants (Appellant/Respondent by CrossAppeal)

Counsel

John Mpampas for Appellant / Respondent by way of Cross-Appeal, for himself
Eric Freedman for Respondent / Appellant by way of Cross-Appeal, Joel Freedman

Judge/s

G.R. Strathy C.J.O., R.A. Blair, P. Lauwers JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Client retained lawyer as legal counsel on three personal injury matters. Parties entered into
CFA. Some legal work was done and settlement offers were being discussed. Lawyer was
removed from record on his own motion. Lawyer brought successful motion for charging
order for his unpaid account under s. 34 of Solicitors Act. Charging order was granted for two
of client's three actions. Motion judge found that preconditions were satisfied that fund or
property was in existence at time order was granted, property was "recovered or preserved"
through instrumentality of solicitor, and that there was some evidence client could or would
not pay fees. Motion judge held that lawyer preserved client's right to sue, which was chose in
action and therefore property. Motion judge concluded that client could not pay lawyer's fees
other than out of judgments or settlements. Client appealed. Cross-appeal by lawyer from
costs award (no costs awarded).

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed. Costs awarded to the respondent fixed at
$3000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.
“We see no error in the reasons of the motion judge. The charging orders over any settlement
funds were properly issued. The respondent acknowledges that any claim that the solicitor get
off the record without just cause can be taken into account by the assessment officer in
determining what fees are reasonable.” (para 1) And, motion judge acted within his discretion
in awarding no costs.
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Livent Inc. (Receiver of) v. Deloitte & Touche (2016 ONCA 11)
2016 CarswellOnt 122, 2016 ONCA 11, 128 O.R. (3d) 225, 24 C.C.L.T. (4th) 177, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 542, 31
C.B.R. (6th) 205, 342 O.A.C. 201, 393 D.L.R. (4th) 1
Date

Heard: March 23-26, 2015
Judgment: January 8, 2016

Parties

Livent Inc., Through its Special Receiver and Manager Roman Doroniuk, Plaintiff
(Respondent/Appellant by Cross-Appeal)
Deloitte & Touche and Deloitte & Touche LLP, Defendants (Appellant/Respondent by CrossAppeal)

Counsel

John Mpampas for Appellant / Respondent by way of Cross-Appeal, for himself
Eric Freedman for Respondent / Appellant by way of Cross-Appeal, Joel Freedman

Judge/s

G.R. Strathy C.J.O., R.A. Blair, P. Lauwers JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Client retained lawyer as legal counsel on three personal injury matters. Parties entered into
CFA. Some legal work was done and settlement offers were being discussed. Lawyer was
removed from record on his own motion. Lawyer brought successful motion for charging
order for his unpaid account under s. 34 of Solicitors Act. Charging order was granted for two
of client's three actions. Motion judge found that preconditions were satisfied that fund or
property was in existence at time order was granted, property was "recovered or preserved"
through instrumentality of solicitor, and that there was some evidence client could or would
not pay fees. Motion judge held that lawyer preserved client's right to sue, which was chose in
action and therefore property. Motion judge concluded that client could not pay lawyer's fees
other than out of judgments or settlements. Client appealed. Cross-appeal by lawyer from
costs award (no costs awarded).

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal dismissed. Costs awarded to the respondent fixed at
$3000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.
“We see no error in the reasons of the motion judge. The charging orders over any settlement
funds were properly issued. The respondent acknowledges that any claim that the solicitor get
off the record without just cause can be taken into account by the assessment officer in
determining what fees are reasonable.” (para 1) And, motion judge acted within his discretion
in awarding no costs.
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Edwards (Litigation guardian of) v. Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) (1979)
Inc. (2016 ONSC 2501)
2016 Carswell Ont 5702, 2016 ONSC 2501
Date

Heard: January 20, 2016
Judgment: April 13, 2016

Parties

Jared Edwards, by his Litigation Guardian Eve Ojasoo and Eve Ojasoo, Russell Topp, Leiki
Candace Edwards and Ailie Anne Bikaunieks, Plaintiffs
Camp Kennebec (Frontenac) (1979) Inc., Kennebec Holdings Limited, Courtney Rondeau
and Cameron Wilson, Defendants

Counsel

David Burstein, for Plaintiffs
Timothy P. Alexander, for Defendants

Judge/s

M.D. Faieta J.

Quick Facts

Plaintif, Jared Edwards suffered from an existing learning disability and seizure disorder
when he fell while entering a sailboat at the defendant’s six-week summer camp for the
disabled, causing him a spinal injury. Eve (Jared’s mother and Litigation Guardian) and her
partner Russell retained De Rose Professional Corporation pursuant to a CFA dated October
4, 2012 to seek recovery of damages arising from the above accident on behalf of Jared, his
parents and his sisters. This action was commenced in April 2014. In October 2015 the
parties agreed to settle this action for $2,750,000.00, inclusive of costs and taxes. It is
proposed that the net proceeds of Jared's settlement will be supplemented by Eve's settlement
to pay $1,475,000.00 for an annuity that will pay Jared the sum of $5,825.00 per month,
without indexation, for the rest of his life. Plaintiffs bring this motion for Judgment
approving the settlement of Jared's claim.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 24, 28(1)
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, ss 2.3(ii), 2.6

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA provides:



33% of any settlement recovered + HST
However, if action goes to trial, then fee is 40% of amount recovered + HST, or the
amount of costs awarded by the Court, whichever counsel chooses
 Or, where claim is not settled or lost at trial, plaintiff still responsible to pay all
disbursements and taxes
CFA does not state that client has been advised to obtain independent legal advice before
signing.
This settlement proposes that Jared will receive $1,427,417.00 after the deduction of
$606,311.30 for fees, disbursements and taxes. Disbursements amounted to $58,207.75.

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Is the CFA void for failure to comply with the Solicitors Act?
B. Is the CFA “fair and reasonable”?

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
A. No. CFA is void because it does not state that "client has been advised that hourly rates
may vary among solicitors and that the client can speak with other solicitors to compares
rate" as required by s. 2.3(ii) of O. Reg. 195/04; and, does not provide a simple example, or
any example, that shows how the contingency fee is calculated as required by s. 2.6 of O.
Reg. 195/04.
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B. No. This is evidenced by client’s (Eve) misunderstandings about the content of the CFA.
“I order that De Rose's account for legal fees, disbursements and taxes in relation to Jared's
claim be reduced by $381,311.30 to $225,000.00. I order that these funds ($381,311.30) be
used to purchase a larger annuity for Jared's benefit, without changing the other terms of the
annuity.” (para 55)

Batalla v. St. Michael's Hospital (2016 ONSC 1513)
2016 CarswellOnt 3936, 2016 ONSC 1513, 264 A.C.W.S. (3d) 357, 81 C.P.C. (7th) 293
Date

Judgment: March 9, 2016

Parties

Mercelita Batalla, Rogelio Batalla and Aaron Jake Batalla, a minor by his Litigation
Guardian, Mercelita Batalla, Primo Eroles, Calixta Eroles and Mercela Batalla, Plaintiffs
St. Michael's Hospital and Dr. Filomena Mary Meffe, Defendants

Counsel

Joel P. Freedman, for Plaintiffs

Judge/s

Darla A. Wilson J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiffs alleged that attending physician and nurses were negligent during delivery of minor
plaintiff and as result he had severe brain damage resulting in very limited cognitive
functioning and impaired motor skills. Mediation was held in April 2014, at which time the
solicitors agreed to resolve the action for the all-inclusive sum of $6,625,000, subject to court
approval. Plaintiff's counsel asserted that plaintiffs signed CFA and sought to have fee
approved of $1,537,223, under the agreement. Counsel for the plaintiffs served motion for
approval of settlement.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 24.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA executed on September 4, 2010 by Mr. and Mrs. Batalla. It provides for:
 30% of all monies received less disbursements
 client to pay interest on money borrowed by counsel to pay disbursements
Counsel seeks to have a fee approved of $1,537,223, per the above provision. However,
counsel willing to accept 25% of the damages and interest + HST + disbursements.

Issue/s with
Agreement
Outcome

Motion brought pursuant to R. 7 of Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.

Is the CFA “fair and reasonable”?
Held: Settlement approved for all-inclusive sum of $6,625,000, including $1,000,000 to Mr.
Freedman + $130,000 in HST + $69,900 in disbursements
Yes, CFA was fair at the time it was signed. However, paragraph requiring plaintiffs to pay
interest on disbursements incurred was not fair. “I do not think it is fair for counsel to look to
the clients for payment of interest charged by the bank for money borrowed to pay the
disbursements. In this case, that amount is $4,480, which is a very small amount in light of
the fee proposed to be charged.” (para 54)
Followed: Raphael Partners v. Lam
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Murillo v Turnbull (2016 ONSC 1906)
2016 CarswellOnt 4178, 2016 ONSC 1906
Date

Heard: March 16, 2016
Judgment: March 17, 2016

Parties

Luz Gomez Murillo and Christian Moreno Gomez, Plaintiffs
Max Turnbull and Custodio Moreno Romero, Defendant

Counsel

T. McKinlay, for Karl Arvai Professional Corporation
R. Mitri, for Grillo Barristers

Judge/s

T.A. Heeney R.S.J.

Quick Facts

The plaintiffs retained Grillo Barristers to act for them, in both a tort and accident benefits
claim stemming from a motorcycle accident in 2010. Grillo prosecuted the action through to
the completion of discoveries and compliance with undertakings, and the assembly of
evidence to support their claims. On August 28, 2015, they received a courtesy call from the
plaintiffs, advising that they had retained new counsel, Arvai. Grillo indicated that they were
prepared to forward the file upon payment of their disbursements (approx. $11 000), as well
as an undertaking to protect their account for fees from any settlement or judgment. Arvai
refused and demanded transfer of the file. Arvai served offer to settle agreeing to resolve all
matters as proposed, but demanding costs of $11,195.66. Ultimately, consent orders were
prepared to resolve matter as follows: file was transferred upon Arvai paying $4,000
disbursements to Grillo, with balance to be carried by them pending completion of file and
certificate of assessment was to be set aside. Parties made submissions regarding costs of
proceedings undertaken.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Issue/s with
Agreement

“[W]hether the prior law firm can insist on payment of their disbursements from the client
prior to releasing the file, when they have a written [contingency fee] retainer agreement
signed by the clients that entitles the firm to payment of their fees and disbursements
"forthwith" upon breakdown of the solicitor and client relationship.” (para 26)

Breakdown of
Contingency Fee
Agreement

The contingency fee retainer was executed by the plaintiffs on September 25, 2013 with a
term that entitles the firm to payment of their fees and disbursements "forthwith" upon
breakdown of the solicitor and client relationship

Outcome

Held: No costs awarded to either side. However, judge acknowledged that if costs were to be
awarded they would be in Grillo’s favour.
“If the case has sufficient apparent merit to warrant taking the file on, Arvai should be
prepared to carry the disbursements, as they no doubt do with their many other personal
injury files where they are retained on a contingent fee basis.” (para 27)
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Smith Estate v. National Money Mart (2010 ONSC 1334)
2010 CarswellOnt 1238, 2010 ONSC 1334, [2010] O.J. No. 873, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 335, 94 C.P.C. (6th) 126
Date

Heard: February, 2010
Judgement: March, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Kenneth Smith, as an Estate Trustee of Margaret Smith, deceased; Oriet
Defendant: National Money Mart; Dollar Financial Group

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C., Linda Rothstein
For Defendant: F. Paul Morrison, John P. Brown for Defendant, National Money Mart
Company
Mahmud Jamal, Jean-Marc Leclerc, Jason MacLean for Defendant, Dollar Financial Group,
Inc.
Terrence J. O'Sullivan, James Renihan for Class Counsel

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

Class proceeding between creditors and debtors, on payday loans, where the debtors alleged
that the creditor charged a criminal rate of interest. Motion by parties in class proceeding for
order approving settlement (and class counsel fees).

Statute & Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure: R. 7.04(1), R.7.08(4); Class Proceedings Act ss. 17(3)-17(6),
32(2); Criminal Code ss.237, 347, 347(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

“All of the law firms agreed to act on the same contingency fee basis as had been agreed
between the representative plaintiffs and Sutts, Strosberg LLP” (para 5)
CFA: provides for 30% of the value of the settlement. Class counsel “submit that if they were
paid in accordance with the [CFA], described above, they would be entitled to a $40 million
counsel fee [($10 million fee + $130,000 disbursements) times four]. They are seeking only
$27.5 million.” (para 114)
Settlement: $120M = (27.5 cash payment made by D.) + (56.4 debt forgiveness) + (30 credits
for new loans made by D.) + (3 payment to Class Proceedings fund)

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are the settlement and legal fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted in part. 11.25% [or $13.5 million] of the total $120M settlement
amount.
“A better version of the settlement and the one that I am approving is that Class Counsel's fee
does not take up all the cash portion of the settlement and there is some repayment to the
members of the Transaction Credit Group.” (para 95)
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Smith Estate v. National Money Mart Co. (2011 ONCA 233) – reversing in
part (2010 ONSC 1334)
– see above
2011 CarswellOnt 1920, 2011 ONCA 233, [2011] O.J. No. 1321, 106 O.R. (3d) 37, 199 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1077, 276
O.A.C. 237, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 208, 3 C.P.C. (7th) 223
Date

Heard: October 25, 2010
Judgment: March 28, 2011

Parties

Kenneth Smith, as Estate Trustee of the Last Will and Testament of Margaret Smith,
deceased, and Ronald Oriet (plaintiffs), Appellant
Sutts, Strosberg LLP, Heenan Blaikie LLP, Paliare Roland Rothstein Rosenberg LLP and
Koskie Minsky LLP, Appellants and National Money Mart Company and Dollar Financial
Group, Inc. (defendants), Respondent

Counsel

Terrence J. O’Sullivan, James Renihan, for Appellants
Chris Hubbard, for Money Mart (not participating in appeal)
Mahmud Jamal, Jason MacLean, for Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (not participating in
appeal)

Judge/s

M.J. Moldaver, R.P. Armstrong, R.G. Juriansz JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Debtors brought class action against creditors with respect to allegedly criminal rate of
interest charged on "payday" loans. During trial, parties reached settlement with forgiving
of outstanding loans, credits for new loans, payment of $27.5 million cash for class counsel
fees and representative plaintiff's $3,000 fee, and establishment of class fund. Settlement
was approved with class counsel fees reduced to $14.5 million. Class counsel appealed,
seeking a fee of $20 million.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 32(1)-(4), 33(1)-(4), 33(7)(a)-(c)

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Perell J. of ONSC fixed class counsel fees in the amount of $14.5 million ($12,806,074.94
for fees, $640,303.75 for GST and $1,053,621.31 for disbursements including GST). The
disbursements included the fees of certain consultants and other counsel retained by class
counsel that the appellants had requested be treated as contingency fees.

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Class counsel sought to have fees, disbursements and taxes of other counsel—who had
provided their services on a contingency basis—treated as a component of the class counsel
base fee rather than as disbursements.
B. Class counsel also sought to have the fees of consultants—who also provided services
on a contingency fee basis—increased by the multiplier the court awarded to class counsel,
and to have the compensation paid to the representative plaintiff paid out of the class fund
rather than out of class counsel fees.

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed in part by providing that the compensation for the representative
plaintiff be paid out of the settlement fund. Appeal dismissed on all other respects.
“…the representative plaintiff's fee should be paid out of the settlement fund and not out of
class counsel fees. Class counsel fees are predicated on the work that class counsel have
done for the class. Allocating a part of that fee to a layperson, especially a representative
plaintiff, raises the spectre of fee splitting […] $3,000 compensation for the representative
plaintiff should be paid out of the settlement fund. I would vary the motion judge's order
accordingly.” (paras 135-, 136)
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Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2010 ONSC 2752)
2010 CarswellOnt 3350, 2010 ONSC 2752, [2010] O.J. No. 2093, 189 A.C.W.S. (3d) 33, 97 C.P.C. (6th) 169
Further reasons in Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 3837) – see below
Date

Heard: April, 2010
Judgement: May, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Osmun; Metro Enterprises
Defendant: Cadbury Adams; The Hershey Company; Nestle Canada; Mars Canada; Itwal
Limited

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C., Charles M. Wright
For Defendant: Not Listed on QL (Motion)

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

Partial settlements were reached in class action. Settlements were approved in Ontario.
Settlement included payment of $5,795,695.60 for benefit of settlement class members.
Motion was brought for approval of fees and disbursements of class counsel.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss. 32(1), 32(3), 33(1), 33(4), 33(7)(c)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA retainer entered into on December 1, 2007 provided for either:
(a) the base fee increased by a multiplier of 4, less any fees already recovered as costs, plus
applicable taxes; or
(b) if a settlement is reached before examinations for discovery, 30% of the settlement, less
any fees already paid, plus applicable taxes.
And, whether a or b:
+ disbursements (not already recovered by the defendants as costs)
+ taxes and interest
Class counsel in Ontario and BC request a 25% contingency fee on this motion
($1,487,195.76 including disbursements and GST).
Settlement: "The details of these proceedings are set out in my reasons on the settlement
approval: Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc., 2010 ONSC 2643… (a) Cadbury has paid
[$5.8M]… for the benefit of settlement class members. Cadbury is also obligated to pay the
costs of notice that exceed [$250k] (b) Cadbury has agreed to cooperate with the plaintiffs in
pursuing their claims against the non-settling defendants;… (c)... (d)..."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are class counsel’s requested fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. 25% + disbursements
“It is appropriate to use other methods of measurement, such as time multiplied by hourly
rate, or a multiplier, or the result, as a check against the reasonableness of the fees claimed;
but, in my respectful view, courts should not be too quick to disallow a fee based on a
percentage simply because it is a multiple - sometimes even a large multiple - of the
mathematical calculation of hours docketed times the hourly rate... As I have noted, on a
straight "time and hourly rate" basis, class counsel's charges would be [$633k], excluding
disbursements. The effective multiplier being requested, therefore, is about two, which is not
out of the reasonable range. That range has been expressed as being from slightly greater
than one (at the low end) to four or higher in the most deserving cases" (para 31)
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O'Neil v. SunOpta Inc. (2010 ONSC 2735)
2010 CarswellOnt 9129, 2010 ONSC 2735, [2010] O.J. No. 5251, 6 C.P.C. (7th) 438
Date

Heard: May, 2010
Judgement: May, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: O'Neil
Defendant: Sunopta; Bromley; Dietrech

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Michael G. Robb, Monique L. Radlein
For Defendant: Steve Tenai, C. Kilby, for Defendant, SunOpta Inc.
Craig Lockwood, for Defendants, Steven R. Bromley and John H. Dietrich

Judge/s

Then: W.U. Tausendfreund J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff brought cross-border securities class action against defendants for alleged
misrepresentation leading to artificial inflation of value of defendant company's shares.
Parties settled action and brought motion for approval of settlement terms and class counsel
fees,

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceeding Act, s.33

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA between Canadian class counsel and representative plaintiff provided for:
 25% contingency fee
 + disbursements
 + taxes
 and a statement that all of the above is subject to court approval
Settlement: USD$11.25M

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
"I am satisfied that this Settlement represents a fair and reasonable compromise." and, "In
view of the cross-border nature of this Settlement, counsel in both actions have agreed that
their combined fees will not exceed 25% of the gross settlement funds of USD$11.25M.
This amounts to [USD$2.8M] plus disbursements and taxes [the present Motion granted the
fee payment of USD$843K]." "Mr. O'Neil, the representative plaintiff, does not object to
the quantum of fees sought by Canadian class counsel, as it is consistent with the retainer
agreement."

118

Fantl v. Transamerica Life Canada (2010 ONSC 3113)
2010 CarswellOnt 3675, 2010 ONSC 3113, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 967, 86 C.C.L.I. (4th) 239
Summary

Only one mention of CFA related to the cost indemnity scale: "In calculating that counsel
fee, I did not include charges for fees associated with the dispute between REO and KO to be
lawyer of record. In paras. 87 of my Reasons for Decision, I stated: I agree with
Transamerica's submission that REO's counsel fee should not include charges for fees
associated with its carriage fight with KO. It seems to me that this expenditure of effort,
which did little to advance the litigation for the Representative Plaintiff or the Class is part of
the risk assumed by Class Council when it takes the retainer. This expenditure is part of what
may justify the contingency fee or the multiplier of a base fee, but it is not reasonable to
charge a client for what it costs the lawyer to safeguard a retainer from a competitor. These
costs are a risk that the lawyer assumes when he or she takes on the retainer. Viewed in the
context of the public's interest, it strikes me as a bad idea to encourage and intensify carriage
fights by the prospect that the winner will not only get the file but be paid something by his
or her client for getting the file."
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Pichette v. Toronto Hydro (2010 ONSC 4060)
2010 CarswellOnt 5399, 2010 ONSC 4060, [2010] O.J. No. 3185, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 47, 98 C.P.C. (6th) 96
Date

Heard: July, 2010
Judgement: July, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Pichette
Defendant: Toronto Hydro

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Michael McGowan, Dorothy Fong, Barbara Grossman
For Defendant: Alan H. Mark, Kelly Friedman, Jennifer Teskey

Judge/s

Then: Cumming J.

Quick Facts

Defendant municipal electric utilities historically charged customers so-called ‘late payment
penalties’ (LPPs) of 7 or 5 per cent when utility bills were not paid by time required. Two
class actions were brought alleging that LPPs were contrary to Criminal Code, which
prohibits charging a rate over 60% per annum. Putative representative plaintiffs in two class
actions brought motion under Class Proceedings Act, 1992 for consolidation of class actions.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss. 5, 5(1), 12, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 29, 32; Criminal Code, s.347

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA provided for:
 25% contingency fee
 + partial indemnity costs
"The requested fees are about 28.5% of the total settlement amount (The inclusion of the
partial indemnity costs result in the overall 28.5% figure)." (The requested fees are
equivalent to a multiplier of about 4.42.) Class counsel also requests a portion of the
settlement to cover disbursements and tax.
Proposed settlement was $17.5 million.

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
25% contingency fee approved, plus partial indemnity costs, so effectively 28.5% +
disbursements and GST/HST
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McLaren v. LG Electronics Canada Inc. (2010 ONSC 4710)
2010 CarswellOnt 6881, 2010 ONSC 4710, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 385
Date

Heard: August, 2010
Judgement: August, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: McLaren
Defendant: LG Electronics

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Megan B. McPhee, Khalid Janmohamed
For Defendant: Kris Borg-Oliver

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

Between June 2004 and April 2005, defendants, LG Inc., manufactured and sold refrigerators
in Canada. These refrigerators contained faulty capacitors that were prone to malfunction,
which could cause refrigerators to overheat and catch fire. Plaintiff's refrigerator caught fire
and severely damaged his home. Plaintiff brought motion to certify action as class proceeding,
to amend pleading to add representative plaintiff, and to have proposed settlement approved.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss. 5, 5(1), 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b)… 5(1)(e)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

No % disclosed. Plaintiff signed a CFA with Kim Orr (current class counsel) providing that
“if a settlement benefits one or more class members, class counsel is entitled to fees by a lump
sum, by payment out of the proceeds, or otherwise as may be directed by the court."
Note: plaintiff changed class counsel once and had a CFA with former counsel (no issues with
switching solicitors)
Proposed settlement includes the following provisions:
 LG will be responsible for payment of the legal fees of Class Counsel. It shall, subject
to approval by the court, pay the legal fees, disbursements and taxes thereon of Class
Counsel in the amount of $250,000.00 on an all-inclusive basis.
 Class Counsel shall not request payment of any legal fees, disbursements, or taxes
from Class Members.

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are class counsel’s fees appropriate as “a matter of interpretation of the settlement
agreement”?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“The proposed settlement promotes the three policy objectives of the CPA: access to justice,
judicial economy and behaviour modification.” (para 33)
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Waterston v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (2010 ONSC 4319)
2010 CarswellOnt 8028, 2010 ONSC 4319, 194 A.C.W.S. (3d) 771, 85 C.C.P.B. 1, 98 C.P.C. (6th) 364
Date

Heard: February, June, July, 2010
Judgement: October, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Waterston
Defendant: CBC

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Anthony Guindon, Ari Kaplan
For Defendant: David Stamp for Defendant
Andre Claudé, Anne Sheppard, Mario Évangelisté for Moving Parties, SCRC and Messrs.
Hebert and Bernard

Judge/s

Then: Pollak J.

Quick Facts

Association of pensioners with defendant corporation CBC brought action against CBC for
breach of alleged collateral agreement relating to use of surplus pension funds. Action was
certified as class proceeding. Union for some active employees with corporation SCRC did
not intervene in certification proceeding. Class proceeding action was settled. SCRC was not
party to settlement. During class proceeding action, another union filed grievance against
CBC regarding collective agreement and surplus pension funds. Arbitrator allowed grievance.
Parties to settlement ("parties") brought motion to approve settlement. SCRC brought crossmotion for leave to intervene and stay of proceedings.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure: R. 21.01(3)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

No details of CFA or counsel’s fee agreement provided. The decision only once mentions that
there was a CFA and does not provide and further information.

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“I approve the counsel fees of $325,590.40 and disbursements of $15,280.07.” (para 109)
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West Coast Soft Wear Ltd. v. 1000128 Alberta Ltd. (2010 ONSC 6388)
2010 CarswellOnt 9127, 2010 ONSC 6388, 7 C.P.C. (7th) 323
Date

Heard: October, 2010
Judgement: November, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: West Coast Soft Wear
Defendant: CNPC International; China National Oil & Gas Exploration; CNPC International;
China National Petroleum

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Charles M. Wright; Anthony O'Brien
For Defendant: Christopher Naudie; Ed Morgan

Judge/s

Then: W.U. Tausendfreund J.

Quick Facts

"In this action, … the plaintiffs seek damages for alleged insider trading by the defendants in
respect of shares of PetroKazakhstan Inc. ("PKZ")."

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency
Fee Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA provided for:
 25% contingency fee
 + disbursements
 + taxes
 provision stating that the above subject to court approval
Class counsel requests fees in the amount of $2,486,156.48 plus disbursements and applicable
taxes. This amount was calculated at 25% of the net settlement funds.
Settlement: "Under the terms of [the settlement] agreement, the defendants provided
settlement funds of [$10M] "

Contingency
Fee Issue/s

Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“The fees are approved in the amount of $2,486,156.48 plus taxes and disbursements in the
amount of $101,017.33.” (para 45)
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Serhan Estate v. Johnson & Johnson (2011 ONSC 128)
2011 CarswellOnt 40, 2011 ONSC 128, 195 A.C.W.S. (3d) 932, 79 C.C.L.T. (3d) 272, 8 C.P.C. (7th) 73
Date

Heard: December, 2010
Judgement: January, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff: Ahmad Serhan, deceased by His Trustee without a will Zein Ahmad Serhan;
Beverley Gagnon, deceased, By Her Trustee without a will, Bruce Allen Gagnon
Defendant: Johnson & Johnson; Lifescan Canada

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Paul Pape; Kirk Baert
For Defendant: Caroline Zayid; Darryl Ferguson

Judge/s

Then: C. Horkins J.

Quick Facts

Proceeding was certified as class action in 2004, with cause of action being waiver of tort.
Defendant was manufacturer of blood glucose monitoring products for diabetics, and class
was all individuals in Canada, except British Columbia and Quebec, who acquired one of
defendant's self-monitoring devices that had two design flaws. Problem resulting from flaws
in defendant's product was rare, and there was no evidence of injury arising from flaws.
Parties engaged in settlement discussions and eventually reached resolution. Settlement
totalled $4 million, all of which was to be cy près distribution, as direct compensation to class
was not practical. Settlement involved defendant providing devices to Canadian Diabetes
Association for those unable to afford costs of self-monitoring, as well as providing funds for
public awareness program to raise awareness of dangers of undiagnosed and untreated
diabetes. Class brought motion for approval of settlement.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA provided for:
(a) to the extent that any disbursements are not received and recovered as party and party
costs, an amount equivalent to the cost of the unrecovered disbursements plus applicable
taxes; and
(b) the greater of:
(1) 25% of the settlement funds or monetary award, plus applicable taxes; or
(2) the base fee, being the number of hours times the usual hourly rates, increased by a
multiplier of 3.0, plus applicable taxes.
Class Counsel requests a fixed fee of $1.5M inclusive of disbursements, taxes and repayment
of $24.7k owed for disbursements advanced by the Class Proceedings Fund.
Settlement: "The settlement has a cash value of [$2.75M] and a product value of [$1.25M],
totalling [$4M], all of which will be a cy près distribution because direct compensation to the
Settlement Class is not practical."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are counsel’s legal fees fair and reasonable?
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Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
[JB thinks it's unusual to include disbursements in the calculation, and s.6 of Reg 195/04
(enabled by SA) prohibits the inclusion of disbursements in the CF % -- HO thinks that
ultimately class counsel was not requesting a contingency fee per the CFA, but a fixed fee so
not sure if there is still a problem there]
"There were no objections to the amount sought and the representative plaintiffs support Class
Counsel's fee request."

Abdulrahim v. Air France (2011 ONSC 512)
2011 CarswellOnt 403, 2011 ONSC 512, 16 C.P.C. (7th) 289, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 583
Date

Heard: January, 2011
Judgement: January, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff: Abdulrahim; Abedrabbo
Defendant: Greater Toronto Airports Authority; NAV Canada et al.

Counsel

For Plaintiff: J.J. Camp, Q.C.
For Defendant: Robert Fenn, for NAV Canada
Timothy Trembley, for Air France

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

"The details of the action, and of the settlement, are set out in my endorsement approving the
settlement, which is being released this day: Abdulrahim ...”

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA only mentioned to the following extent: "The retainer agreement between class counsel
and the representative plaintiff provides for a fee of 33%."
However, "Class counsel is requesting a fee of $6,225,000, plus disbursements and taxes. This
is based on 30% of the settlement amount."
Settlement: “the settlement was for the total sum of $20.75M, inclusive of costs."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
30% "in the amount of $6,225,000.00 as well as the taxes and disbursements set out above."
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Rowlands v. Durham Region Health (2011 ONSC 719)
2011 CarswellOnt 3228, 2011 ONSC 719, [2011] O.J. No. 1864, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 895, 20 C.P.C. (7th) 253
See further reasons in Rowlands v. Durham Region Health (2011 ONSC 719) – see below
Date

Heard: December, 2010
Judgement: February, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff: Rowlands; Durham Region health;
Defendant: Regional Municipality of Durham

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Todd J. McCarthy; Sean A. Brown
For Defendant: Boghosian; Catherine Virgo

Judge/s

Then: P.D. Lauwers J.

Quick Facts

Prospective class plaintiff brought action on his own behalf and on behalf of class members
for damages arising out of loss by nurse of USB key containing personal health information.
Plaintiff brought motion for certification of class proceeding.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure: R. 1.03; Class Proceedings Act, ss.5, 17, 22

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

NA - see below

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

This case is more about the indemnity scale; only one mention of CFA: "The "funding of all
disbursements necessary to properly prosecute this action to a successful completion have
been and will continue to be paid by Class Counsel so there are no access to justice concerns
in requiring the Plaintiff to bear the costs of the Notice and Opt-out program"; this is how, Mr.
Boghosian submits, Class Counsel's 25% contingency fee is justified.""

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Certification approved.
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Mortillaro v. Unicash Franchising Inc. (2011 ONSC 923)
2011 CarswellOnt 802, 2011 ONSC 923, [2011] O.J. No. 595, 16 C.P.C. (7th) 352, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 850
Date

Heard: February, 2011
Judgement: February, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff: Mortillaro
Defendant: Unicash

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Susan S. Brown; Jody Brown
For Defendant: Meagan J. Swan

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

"This is a "payday loans" case against the defendant Planinvest Consulting Limited
("Unicash"). Unicash operated primarily in the Greater Toronto Area … [it] offered low
principal, high cost consumer loans, which were designed to provide financing between
paydays. The plaintiff alleges … that the total interest charged exceeded an effective annual
rate of 60%, contrary to s. 347(1) of the Criminal Code." Motion to approve settlement and
legal fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA provided for:
 25% contingency fee of the recovery
 + disbursements
 + taxes
 with provision stating that the above is subject to the approval of the court
"Class counsel asks that their fees be approved in the amount of [$55k] plus [taxes], and
disbursements of [$23k] (being the actual amount expended), plus $500 for estimated ongoing
disbursements (inclusive of applicable GST and HST), to be paid from the settlement fund in
accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement." "The fee proposed is higher than the
amount to which counsel would be entitled under that arrangement. Mr. Mortillaro agrees to
the proposed fee. Class counsel's time spent in this matter has a face value of nearly [$250k]"
Settlement: "Under the proposed settlement, which is subject to court approval, Unicash will
forgive all unpaid payday loans owed by class members and will make a payment of [$155k],
to be distributed as follows: ... It is estimated that the cy près distribution will be in the range
of [$50k]"

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. (i.e. 35% + disbursements)
"In my view, the proposed fee is fair and reasonable, having regard to the factors to be
considered in determining a lawyer's fee as well as the goals of the C.P.A. The outcome of
this litigation was dictated by circumstances beyond the control of counsel. It can be regarded
as a victory in principle if not in dollars. Fee awards should be designed to encourage good
lawyers to take on risky and difficult class proceedings. This was such a proceeding."

127

Dugal v. Manulife Financial Corp. (2011 ONSC 1785)
2011 CarswellOnt 1889, 2011 ONSC 1785, [2011] O.J. No. 1239, 105 O.R. (3d) 364, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 105, 200
A.C.W.S. (3d) 35
Date

Heard: February, 2011
Judgement: March, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff/Moving Party: Dugal; Ironworkers Pension Fund
Defendant: Manulife Financial et al

Counsel

For Plaintiff/Moving Party: Charles M. Wright, Michael D. Wright, Daniel Bach, Stephanie
Dickson
For Defendant: Patricia D.S. Jackson, Andrew Gray, for Defendant / Respondent, Manulife
Financial Corporation
R. Paul Steep, E.S. Block, for Defendant, Peter Rubenovitch
Linda L. Fuerst, for Defendant, Domenic D'Alessandro
Alexa Abiscott, for Defendants, Gail Cook-Bennett, Arthur Sawchuk

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

"The plaintiffs claim that the defendant Manulife Financial Corporation ("Manulife"), which
is a public company, made misrepresentations concerning its risk management practices in its
public disclosure documents, and that this had the effect of artificially inflating the value of its
stock. ... This action has not yet been certified as a class proceeding under the Class
Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 (the "C.P.A.")." Motion by P. for approval of funding
agreement as between a P. and a third-party "on any settlement or judgment in this action"

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.12

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

This case is unusual and involves a third-party indemnity agreement between the Ps and a
third-party (third-party = CFI, "an Irish corporation, which will pay any adverse costs award
made against the plaintiffs, in return for a "commission""): "
 CFI is entitled to a commission of 7% of the amount of any settlement or judgment,
after deduction of the fees and disbursements of class counsel and administration
expenses.
 The commission is subject to a "cap" of $5 million if the resolution occurs at any time
prior to the filing of the plaintiffs' pre-trial conference brief and $10 million if the
resolution occurs at any time thereafter.
 CFI will pay $50,000 towards the plaintiffs' disbursements.
 Class counsel are required to advise CFI of any significant issue in the proceeding,
including prospects of success, strategy and quantum, and class counsel are required
to respond to any reasonable request by CFI for information about the proceedings....
this agreement does not come into effect unless approved by the court."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is the funding agreement between the plaintiffs and CFI fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
"(a) The funding agreement helps to promote one of the important goals of the CPA —
providing access to justice. That goal would be illusory if access to justice were deterred by
the prospect of a crushing costs award to be borne by the representative plaintiff or counsel. In
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this sense, the agreement is beneficial to the proper administration of justice […] Just as
[CFAs] have been recognized as providing access to justice, so too third party indemnity
agreements can avoid the unfortunate result that individuals with potentially meritorious
claims cannot bring them because they are unable to withstand the risk of loss: see McIntyre
Estate at para. 55. (b)... (c) ... (j) "In McIntyre Estate ... the Court of Appeal held that a
lawyer's contingent fee agreement was not per se prohibited by the Champerty Act and that it
was necessary for the court to consider the reasonableness and fairness of the fee structure in
the Contingency Fee Agreement. ... The court therefore concluded that it was premature to
determine whether the agreement was reasonable and fair because the fee payable might
prove to be unreasonable when considering the factors that courts historically take into
account in fixing lawyers' fees..."
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Travassos v. Tattoo (2011 ONSC 2290)
2011 CarswellOnt 3193, 2011 ONSC 2290, 19 C.P.C. (7th) 209, 200 A.C.W.S. (3d) 984
Date

Heard: April, 2011
Judgement:April, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff: Travassos (Ruben and Ana)
Defendant: Moonshin Tattoo; Mason; Smith; Regional Municipality of Peel; Peel Public
Health

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Todd J. McCarthy; Sean A. Brown
For Defendant: Linda Phillips-Smith, for Defendants, Regional Municipality of Peel, Peel
Public Health

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

Defendants CM and ES operated defendant tattoo parlour. Defendant public health
department was regulation and investigating authority governing activities of
defendant tattoo parlour. In March 2009, defendant public health department warned that
approximately 3,000 patrons who received tattoos or piercings at tattoo parlour may have
been put at risk for blood-borne infection due to non-sterile instruments or equipment. In
March 2009 plaintiffs commenced class action against defendants. After action commenced
parties engaged in settlement discussions culminating in formal mediation. Information for
purposes of settlement discussions was that no tattoo customers tested positive for for
Hepatitis B or C or for HIV. Parties arrived at proposed settlement which included
compensation for uninfected persons, infected persons and contingency fee includes of GST,
HST and disbursements. Parties brought motion for certification of class for purposes of
settlement.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss.5(1)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

30% CFA: "In March 2009, Mr. Travassos retained Flaherty Dow Elliott & McCarthy to
commence a class action. He signed a contingency fee retainer agreement that stipulates a fee
of 30% of the value of any settlement."
Settlement Agreement included the following:
 Class Counsel shall seek, with the consent of Peel, court approval of a contingency
fee of $275,000.00, inclusive of GST, HST, and disbursements.
 The contingency fee, if approved, shall be paid from the Uninfected Fund, thereby
reducing the fund from $900,000.00 to $625,000.00.
Settlement is $1.1M: (including: "Peel Region and Peel Public Health shall establish a fund of
$900,000.00 (the "Uninfected Fund") […] Peel shall establish a fund of $200,000.00 (the
"Infected Fund")."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are class counsel’s fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Application granted.
“I approve the counsel fee [as set-out in the Settlement Agreement]. I believe that the Class
Counsel have earned their fee. The fee is fair and reasonable compensation in all the
circumstances.” (para 34)
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Robertson v. ProQuest Information & Learning Co. (2011 ONSC 2629)
2011 CarswellOnt 2923, 2011 ONSC 2629, [2011] O.J. No. 2013, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 406, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 345
Date

Heard: April, 2011
Judgement: May, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff: Robertson
Defendant: Proquest; Cedrom; Toronto Star; Rogers Publishing; Canwest Publishing

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Kirk Baert; Celeste Poltak
For Defendant: Donald A. Cameron, Christina Capone-Settimi, for Defendant, ProQuest
Information and Learning LLC
Wendy Matheson, Andrew Bernstein, for Defendant, Rogers Publishing Limited
Ernest M. Chan, for Defendant, Cedrom-SNI Inc.
Ryder Gilliland, for Defendant, Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd

Judge/s

Then: C. Horkins J.

Quick Facts

"The statement of claim alleges that the defendants breached class members' rights to their
articles and literary works under the Copyright Act, … By the defendants' reproduction,
distribution and communication of these works to the public in electronic media, such as
online databases, without the permission of authors or the copyright holders, the plaintiff
claimed the defendants had infringed the class members' copyrights." Motion to approve
settlement and legal fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

CFA: "The retainer agreement provides that payment of legal fees and disbursements would
be contingent upon success at trial or settlement of this matter. The retainer agreement
provides that legal fees are based upon the multiplication of a base fee by a multiplier to be
determined by the court [value of Class Counsel's total docketed time is $1.2M]."
Class counsel requests fees in the amount of $1.9 million (exclusive of taxes disbursements),
equivalent to 24% or 1.7 multiplier of settlement.
Settlement of $7.9M: "Under the terms of the settlement agreements, Toronto Star... have
agreed to pay [$3.475M] and ProQuest has agreed to pay [$2M]. In addition, there will be the
proceeds from the sale of the Postmedia shares [$2.4M] for a total of [$7.9M]."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Counsel’s fees approved at the requested amount.
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Baker Estate v. Sony BMG Music (Canada) Inc. (2011 ONSC 7105)
2011 CarswellOnt 15453, 2011 ONSC 7105, [2011] O.J. No. 5781, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 586, 31 C.P.C. (7th) 320, 98
C.P.R. (4th) 244
Date

Heard: November, 2011
Judgement: November, 2011

Parties

Plaintiffs/Moving Parties: Estate of "Chet" Baker et al.
Defendant/Respondents: Sony et al.

Counsel

For Plaintiffs/Moving Parties:
For Defendant: Danielle Royal, for Defendant / Respondent, Universal Music Canada Inc.
Timothy Pinos, Casey M. Chisick, for Defendants / Respondents, CMRRA, SODRAC

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

"Unfortunately… Chet Baker, an American trumpeter and jazz singer, and his heirs, ... did not
receive full compensation for the use of his works by others. This was the result of a royalty
and licensing system in Canada that permitted third parties, such as the defendants, Sony
BMG Music (Canada) Inc. ("Sony"), EMI Music Canada Inc. ("EMI"), Universal Music
Canada Inc. ("Universal") and Warner Music Canada Co. ("Warner") (collectively, the
"Record Labels"), to reproduce and distribute copyrighted musical works owned or controlled
by musicians or their rights holders, without having a licence to do so or without paying the
royalties due to the rights holders.... This class action was brought in 2008 on behalf of artists
and rights holders who had not received full compensation for the use of their works"

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

30% CFA: "Both representative plaintiffs executed contingent fee agreements that stipulated a
maximum counsel fee of 30% of the amount recovered."
"The fee request made by Class Counsel is approximately 15% of the gross settlement value
[$7.6 million total, $6.95 million for legal fees and $87 k for taxes and disbursements] and
therefore represents a significant discount of the fee to which Class Counsel is contractually
entitled. The fee request is supported by both Mrs. Baker and Mr. Northey."
"The fee request is opposed by the Collectives, by Universal and by [WCMC]. "WCMC takes
the position that the fee is excessive in light of the services rendered by Class Counsel, when
balanced against the complexity of the matter, the importance of the matter to the Class, the
expectations of the Class and the effect that the fee will have on the recovery achieved by the
Class."
Settlement: "Under the terms of the settlement, as ultimately implemented, a total of [$46.7M]
is to be paid into a settlement trust for the benefit of Class members."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“If class proceedings are to realize the goal of access to justice, Class Counsel must be
liberally compensated to ensure that they take on challenging but difficult briefs such as this
one." "If first-class lawyers cannot be assured that the Courts will support their reasonable fee
requests, how can the Courts and the public expect them to take on risky and expensive
litigation that can go for years before there is a resolution?"
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Voutour v. Pfizer Canada Inc. (2011 ONSC 7118)
2011 CarswellOnt 14961, 2011 ONSC 7118, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 307, 38 C.P.C. (7th) 360
Date

Heard: November, 2011
Judgement: November, 2011

Parties

Plaintiffs: Jesse Voutour ("JV"); Eiko Voutour ("EV"); Waheed; Perotta
Defendants: Pfizer

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: B.C. McPhadden, J. Rochon, I. Erez, A. Thorsen
For Defendants: G. Zakaib, E. Larose

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"Pfizer … manufactured and marketed the drugs Bextra and Celebrex ["Pfizer drugs"], which
are prescription, non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory drugs ("NSAIDs"), a class of drugs used for
the treatment of inflammation and associated pain… In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs allege
that the drugs caused serious and life-threatening adverse reactions and that the Defendants
knew or ought to have known of these risks and failed to warn Canadian consumers
sufficiently or at all and failed to take appropriate steps related to the risks." Motion for
approval of settlement and counsel fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

The Representative Plaintiffs signed retainer agreements that all involve CFAs, but the
agreements differ:
A. 604-682-3377The retainer with PW: 30% of the amounts recovered or on the
basis of a 3 times multiplier, whichever is higher.
B. with PP, 25% of the amounts recovered or on the basis of a 3 times multiplier,
whichever is higher.
C. The retainers with JV and EV: 25% of the amounts recovered"
As a term of the proposed Settlement Agreement Class Counsels seeks $4 million in legal
fees plus disbursements of $212,068.87 plus applicable taxes.
Settlement: $12 million

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsels’ fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“Class Counsel have earned their fees including what amounts to a quite modest premium
above their hours and hourly rates for what was difficult and high-risk products liability
litigation against a formidable foe that has not admitted liability.” (para 74)
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Banerjee v. Shire Biochem Inc. (2011 ONSC 7616)
2011 CarswellOnt 14798, 2011 ONSC 7616, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 616
Date

Heard: December, 2011
Judgement: December, 2011

Parties

Plaintiff/Moving Party: Banerjee
Defendants/Respondents: Shire Biochem

Counsel

For Plaintiff/Moving Party: Darcy R. Merkur, Stephen Birman
Sylvie Rodrigue, for Defendants, Eli Lilly Canada Inc., Eli Lilly and Company
Malcolm N. Ruby, for Defendant, Shire Biochem Inc.
Christopher Hubbard, Keegan Boyd, for Defendant, Draxis Health Inc.

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

"on behalf of residents of Canada who were prescribed a drug called "Permax"… Permax was
approved for sale in Canada... and was successfully used to treat thousands of Canadians with
Parkinson's disease.... The plaintiff alleged that a very small percentage of users of Permax
experienced behavioural changes, broadly described as "impulse control disorders" ("ICDs").
These included compulsive gambling, hyper-sexuality, compulsive shopping and compulsive
eating." This is a motion by the plaintiff, on consent of the defendants, for approval of the
settlement and legal fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees
& Settlement

"the retainer agreement signed between the representative plaintiff and Class Counsel
stipulates a contingency fee of 15% over and above partial indemnity costs... In addition, the
retainer agreement permits Class Counsel to seek an order for a multiplier of up to four times,
being applied to the fees charged, where the outcome of the litigation warrants such a
multiplier."
Counsel requests $762k on this motion ($812k [inclusive fees and disbursements] - $50k
(disbursements) = $762k).
Settlement: "the defendants will pay [$2.4M] in settlement of the claims of the Class together
with a contribution of [$300k] towards costs."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. 32%
“The proposed settlement applies a litigation risk discount of approximately 50% to the claim
of each Class member, as quantified by Class Counsel. This discount reflects the fact that the
outcome of the litigation is far from certain.”
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Simmonds v. Armtec Infrastructure Inc. (2012 ONSC 5228) and (2012
ONSC 44)
Summary

not really a case about CFA and the case is more about what happens when two competing
firms are trying to sue the same P.

Minor CFA Issue

Does a difference in page length (in this case, between a five-page CFA and one-page CFA)
make one agreement ‘stronger’ than the other?
From (2012 ONSC 5228): “As noted earlier [in (2012 ONSC 44)], Thomas J. concluded
that fact was of little consequence because the fee charged by class counsel is subject to
court approval.” (para 70)

Kidd v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (2012 ONSC 740)
2012 CarswellOnt 1064, 2012 ONSC 740, [2012] O.J. No. 506, 19 C.P.C. (7th) 378, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 787, 95
C.C.P.B. 73
Date

Heard: January, 2012
Judgement: February, 2012

Parties

Plaintiffs: Kidd; Harvey; Marentette; Yip; Henderson; Yeomans
Defendants: Canada Life Assurance Company; Symons; Loney; Grant

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: M. Zigler, C. Godkewitsch, D.B. Williams; D. Brown, L. Sokolov;
For Defendants: J. Galway, for Defendant, Canada Life Assurance Company
J. Field, for Defendants, A.P. Symons, D. Allen Loney, James R. Grant

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

In 2005, David Kidd, Alexander Harvey, and Jean Paul Marentette brought a proposed
class action against Canada Life Assurance Company and the other defendants. The
Plaintiffs make three major claims. One claim concerns the ownership of the surplus assets
of the Pension Plan. The Plaintiffs plead that amendments to the Pension Plan concerning
the reversion of surplus assets to Canada Life on Plan and Fund termination are unlawful
and are of no force or effect. The second claim concerns the payment out of surplus funds
to certain groups of employees whose participation in the Pension Plan was terminated and
who have a claim for a partial winding-up of the Pension Plan. The third claim concerns
negating Canada Life's alleged entitlement to be reimbursed for expenses on behalf of the
Pension Plan. The Plaintiffs plead that Canada Life should restore monies, estimated to be
in excess of $41 million. Motion for approval of retainer agreement and fees

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29
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Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

Mr. Marentette retained Harrison Pensa LLP and Koskie Minksy LLP on a contingency fee
basis to represent him and other class members. He signed a Retainer Agreement.
Messrs. Kidd, Harvey, Mr. Yeomans and Ms. Henderson, signed identical retainer
agreements. The agreements provide that:
 in the event of success, Class Counsel may apply to the court for approval of a
multiplier of 3.0;
 commencing one year after the execution of the retainer, an additional multiplier of
0.01 would be applied for each month until judgment or settlement up to a
maximum multiplier of 3.5; and
 under no circumstances can legal fees exceed 25% of the total amount recovered
Settlement: "the total financial benefit to Class members is estimated at [$54M], plus
payment of all of their legal fees and expenses estimated at [$5M]."
[Note: "After many years of negotiating, the parties reached a settlement... Untypically and
perhaps without precedent, the proposed Class Members have voted for or against the
settlement... There are 5,228 persons in the classes. As of ... 4,293 Class Members (82%)
voted in favour of settling their claims in accordance with the Surplus Settlement
Agreement."]
A. “With the support of the class representatives, Class Counsel [Class Counsel
Koskie Minsky LLP and Harrison Pensa LLP] seek court approval of a fee request
in the amount of [$4.7M] plus applicable taxes and disbursements of [$61k] (less
than 10% of the value of the settlement on a net basis after payment of all
expenses).
B. In another motion, Class Counsel Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP requests an Order:
(a) approving the payment of Class Counsel's fees, taxes and disbursements in the
amount of [$120k] for legal services to the Adason Representative Plaintiffs.

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Are counsels’ requested fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motions granted.
"In my opinion, considering the facts described above and the factors relevant to assessing
the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee request, there is no doubt that the retainer entered
into by the representative plaintiffs should be approved and that Class Counsel's fee request
should be approved and I do so in accordance with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.
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Robinson v. Rochester Financial Ltd. (2012 ONSC 911)
2012 CarswellOnt 1368, 2012 ONSC 911, [2012] 5 C.T.C. 24, [2012] O.J. No. 534, 212 A.C.W.S. (3d) 20, 27
C.P.C. (7th) 351
Date

Heard: January, 2012
Judgement: February, 2012

Parties

Plaintiff: Kathryn Robinson; Rick Robinson
Defendant: Rochester Financial Limited et al

Counsel

For Plaintiffs/Moving Parties: David Thompson, Matthew G. Moloci
For Defendants/Respondents: Glenn Smith, Sean O'Donnell

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

"The action relates to a tax shelter called the Banyan Tree Foundation Gift Program, which
operated in 2003-2007. It has been referred to as a "leveraged" charitable donation program
because, in return for a proportionately small out-of-pocket payment, a taxpayer was
purportedly entitled to ratchet-up his or her donation and to receive a charitable tax receipt
equivalent to 3 1/2 times the amount of his or her cash outlay." Motion for approval of
settlement and legal fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

25% CFA: "Class counsel entered into a [CFA] with the representative plaintiffs that
provided for a contingent fee of 25% of the total value of any settlement."
"Class Counsel request approval of the payment of [$3.3M] for their fees, disbursements
[of $200k] and taxes."
Settlement: "… mediation… total sum of [$11M]. Approximately $7.75 million of this
amount will be paid to class members in proportion to the charitable contributions they
made, under a distribution plan that will be administered by class counsel. The balance will
be used to pay the fees and disbursements of class counsel and the costs of administration
of the settlement"

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s requested legal fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
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Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 3837)
2012 CarswellOnt 8440, 2012 ONSC 3837, 41 C.P.C. (7th) 333
Further reasons to the partial settlement reached in Osmun v. Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 3837) – see
above
Parties

Plaintiff: Osmun; Metro (Windsor) Enterprises
Defendant: Cadbury Adams Canada; Hershey Company; Nestle Canada; Mars; Itwal
Limited

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Charles M. Wright
For Defendant: Scott Maidment, Lisa Parliament, for Defendants, Hershey Company,
Hershey Canada Inc.
Christopher P. Naudie, for Defendant, Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. (now Kraft Canada
Inc.)
Catherine Beagan Flood, for Defendant, Nestlé Canada Inc.
Donald Houston, for Defendant, ITWAL Limited
Matthew Milne-Smith, for Defendants, Mars Incorporated and Mars Canada Inc.

Judge/s

Then: G.R. Strathy J.

Quick Facts

Partial settlements were reached in class action. Settlements were approved in Ontario.
Settlement included payment of $5,795,695.60 for benefit of settlement class members.
Motion was brought for approval of fees and disbursements of class counsel. (The
settlements are conditional upon approval of the courts in each of Ontario, British
Columbia and Québec.)

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 32, 33.

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

“The retainer agreement entered into with the plaintiffs in this action as of December 1,
2007, provides that in the event of success in the action, Ontario class counsel will be paid
any disbursements (not already recovered from the defendants as costs), plus applicable
taxes and interest in accordance with s. 33(7)(c) of theClass Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O.
1992, c. 6 ("C.P.A."), plus the greater of:
a. the base fee increased by a multiplier of 4, less any fees already
recovered as costs, plus applicable taxes; or
b. if a settlement is reached before examinations for discovery, 30% of the
settlement, less any fees already paid, plus applicable taxes.”
“Class counsel in Ontario and B.C. request fees of $1,335,235.12 with respect to the
settlement, plus disbursements of $81,231.04 and G.S.T. in the amount of $70,729.60, for a
total of $1,487,195.76. The fee represents 25% of the portion of the settlement amount
allocated to the Ontario and B.C. settlement classes ($5,340,940.48) and is less than the
30% permitted by the retainer agreements entered into with the plaintiffs in this action and
the B.C. action.”
Settlement: " Hershey Canada will pay [$5.3M] for the benefit of the settlement class
members and the claims against Hershey will be dismissed."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
Class counsel's fee approved in amount of $1,487,195.76.
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Rowlands v. Durham Region Health (2012 ONSC 3948)
2012 CarswellOnt 8668, 2012 ONSC 3948, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 779
Date

Heard: July, 2012
Judgement: July, 2012

Parties

Plaintiffs: Rowlands
Defendants: Durham Healh Region; Regional Municipality of Durham; Durham Health
Department

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Todd J. McCarthy; Sean A. Brown; Matthew J. Stepura
For Defendant: David B. Boghosian; Ward Branch; Laura Day

Judge/s

Then: P.D. Lauwers J.

Quick Facts

"... a nurse employed by the Durham Regional Health Department lost a digital memory
USB key. It held the unencrypted personal and confidential information of 83,524
individuals who... received an H1N1 immunization shot at a clinic in Durham Region. The
plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of the Class Members for damages arising
out of the loss of the USB key, and especially in light of the prospect that the confidential
information about the Class Members contained in the USB key might be used to facilitate
identity theft." MOTION for approval of settlement and class counsel fees [$500k].

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA "The Representative Plaintiff entered into [CFA] with Class Counsel. Since the
inception of this claim, the retainer agreement stipulated a counsel fee of 25% of the value
of any claim awarded to a Class Member. ...The promise of 25% of the value of any claim
awarded to a Class Member is a motivating factor to ensure that Class Counsel remains
interested and involved in the Claims Process, which will benefit claiming Class
Members."
Settlement Agreement provides for the payment of costs to class counsel in the additional
amount of $500,000.00 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, plus 25 per cent of actual
claims paid by the defendant in the future.
Settlement: "Durham Region and its insurer ... not prepared to pay compensation to a Class
Member in the absence of an actual financial loss." "Class Members who believe they have
suffered economic harm as a result of the loss of the USB key can submit a Claim by
completing the Claim Form. The Class Member must provide sufficient information to
allow the Defendants to determine the harm they have suffered and to take steps to mitigate
that harm."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s requested legal fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. $500k approved.
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Krajewski v. TNOW Entertainment Group Inc. (2012 ONSC 3908)
2012 CarswellOnt 8567, 2012 ONSC 3908, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 757
Date

Heard: June, 2012
Judgement: July, 2012

Parties

Plaintiff: Krajewski; Brandsma; Dunbrack
Defendant: Tnow Entertainment Group; Ticketmaster; Premium Inventory

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: Ward Branch, Jay Strosberg; Luciana Brasil
For Defendants: Wendy Matheson; Stuart Svonkin

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"Messrs. Krajewski, Brandsma, and Dunbrack's action concern [actions in different
Canadian provinces]: (a) the primary market sale; and (b) the secondary market resale of
tickets for music, sports, theatre and other events at prices that the plaintiffs allege
contravene the provisions of the Ticket Speculation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 17... While each
of the actions is based on a different [provincial] statute, the theory of the plaintiffs is the
same; namely, the sale of primary and secondary market tickets to the plaintiffs and to the
members of the proposed classes was contrary to the various statutes. The plaintiffs seek a
number of remedies, including an injunction restraining the defendants and others from
selling primary and secondary tickets at prices which contravene the statutes and damages
based upon unjust enrichment and conspiracy." Motion to approve settlement and legal
fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss.5(1), 29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: "[P.] signed a [CFA]. He (and each of the plaintiffs in the companion actions) agreed
to a fee of 25% of the settlement amount, plus disbursements and applicable taxes. He also
agreed that regardless of whether success was achieved in the Ontario Action, Class
Counsel would be paid all costs recovered in the action, which as noted above is [$850k]"
"Class Counsel seek an immediate payment of [$850k], plus 25 percent of each cheque that
is cashed by a Settlement Class Member."
Note: "Before preparing for the consent certification and settlement approval hearing, Class
Counsel docketed time valued at [$1.14M]. Assuming that all of the Settlement Class
Members cash their refund cheques, the projected fee would provide a multiplier of 1.1."
AND "Mr. Krajewski supports the fee request, and there are no objections to the amount
sought."
Settlement: "Assuming that all of the Settlement Class Members cash their refund cheques
(of $36 per ticket purchased), the projected recovery is [$5.03M]."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. $850k now and 25% of each cheque cashed
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Lundy v. VIA Rail Canada Inc. (2012 ONSC 4152)
2012 CarswellOnt 9152, 2012 ONSC 4152, 111 O.R. (3d) 628, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 21, 41 C.P.C. (7th) 347
Summary

Only mention of CFA: " In the case at bar, the proposed representative plaintiffs are Sandra
Lundy, Allison Kaczmarek and Marc Couroux. The proposed representative plaintiff will
have a conventional lawyer and client relationship with the lawyer of record, usually
formalized by a written Contingency Fee Agreement. There may be some unconventional
elements to their relationship with class counsel, such as an indemnity agreement or
funding from the Law Foundation or third party funder, but the lawyer and client
relationship will be governed by the traditional common law and equity that governs the
relationship between a lawyer and his or her client."
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Markson v. MBNA Canada Bank (2012 ONSC 5891)
2012 CarswellOnt 17304, 2012 ONSC 5891, [2012] O.J. No. 4967, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 335, 42 C.P.C. (7th) 202
Date

Heard: October, 2012
Judgement: October, 2012

Parties

Plaintiff: Markson
Defendant: MBNA Canada Bank

Counsel

For Plaintiff/Moving Party: Margaret L. Waddell, Kirk Baert
For Defendant/Respondent: Jill Lawrie, David Noseworthy

Judge/s

Then: C. Horkins J.:

Quick Facts

"The action [originally started in 2004] relates to cash advance transaction fees and related
compound interest that MBNA charged and received. The fees and interest occurred when
MBNA customers took a cash advance using the credit facilities accessed through their
MBNA credit cards ("Cash Advances")... The plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (i)
breach of contract, (ii) unjust enrichment and for restitution of criminal interest paid to
MBNA Canada Bank ("MBNA"), and (iii) a declaration that MBNA has violated s. 347 of
the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46." MOTION by plaintiff for approval of [A]
settlement and [B] class counsel fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

30% CFA: "agreement provided that fees were to be fixed at 30% of any settlement or
award, subject to court approval"
"Class Counsel seek approval of their fees in accordance with this agreement, in the amount
of [$2.4M] (30% of [$8M]), plus applicable taxes and disbursements."
Note: Under the terms of the contingency fee retainer agreement, they will receive a
premium of about $500,000, or less than a multiple of 1.3 on their docketed fees. No one in
the class has complained about the amount of fees."
Settlement: "... MBNA will pay [$8M] into an interest bearing account, which will
comprise the Settlement Fund to be paid out as follows:
1. Class Counsel's fees and disbursements, inclusive of taxes, as approved by the court, will
be deducted from the Settlement Fund.
[...]
4. The balance of the Settlement Fund will be divided by the number of open MBNA
accounts as of November 30, 2011 where at least one Cash Advance has been taken (the
"Distribution Class Members"..."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. 30%
"In summary, I conclude that this settlement is fair and reasonable and in the best interests
of the class as a whole."
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Toronto Community Housing Corp. v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator (Canada)
Ltd. (2012 ONSC 6626)
2012 CarswellOnt 14602, 2012 ONSC 6626, 44 C.P.C. (7th) 361
Date

Heard: November, 2012
Judgement: November, 2012

Parties

Plaintiff: Toronto Community Housing; Housing Services Incorporated
Defendant: Thyssenkrupp Elevator

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: Linda R. Rothstein; Odette Soriano
For Defendants: John P. Brown

Judge/s

Then: C. Horkins J.

Quick Facts

"The plaintiffs allege that the defendants ["TKE"] negligently designed and manufactured
the sheave jammer, and then knowingly sold and installed the negligently designed sheave
jammers. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, not the elevator owners, are liable for
the costs associated with removing the sheave jammers and replacing them with an
alternate emergency braking device.... The available evidence shows that class members
replaced approximately 2,100 sheave jammers in elevating devices in Ontario as a result of
[a] TSSA Order. The average replacement cost was $10,000 per sheave jammer [P. allege
that TKE charged the owners for the preventative maintenance and should not have]"
MOTION for approval of the settlement of this class action and class counsel fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: 30% "Class counsel entered into a [CFA] retainer with the representative plaintiffs
whereby fees were to be fixed at 30% of any settlement or award, subject to court
approval."
Counsel sets their fee in accordance with the CFA, in the amount of $3.5M plus applicable
taxes, and $5k for future disbursements.
Note: The representative plaintiffs agreed that these fees are reasonable
Settlement: "The defendants have paid [$12M] into an interest bearing account, which will
comprise the Settlement Fund"

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
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Sugar v. Kim Orr Barristers Professional Corp. (2012 ONSC 6668)
2012 CarswellOnt 14968, 2012 ONSC 6668, 222 A.C.W.S. (3d) 806
Quick Facts

This case involves a lawyer trying to claim money for work done with a law firm, but that
is the extent of the CFA discussion. The most telling quote: "The Defendant understood
that no one works for free, especially given Mr. Kim's view that there was no reasonable
expectation that the Plaintiff would actually be joining the firm. The Plaintiff understood
that class counsel do not get paid unless they are ultimately successful in winning or
settling the case so that their fees can be deducted from the proceeds paid to their clients.
He had himself negotiated a contingency fee retainer agreement with the Defendant for the
Precious Metal case, and he was certainly aware of the basis on which the Defendant would
be paid, if at all, for the Timminco, WCC, and Manulife claims."

144

Woods v. Redeemer Foundation (2012 ONSC 7254)
2012 CarswellOnt 16446, 2012 ONSC 7254, 224 A.C.W.S. (3d) 266, 43 C.P.C. (7th) 211
Date

Heard: December, 2012
Judgement: December, 2012

Parties

Plaintiff: Woods
Defendant: Redeemer Foundation; Redeemer University College

Counsel

For Plaintiff: David Thomson
For Defendant: John Downing

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"In 1989, [Redeemer University College established a "Foregiveable loan" program where
students would pay for tuition and Redeemer would issue charitable donation tax receipts in
return]. By way of example, a $10,000.00 education cost per year would generate a
charitable donation tax credit of approximately 29% of the "donation" amount, being
$2,900.00 ... [after factoring in education tax credits, etcetera, the] net cash outlay for a
$10,000.00 education cost per year was $4,250.00 [which is $3,350 less than without the
Program]”. The CRA then became involved, disallowing] the charitable donation tax
credits for 2001 and 2002. Donors became liable for interest charges on income tax
reassessments..." "Proceedings in the tax courts followed and eventually a settlement with
the CRA. Mr. Wood retained Scarfone Hawkins LLP as proposed Class Counsel in an
action against the Defendants." MOTION for approval of the settlement, for approval of
payment of class counsel fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: "... Class Counsel receive a legal fee of 30% of the value of settlement benefits
available to the Class."
Class Counsel requests legal fees, disbursements, and taxes in the amount of $65k all
inclusive.
Note: "Mr. Wood recommends the approval of the settlement. There were no objectors to
the settlement." AND "It represents significantly less than Class Counsel is entitled to
under the [CFA], and less than the value of time spent. There is no premium or multiplier."
Settlement: "Class Counsel estimates that the value of the settlement is approximately
$400,000.00, based on their being approximately 200 Class Members, with an average of
$1,000.00 per year of participation in the Forgiveable Loan Program."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
"In my opinion, Class Counsel should be commended for taking on this small class action.
It provided access to justice for the Class Members and a fair and reasonable settlement.
The fee request should be approved."
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Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2013 ONSC 853)
2013 CarswellOnt 1303, 2013 ONSC 853, 226 A.C.W.S. (3d) 26
Date

Heard: January, 2013
Judgement: February, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Eidoo; Cygnus Electronics Corporation
Defendant: Infineon; Hynix Semiconductor; Samsung Electronics; Samsung
Semiconductor; Micron; Elpida Memory

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: Jonathan J. Foreman, Robert L. Gain
For Defendant: Adam D.H. Chisholm, for Micron Technology, Inc. and Micron
Semiconductor Products, Inc. O/A Crucial Technologies
Eric Hoaken, Emrys Davis, for NEC Corporation, NEC Corporation of America, NEC
Canada, Renesas Electronics Corporation, and Renesas Electronics America, Inc.
Christine Kilby, for Nanya Technology Corporation and Nanya Technology Corporation
USA
Eliot Kolers, for Infineon Technologies AG, Infineon Technologies Corporation and
Infineon Technologies North American Corporation
John P. Brown, for Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America Inc. and
Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing America, Inc.
Christopher Naudie, for Elpida Memory Inc.

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

In the first class action Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation sue: Infineon
Technologies [and about twelve others, including Samsung]... In the second class action,
Mr. Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics sue: Hitachi Ltd. [and 23 others, including Mitsubishi
and Toshiba]
All the actions concern allegations that the Defendants conspired to fix prices in DRAM
(dynamic random access memory) devices. The second action in Ontario is in effect a
device to add defendants as co-conspirators to the conspiracy alleged in the first class
action. The claims in the various actions are for: (a) breach of Part IV of the Competition
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34; (b) civil conspiracy; and (c) tortious interference with economic
interests."
MOTION for approval of four partial settlements, for ancillary relief, and approval of class
counsel’s fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: "The Ontario Fee Agreements, which were previously approved by this Court,
provide for a fee payable of up to 30% of the value of any settlement plus disbursements
and applicable taxes."
Class Counsels' fee at $6.99M and disbursements of $134k. "Since commencing the
Proceedings, Class Counsel have docketed $4.53M worth of legal services at their regular
hourly rates. They have incurred disbursements of $637k since commencing the various
class actions."
Settlement: "Together, the Settlement Agreements total $23.33M. This brings the total
recovery to over $29M"... Plaintiffs in British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec actions
entered into a settlement agreement with Elpida... Under the terms of the agreement, Elpida
agreed to pay $5.75M plus interest in exchange for a full release of claims. The Elpida
Settlement contained what is known as a Most Favoured Nation or MFN clause. Pursuant
to its MFN clause, Elpida is entitled to a refund of portions of its settlement fund payment
146

if its settlement is greater than specified settlement sums paid by certain specified codefendants. In other words, if the Plaintiffs settle for less than the confidential thresholds,
the Plaintiffs must refund the difference."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. at lower rate of 20% [absent distribution plan, 30% is not "fair and
reasonable".]
"it would not be in the best interests of the class members to reject these settlements
because of the absence of a distribution plan.” BUT “notwithstanding the absence of a
distribution plan, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class as a
whole."
“I also approve Class Counsel's fee, but not as requested... I am awarding $4.18M, all
inclusive.” "A fee calculated on the basis of 30% percent of the recovery may ultimately be
fair in this litigation; however, in my opinion, at this juncture of the litigation without Class
Counsel having completed the work of a distribution plan, a 30% fee is not fair and
reasonable. Thus, 20% of $29M [.20*29 = $5.8M] plus disbursements to date equals
$6.44M. Deducting the Elpida award yields an award of $4.18M, all inclusive."
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Morgan v. Sara Lee of Canada NS ULC (2013 ONSC 859)
2013 CarswellOnt 1304, 2013 ONSC 859, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 29
Date

Heard: February, 2013
Judgement: February, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Morgan
Defendants: Sara Lee Corporation; Tana Canada Inc.; Hanesbrands Canada

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Geoffrey D.E. Adair, Q.C.; Ian W.M. Angus
For Defendant: J.A. Prestage

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"... Christopher Prichard, the son of a pensioner with a pension plan from the Defendants,
approached Adair Morse LLP to investigate whether there was a claim against the
Defendants with respect its administration of its employee pension plans." the other issue is
that Adair LLP was dropped by the representative plaintiff in one of the actions (there were
two class actions), but this issue was ignored. MOTIONS for, among other things: (a) the
approval of a settlement in two actions under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992... (b) the
approval of several fee agreements; and (c) the approval of Class Counsels' fees in the two
class actions.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

20% CFA: “In May 2011, thirty-two pensioners signed a contingent retainer agreement
with Adair Morse LLP. The fees if the contingency was satisfied was 20% of any amount
recovered over 50% of the surplus plus unrecovered disbursements and all applicable
taxes.”
Settlement: "Under the Settlement Agreement, all of the surplus in both pension plans,
estimated to be $3.5M will be paid to the plan beneficiaries. In addition, $350k will be paid
in respect of all other claims including costs... in my opinion, all of the $350k can be used
to pay legal fees before encroaching on the surplus to be paid to the Class Members."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. 12%
"The aggregate legal accounts that have been approved by the Court total $415,000, all
inclusive"
"In all the circumstances of this case, I award Adair Morse LLP $340,000, all inclusive. I
approve the retainer agreement with Mr. Morgan. As noted above, Mr. Angus claims an all
inclusive fee of $109,593.05. This fee includes a multiplier of 1.5 of the base fee. In the
circumstances of this case, there is no basis for any multiplier. From a risk perspective, Mr.
Angus's retainer did not begin until after the settlement had been achieved. Although Mr.
Angus was unofficially involved and present at the mediation session, practically speaking,
he was retained by Mr. Scime for a second opinion... In all the circumstances of this case, I
award Mr. Angus a fee of $75,000 all inclusive of counsel fee and disbursements and
applicable taxes."
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Sa'd v. Remington Group Inc. (2013 ONSC 1404)
2013 CarswellOnt 2453, 2013 ONSC 1404, 115 O.R. (3d) 627, 49 C.P.C. (7th) 206
Date

Heard: March, 2013
Judgement: March, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Samir Sa'd
Defendant: Remington Group Inc.; Rouge Residences I Inc.; Rouge Residences II Inc.,

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Sean M. Grayson
For Defendant: Michael F. Cooper

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"Mr. Sa'd and other members of the proposed class purchased condominium units from
Rouge I and Rouge II in a development in Markham, Ontario that included the Rouge Bijou
Condominium Residences. Mr. Sa'd alleges that they were overcharged for development
charges. There are approximately 400 class members." MOTION (a) to certify the action …
(b) for approval of the Settlement Agreement ... and (c) for approval of Class Counsel's fee.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss.5, 5(1), 29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA "25% of the total settlement fund"
Settlement: "The Defendants have agreed to pay $578k to a settlement fund..."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Contingency fee of 25% approved.
"In my opinion, considering the facts described above and the factors relevant to assessing
the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee request, I am satisfied that Class Counsel's fee
request should be approved, and I do so in accordance with the Class Proceedings Act,
1992."
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Goodridge v. Pfizer Canada Inc. (2013 ONSC 2686)
2013 CarswellOnt 5615, 2013 ONSC 2686, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 941, 49 C.P.C. (7th) 342
Date

Heard: May, 2013
Judgement: May, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Goodridge; Davidson; Lauricella
Defendant: Pfizer Inc.

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Michael J. Peerless, Matthew D. Baer
For Defendant: Patricia D.S. Jackson; Nicole Martini

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"Pfizer Canada Inc. and Pfizer Inc. manufacture Neurontin, which is a prescription
anticonvulsant medication, approved by Health Canada in May 1994, for use as a
therapeutic antiepileptic agent, specifically as an adjunctive therapy for seizures. In this
class action on behalf of consumers of Neurontin, it was alleged that the majority of
Neurontin sales were for off-label use and that Neurontin was ineffective and/or defective
for these various off-label uses. It was further alleged that Neurontin can cause an increased
risk of suicidal behaviour and that consumers did not receive adequate warning of this
dangerous propensity of the drug. Pfizer vigorously denied that Neurontin can cause
increased risk of suicidal behaviour and, in general, that the issue of whether or not
antiepileptic drugs, including Neurontin, can increase the risk of suicide ideation and
suicidal behaviour is controversial." MOTION for approval of the settlement and for
approval of Class Counsel's fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFAs 30% and 25%: Ms. Goodridge and Mr. Davidson executed retainer agreements.
A. Ms. Goodridge's retainer with Dunn & Company provides for a legal fee of 30% of
any settlement achieved, plus disbursements and applicable taxes.
B. Mr. Davidson's retainer agreement with Siskinds provides for a legal fee of 25% of
any settlement achieved, plus disbursements and applicable taxes."
"Class Counsel is seeking to enforce the terms of the CFA entered into by Mr. Davidson
[25%], the lesser of the two percentage rates.... a legal fee of $1.04M plus disbursements of
$322k plus applicable taxes of ... for a total of $1.5M."
Note: “Class Counsel have not received any objections to the Settlement."
Settlement: Under the Settlement Agreement, the Defendants agree to pay $4.8M allocated
as follows: (a) $2.6M for Eligible Claims; ... (c) $400k for Administration Expenses,
including publication of notices and claims administration; and (d) $1.5M for Class
Counsel Fees including legal fees, disbursements, and applicable taxes.

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. (25% contingency fee approved)
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Sorenson v. Easyhome Ltd. (2013 ONSC 4017)
2013 CarswellOnt 7898, 2013 ONSC 4017, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 934, 49 C.P.C. (7th) 305
Date

Heard: June, 2013
Judgement: June, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Sorenson
Defendant: Easyhome Ltd.; Ingram; Goertz; Fregren

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Daniel E.H. Bach
For Defendant: Ronald Slaght, Q.C.

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"Mr. Sorenson... purchased 800 common shares of easyhome at a price of $11.90 per
share... [He] alleges that ... easyhome's public disclosures contained material
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts due to a significant employee fraud at
one of its kiosks, with the result that its share price was artificially inflated to the detriment
of the Class." MOTION for approval of a settlement and approval of Class Counsel's fee.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: 25% "Mr. Sorenson... signed a [CFA] that provided that Class Counsel's
compensation should be 25% of the total recovery available to Class Members obtained in
the Action, plus disbursements and taxes."
"Siskinds seeks approval of legal fees plus disbursements and applicable taxes in the
amount of $662k, broken down as follows: (a) legal fees, $563k; (b) H.S.T. ...; and (c)
disbursements (incl. taxes as applicable), $26k.
Note: Siskinds LLP docketed time is in excess of $183k and disbursements are in excess of
$23k, plus taxes. And, there have been no objections to the proposed settlement.
Settlement: easyhome agreed to cause its insurers to pay $2,250,000.00, into the Escrow
Account for the benefit of the Class...

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. (25% contingency fee approved)
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Blair v. Toronto Community Housing Corp. (2013 ONSC 4237)
2013 CarswellOnt 9409, 2013 ONSC 4237, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 686, 52 C.P.C. (7th) 399
Date

Heard: June, 2013
Judgement: June, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Blair
Defendant: Toronto Community Housing Corporation; Greenwin Property Management

Counsel

For Plaintiff: M. Teplitsky, Q.C.; S. Sagle
For Defendant: Peter Lukesiwicz, Deborah Templer, for Defendant, Toronto Community
Housing Corporation
Sarah Pottle, for Defendant, Greenwin Property Management Incorporated
Rivka Birkan, for Third Party, Forensic Investigations Canada

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"The apartment building was owned by the Defendant, Toronto Community Housing
Corporation ("TCHC") and operated by the Defendant Greenwin Property Management
Incorporated. After [a fire at 200 Wellesley Street East], the Defendant, TCHC, without
admitting that it had been at fault offered a Compensation Plan to the tenants and after
receiving independent legal advice about half of the tenants accepted the compensation
offered by TCHC, which I understand to have an average value of approximately $4,000
per dwelling unit tenant. These tenants released their claims against TCHC, and they
assigned to TCHC their claims against Greenwin. Ms. Blair, however, was not satisfied
with the Compensation Plan. She retained the law firms of Shell Lawyers and Teplitsky,
Colson LLP to commence a class action." MOTION for approval of a settlement and
approval of Class Counsel's fee.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

Ms. Blair signed a CFA but no details of the agreement are provided in the decision.
“Class Counsel asks that the Court approve a total of $1,150,000 as payment of all Class
Counsel legal fees. Of this amount, Class Counsel proposes that $500,000 will come from
the Legal Fees and Disbursements Amount ($1.4 million) and $650,000 will come from the
Claims Amount ($5.4 million).” (para 41)
Settlement: provides for, "$1.4M as the full and final contribution of the Defendants to the
legal fees and disbursements, including HST, including for all expenses related to the
distribution of settlement funds to individual Class Members... The balance of the Claims
Amount, namely $4.85M, will be distributed by Class Counsel to Class Members."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Settlement and counsel’s fee approved.
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Musicians' Pension Fund of Canada (Trustee of) v. Kinross Gold Corp.
(2013 ONSC 4974)
2013 CarswellOnt 11197, 2013 ONSC 4974, 117 O.R. (3d) 150, 230 A.C.W.S. (3d) 970, 55 C.P.C. (7th) 437, 6
C.C.P.B. (2nd) 82
Summary

interesting case about using third-parties to indemnify plaintiffs, but not really about CFAs.
Only real discussion of CFAs:"At the outset of the proposed class action, the Pension Fund
retained Koskie Minsky LLP as its lawyers, and the law firm agreed to take on the retainer
pursuant to a Contingency Fee Agreement, which has been disclosed to the court in the
material filed for this motion. The Contingency Fee Agreement is subject to court approval,
and ultimately the court supervises and determines Class Counsel's legal fees under the
provisions of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c.6.
12
Although Koskie Minsky was prepared to take on the risk of a contingency fee
retainer, it was not prepared to agree to indemnify the Pension Fund from any adverse costs
award, and thus, from the outset of the action, Koskie Minsky sought to secure funding for
any adverse costs awards made against its client, the Pension Fund."

Zaniewicz v. Zungui Haixi Corp. (2013 ONSC 5490)
2013 CarswellOnt 11949, 2013 ONSC 5490, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 319, 44 C.P.C. (7th) 178
Date

Heard: August, 2013
Judgement: August, 2013

Parties

Plaintiffs: Zaniewicz; Clarke
Defendants: Haixi Corporation; E&Y (auditors); Fengyi Cai; Manley; Ryan; Wahle; CIBC
World Markets; Canaccord Genuity; GMP Securities; Mackie Research Capital

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: Charles M. Wright, Douglas M. Worndl
For Defendant: Deborah Berlach, for Defendant, Zungui Haizi Corporation
Margaret L. Waddell, for Defendant, Michelle Gobin
Michael A. Eizenga, for Defendant, Michael W. Manley
James S.F. Wilson, for Defendants, Patrick A. Ryan, Elliott Wahle, and Margaret Cornish
Linda L. Fuerst, for Defendant, Ernst &Young LLP
Kent Thomson, Derek Ricci, for Defendants, CIBC World Markets Inc., Canaccord
Genuity Corp. (f.k.a. Canaccord Financial Ltd.) and Mackie Research Capital Corporation
(f.k.a. Research Capital Corporation) and GMP Securities LP

Judge/s

Then: Perell J.

Quick Facts

"securities class action under the Class Proceedings Act... The Plaintiffs Jerzy Robert
Zaniewicz and Edward C. Clarke advance common law tort claims and also statutory
claims with respect to the sale of the shares of Zungui Haizi Corporation in the primary and
secondary markets... The Plaintiffs are residents of Ontario. Each purchased common
shares of Zungui in the primary market. Mr. Clarke also purchased common shares of
Zungui in the secondary market. On August 22, 2011, Zungui issued a press release
announcing that its auditor, Ernst & Young LLP ("E&Y"), had suspended its audit of
Zungui's ... With that announcement, Zungui's shares immediately lost 77% of their value.
Subsequently, Zungui's shares became the subject of various temporary and permanent
cease trade orders, and they are now worthless." MOTION for certification for settlement
purposes and approval of three settlements, in addition to other approvals around the
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settlement process.
Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss.26, 26(1), 29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: "The Retainer Agreements with the Plaintiffs provide that Class Counsel may seek a
fee of up to 30% of the recovery."
"Class Counsel seeks $2.25M, plus disbursements, interest on disbursements, and
applicable taxes. The total request is for $2.81M."
Note: "...Class Counsel had docketed time of $648,386.00, excluding applicable taxes,
disbursements of $226,670.44, exclusive of applicable taxes." AND "Class Counsel is not
seeking to recover, and will not return to request payment of the time and disbursements
required to complete the administration of the settlement, which is estimated to be at least
$50k."
Settlement: "The Plaintiffs have concluded three settlements: (1) the Auditor Settlement;
(2) the Zungui Settlement; and (3) Underwriter Settlement. The Auditor Settlement is for
$2M. The Zungui Settlement is for $8M, and the Underwriter Settlement is for $750k...
Thus, if all the settlements are approved, the settlement funds will total $10.85M plus
interest before deductions for counsel fee and administrative expenses."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted but with a varied "Plan of Allocation"
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Glube v. Pella Corp. (2013 ONSC 6164)
2013 CarswellOnt 13746, 2013 ONSC 6164, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 16
Date

Heard: October, 2013
Judgement: October, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Glube; Terpstra
Defendant: Pella Corp.

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: Joel Rochon, John Archibald
For Defendants: Scott Maidment, Lindsay Lorimer, Calie Adamson

Judge/s

Then: Conway J.

Quick Facts

"This is a product liability case. In the proposed class action, the plaintiffs allege that
design and manufacturing defects in Pella windows and doors allowed water to penetrate
the aluminum cladding and failed to protect the surrounding wood from rot. They allege
that class members suffered damage, including the cost of repairing or replacing the Pella
products.... A parallel U.S. proceeding [is] underway. From the outset class counsel in the
Ontario action had a relationship with the lead counsel in the U.S. proceeding, as well as
with their U.S. fenestration (window and door) expert." MOTIONS approving the
settlement pursuant to s. 29(2) of the Class Proceedings Act, and approving class counsel
fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, s.29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: "Pella will pay class counsel, subject to court approval, legal fees in the all-inclusive
amount of $650k. [disbursements = $10k]". Nature of agreement not provided beyond the
$650k all-inclusive figure.
"Class counsel submits that it has spent over 450 hours on the case as of September 22,
2013, representing over $250k in unbilled time, exclusive of taxes. It anticipates spending
another $40k to $60k on the hearing and subsequent administration of the settlement.
Disbursements are approximately $10k. That works out to a multiplier of 2.2 times
counsel's base fee ... and a multiplier of less than 2 when the additional fees are included."
Settlement: The Settlement Agreement contains the following principal terms:
a. Eligible claimants may receive cash benefits under the settlement either through a
claims process or an expedited and streamlined arbitration process. Under the
former, they may receive a maximum amount of $750 per structure; under the
latter, they may receive up to $6000 per structure.
b. Pella will offer discounts, at various rates, to class members who repaired or
replaced their windows.
c. Pella will pay each of the two plaintiffs an honorarium of $5000 based on their
important assistance in the investigation of the case and their roles in shepherding it
forward.
d. Pella will pay class counsel a class counsel fee of $650,000, which amount is
inclusive of all disbursements and taxes, subject to court approval.
e. Pella will pay all notice costs and the costs of settlement administration.

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. $650k paid by Pella approved.
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Patel v. Groupon Inc. (2013 ONSC 6679)
2013 CarswellOnt 15030, 2013 ONSC 6679, 234 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847
Date

Heard: September, 2013
Judgement: October 20143

Parties

Plaintiff: Patel
Defendant: Groupon Inc.

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Louis Sokolov, Christine Davies, Nadine Blum
For Defendant: Laura K. Fric, Robert Carso

Judge/s

Then: Edward Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

"The plaintiff alleges that Groupon engaged in "unfair practices" contrary to provincial
consumer protection legislation by selling Groupon vouchers with illegal expiration dates.
The plaintiff further alleges that Groupon illegally required consumers to use the entire
"groupon" in a single transaction, or lose any remaining balance. The proposed class action
is framed in breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of consumer protection
legislation and unjust enrichment. There are about one million potential class members in
Canada. Shortly after the commencement of this action, Groupon changed its terms of
service to clarify that the purchase value of the Groupon vouchers would not expire.
However, despite these changes, Groupon did not take any steps to refund the purchase
price of class members' expired groupons and continued to publish deal pages that, on their
face, included an expiry date and, in the plaintiff's view, did not make clear that the expiry
date only referred to the promotional value and not to the purchase value. The lawsuit,
therefore, continued." MOTION for approval of the settlement agreement and approval of
class counsel fees, payable by Groupon, in the amount of $235k.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, ss.5, 5(1), 29(2)

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: 20% contingency fee ("If class counsel had based their legal fees request on a 20
percent contingency, they would have arguably been entitled to $457k in legal fees.")
Counsel requests approval for the lower amount of $235,000.
Settlement: "The value of the overall settlement, on the most conservative measure, would
thus be $2.285M ($535k plus $1.75 million in "non-monetary value.")"

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“the legal fees are approved but only because they are less than what would have been
awarded on a contingent fee basis. […] As part of the settlement, the defendant has agreed
to pay legal fees of $235,000 directly to class counsel.”
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Roveredo v. Bard Canada Inc. (2013 ONSC 6979)
2013 CarswellOnt 15486, 2013 ONSC 6979, 234 A.C.W.S. (3d) 845
Date

Heard: November, 2013
Judgement: November, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Roveredo; Premsukh
Defendant: Bard Canada Inc.; Davol Inc.

Counsel

For Plaintiffs: Harvin Pitch; Colin Stevenson
For Defendants: Michael Eizenga; Christiaan Jordaan

Judge/s

Then: Edward Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

"This medical-devices class action was commenced on behalf of individuals who had been
implanted with certain surgical mesh products ("the Covered Products") used to repair
ventral or abdominal hernias. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to warn
Canadian patients of the Covered Products' risk of failure which allegedly could result in
serious injuries and even death... In addition to this action, three other proposed class
proceedings were launched - in B.C., Alberta and Quebec." MOTION 30% for approval of
the settlement agreement and for approval of class counsel fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA 30% "Class counsel's retainer agreement provided for counsel fees of 30% on the first
$20 million (subject to court approval) and the payment of all disbursements."
Counsel requests approval for a 30% contingency fee per the CFA.
Settlement "A national settlement has now been achieved and is conditional on this court's
approval. Under the settlement agreement, the defendants will pay $1.38M into a settlement
fund. After deducting legal fees, notice and administration costs ..., the balance will be paid
out to class members."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. (30% contingency fee approved)
“Most judges, myself included, are prepared to approve contingency fees in the range of
20% to 25%. If more is being sought, such as the 30% herein, class counselare typically
required to make further submissions justifying these additional five percentage points.
Here, however, I am satisfied that the full 30%, as requested, should be approved." "It
would therefore be unfair in the extreme to deny class counsel a CFA award that, by any
measure, is a fraction of the legal costs that were actually and legitimately incurred."
"30% contingency fee amount of $413k is therefore approved. The $184k in disbursements
are also approved."
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Snelgrove v. Cathay Forest Products Corp. (2013 ONSC 7282)
2013 CarswellOnt 17592, 2013 ONSC 7282, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 25
Date

Heard: November, 2013
Judgement: November, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff: Snelgrove
Defendant: Cathay Forest Products Corp.; Ng; Perron; Wong

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Charles M. Wright; Nicholas C. Baker
For Defendant: Jeremy Devereux, Jennifer Teskey, for Cathay Forest Products Corp., Luc
Perron, John Duncanson and John Housser
D. Gallo, for Defendants, Raymond Lo & Paul Wong

Judge/s

Then: H.A. Rady J.

Quick Facts

"This action is a class proceeding brought by and on behalf of current and former
shareholders of Cathay Forest Products Corporation. Cathay is a junior forestry company
incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44. It was
involved in the development of tree plantations, sub-concession of harvesting rights and log
trading in the People's Republic of China and forest harvesting operations in the Russian
Federation... The plaintiff's allegations in the action include the following: Cathay's ...
prospectus and the financial statements that were the subject of the February 4, 2011
restatement contained materially misleading statements about Cathay's financial statements
not in accordance with Canadian generally accepted accounting principles; [...] Cathay's
share price during the class period was artificially inflated. The claim pleads common law
causes of action in negligence and negligent misrepresentation as well as statutory causes
of action for prospectus misrepresentation, secondary market misrepresentation and
oppression pursuant to the Securities Act and the Canada Business Corporations Act."
Application to approve settlement agreement and for approval of class counsel fees.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: 25% "There was a Contingency Fee Agreement by the terms of which the firm was
entitled to recovery of 25% of any settlement or judgment."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is class counsel’s requested fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Application granted.

Settlement: "global settlement amount of $1.9M CAD"

"the firm has agreed to reduce its percentage to approximately 21% to recognize the fact
that it did not achieve precisely the level of success that it had wished. In addition, it is
entitled to reimbursement for disbursements incurred."
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Cannon v. Funds for Canada Foundation (2013 ONSC 7686)
2013 CarswellOnt 17784, 2013 ONSC 7686, [2013] O.J. No. 5825, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 24
Date

Heard: October, 2013
Judgement: December, 2013

Parties

Plaintiff/Moving Party: Cannon
Defendant/Responding Party: Funds for Canada Foundation; Donations Canada Financial
Trust; Appleby Services (Bermuda) Ltd.; et al

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Margaret Waddell; Samuel Marr; Andrew Lewis
For Defendant: Not disclosed on Westlaw

Judge/s

Then: Edward Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

Class action settlement was approved and class members received $28.2 million. Court
previously approved 25 per cent of settlement for class counsel based on precedent, but
invited supplementary submissions. Application by class counsel to vary order to allow full
one-third contingency fee, which amounted to $9.4 million.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement,
Requested Fees &
Settlement

CFA: 1/3 or 33% ($9.4M) – counsel requests an increased fee per the 1/3 allowance in their
CFA
Settlement: "The class members will receive about $28.2 million."

Contingency Fee
Issue/s

Is counsel’s request fee fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
"The one-third contingency is not excessive because it is in line with the percentages that
are charged in the personal injury area. And there is no suggestion that the $9.4M amount
that class counsel will receive is unseemly or inherently unreasonable. In short, no reasons
have been advanced to rebut the presumption of validity"
"I reviewed several of the decisions, expecting to find persuasive reasons for capping the
legal fees at say, 20 to 25 per cent and not allowing the 30 per cent or one-third that had
been agreed to in the retainer agreement. What I found, instead, were well-intentioned
judicial efforts to rationalize legal fee approvals by discussing arguably irrelevant or
immeasurable metrics such as docketed time (irrelevant) or risks incurred (immeasurable.)
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By using these metrics, judges felt comfortable building up a reasonable legal fees award
that was capped at the 20 to 25 per cent level, sometimes 30 per cent but rarely, if ever,
approved at the one-third level." "What I suggest is this: contingency fee arrangements that
are fully understood and accepted by the representative plaintiffs should be presumptively
valid and enforceable, whatever the amounts involved. Judicial approval will, of course, be
required but the presumption of validity should only be rebutted in clear cases based on
principled reasons. Examples of clear cases where the presumption of validity could be
rebutted include the following: (i) Where there is a lack of full understanding or true
acceptance on the part of the representative plaintiff...
(ii) Where the agreed-to contingency amount is excessive. I, for one, am prepared to accept
that a one-third contingency is presumptively reasonable and acceptable in the class actions
area because that amount that has been found to be reasonable and acceptable (and
successful) in the personal injury area...
(iii) Where the application of the presumptively valid one-third contingency fee results in a
legal fees award that is so large as to be unseemly or otherwise unreasonable..." "But to the
extent that the retainer agreement provides for a percentage-based fee approach rather than
the multiplier approach, I will be one judge that will accept a fully understood one-third
Contingency Fee Agreement, Requested Fees & Settlement as presumptively valid."
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Urlin Rent-A-Car Ltd. v. Champion Laboratories Inc. (2014 ONSC 577)
2014 CarswellOnt 1085, 2014 ONSC 577, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 73
Date

Heard: January 8, 2014
Judgment: January 24, 2014

Parties

Urlin Rent-A-Car Ltd., Plaintiff
Champion Laboratories Inc., Honeywell International Inc, Wix Filtration Products, Affina
Group Inc., Cummins Filtration Inc., Cummins Filtration International Corp., Cummins
Inc., The Donaldson Company, Baldwin Filters Inc., ArvinMeriotr Inc., ArvinMeritor
Filters Operating Company LLC (f/k/a Purolator Products NA LLC, ArvinMeritor Holding
Company (f/k/a Purolator Products Company LLC) and ArvinMeritor Canada, Defendants

Counsel

C. Wright, K. McGladdery Dent, for Plaintiff
R. Kwinter, for Defendant, Champion Laboratories Inc.
S. Forbes, for Defendant, Honeywell International, Inc.
D. Kent, for Defendants, Wix Filtration Products and Affina Group Inc.
P. Martin, for Defendants, Cummins Filtration Inc., Cummins Filtration International Corp
and Cummins Inc.
C. Chow, for Defendant, Baldwin Filters Inc.
D. Houston, for Defendants, ArvinMeritor Inc., ArvinMeritor Filters Operating Company
LLC (f/k/a Purolator Products NA LLC, ArvinMeritor Holding Company (f/k/a Purolator
Products Company LLC) and ArvinMeritor Canada

Judge/s

H.A. Rady J.

Quick Facts

The claim alleges a price fixing conspiracy for aftermarket filters in Canada. Aftermarket
filters are oil, air, fuel and transmission filters sold as replacement filters for automobiles,
trucks and other vehicles. The claim was narrowed to include oil and air filters only, which
account for the majority of the filters market. A parallel action is proceeding in Quebec and
related claims have been made in the United States. The plaintiff seeks approval of a
settlement it has reached with the defendants which resolves the litigation in its entirety, as
well as for counsel’s legal fees.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA provides for:
 25% contingency fee
Counsel has reduced their fee request to 19% so that when added to disbursements, the
25% level is not surpassed. Settlement reached is for $350,000 CDN.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Are the proposed legal fees under the CFA fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Both settlement and legal fees requests approved.
Fees and disbursements are fair and reasonable, and the settlement recovery is “modest and
undoubtedly disappointing to the plaintiff,” but this comes with the nature of class action.
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Waldman v. Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (2014 ONSC 1288)
– appealed in Waldman v Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (2015 ONCS 53) – see last row of this chart
2014 CarswellOnt 2674, 2014 ONSC 1288, 120 C.P.R. (4th) 127, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303, 56 C.P.C. (7th) 81
Date

Heard: February 19, 2014
Judgment: March 4, 2014

Parties

Lorne Waldman, Plaintiff
Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, Defendant

Counsel

Jordan Goldblatt, M. Edwardh, for Plaintiff
Andrew Bernstein, for Defendant

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Class action alleged defendant infringed copyright of class members by making available
without permission and for fee copies of court documents authored by class members and
their law firms on Litigator. Parties signed settlement subject to court approval. Defendant
agreed to make changes to copyright notices on Litigator and to terms of its contract with
subscribers. Settlement agreement provided for cy-pres trust fund. Individual class
members, who might opt-out, received no monetary award under settlement agreement,
and signed release and granted non-exclusive license of their copyrights in court
documents to defendant. Seven class members opposed settlement agreement. Class
counsel brought motion for approval of CFA and for court approval of counsel fees of
$825,000 all-inclusive. Class counsel's fee is paid as term of proposed settlement
agreement.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Class counsel (Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP, with assistance of Deeth Williams Wall
LLP) moved for approval of the CFA with the plaintiff, Mr. Waldman for counsel fees of
$825,000, all inclusive.
In proposed settlement agreement Thomson settles a $350,000 cy-près trust fund to
support public interest litigation. Thomson also agrees to make changes to the copyright
notices on Litigator and to the terms of its contract with subscribers. The individual Class
Members, who may opt-out, receive no monetary award under the Settlement Agreement,
and they sign a release and grant a non-exclusive license of their copyrights in the court
documents to Thomson.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Class counsel contingency fee was contingent on success of settlement approval, as it was
a term therein. If settlement approved then question is, is class counsel’s fee “fair and
reasonable”?

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed. Settlement and agreement and thus class counsel fee not
approved. No order as to costs.
“It is wrong to make the payment of Class Counsel's Fee, in effect, a pre-condition to
approval of the settlement agreement.” (para 115) “…the court should have been afforded
the option of reducing the Counsel Fee as it thought appropriate and then approving the
Settlement
Agreement. For settlement approval purposes, better still is the situation where the court
has the option of reallocating a portion of class counsel's fee to enhance the benefits of
class members.” (para 118)
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Appealed in (2015
ONCA 53)

Waldman v. Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd. (2015 ONCA 53) – appeal by plaintiff from
judgement reported in (2014 ONSC 1288) – see above
“The appellant, supported by the respondent, argues that, in any event, an appeal lies to
this court under s. 6(1)(b) of the CJA because the order refusing to approve the settlement
agreement is a final order of a judge of the Superior Court. He argues that this is a final
order because, although the litigation could continue, the settlement agreement has been
finally dismissed. The appellant submits that, where the approval of a settlement has been
determined, substantive rights are affected. He argues that this situation is therefore
different from the dismissal of a motion for summary judgment, which typically neither
finally determines an issue in the litigation nor affects substantive rights.” (para 18)
Held: Appeal quashed. No costs ordered because both appellant and respondent allied in
favour of ONCA’s jurisdiction.
“Here, although the settlement agreement was not approved, the litigation continues, and
the parties cannot be said to have lost a substantive right relating to the merits of the
litigation. The order is interlocutory and any appeal lies to the Divisional Court with
leave.” (para 23)
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Slark (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario (2014 ONSC 1283)
2014 CarswellOnt 2725, 2014 ONSC 1283, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 302
Date

Heard: February 25, 2014
Judgment: March 4, 2014

Parties

Marilyn Dolmage as Litigation Guardian of Marie Slark and Jim Dolmage as Litigation
Guardian of Patricia Seth, Plaintiffs
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, Defendant

Counsel

Kirk M. Baert, Celeste Poltak, David Rosenfeld, for Plaintiffs
Robert Ratcliffe, John Kelly, Jonathan Sydor, for Defendant

Judge/s

Conway J.

Quick Facts

Actions related to three provincially operated residential facilities for individuals with
developmental disabilities were commenced. In each action, plaintiffs alleged that
defendant Crown was negligent and breached its fiduciary duties in funding, operation,
management, administration, supervision and control of facility. All three actions were
settled and settlements approved by court. Total cash payment by Crown in settlement
was $70.7 million. Class counsel sought global fee for actions in amount of $14 million,
plus disbursements of approximately $1.6 million and taxes of $1.78 million. Class
counsel brought motion for approval of its fees pursuant to ss. 32 and 33 of Class
Proceedings Act.

Statute/Rules
Considered
Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 29(2).
CFA in Huronia action:


at least the sum of 3.0 and 0.01 for every month between the date of the
agreement and date of settlement approval – in this case multiplied is 3.5, making
class counsel entitled to fees of $15,556,016
CFAs in Rideau and Southwestern actions


4.0 multiplier or 30% of any settlement – in this case class counsel entitled to
fees of $6,185,700 for Rideau and $3,624,300 for Southwestern
However, class counsel seeks only 20.68% or 19.8% (when notice and administration costs
are added in) of settlement fund.
Issue/s with
Agreement

Are the fees sought by class counsel fair and reasonable? (Note: they seek a lesser
amount that provided for under their retainer agreements, see ‘CFA Breakdown’ above)

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“The fees sought are well below what class counsel is entitled to recover under its
retainer agreements entered into at the start of this litigation. The amount of
these fees has further been approved by the litigation guardians in all three actions
recently, in January 2014, after the settlement figures were known. The fees are certainly
within the expectations of the class.” (para 14)
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Ducharme v. Solarium De Paris Inc. (2014 ONSC 1684)
2014 CarswellOnt 3383, 2014 ONSC 1684, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 304
Date

Heard: March 7, 2014
Judgment: March 20, 2014

Parties

Doris Ducharme, Plaintiff
Solarium de Paris Inc., Defendant

Counsel

William J. Sammon, for Plaintiff
Brian C. Elkin, for Defendant

Judge/s

Robert J. Smith J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff brought class action alleging negligence by defendant in design and manufacture
of solariums. Plaintiff brought motion to settle certification order and notice to class to
obtain orders with respect to costs. Defendant brought cross-motion to amend class
definition, to remove representative plaintiff, and to decertify class action.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA – no details of the CFA were given

Issue/s with
Agreement

Defendant expressed concern that the notice does not sufficiently inform class members
of the financial arrangement. In particular, the notice sets-out that legal fees are to paid
on a contingency basis, i.e. under a CFA.

Outcome

Held: Plaintiff’s motion granted. Defendant’s cross-motion dismissed
On CFA issue: “The legal fees charged will have to be approved by the Court in any
event, which will ensure that the fees charged are fair and reasonable to class members.
To ensure that class members are fully informed the following sentence should be added:
"Any member of the class will be provided with a copy of the retainer agreement with the
representation plaintiff on request".” (para 22)
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Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v. Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP
(2014 ONSC 4118)
2014 CarswellOnt 9299, 2014 ONSC 4118, 242 A.C.W.S. (3d) 776, 31 B.L.R. (5th) 46
Date

Heard: June 26-27, 2014
Judgment: July 8, 2014

Parties

Excalibur Special Opportunities LP, Plaintiff
Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP, Defendant

Counsel

Margaret L. Waddell, Nasha Nijhawan, for Plaintiff
Tim Farrell, Jordan Page, for Defendant

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff was Canadian investor, who was among 57 accredited investors under Unites
States legislation for transaction refinancing American-owned hog producer in China.
Accredited investors were provided with memorandum that included clean audit report
prepared by defendant accounting firm. Accredited investors invested some $7.5 million
before learning that producer lacked financial controls over its all-cash-business.
Producer went out of business. Plaintiff brought class action against defendant for
negligence and negligent misrepresentation in production of clean audit report. Plaintiffs
brought motion for certification.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 5(1), 5(1)(a), 6.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA – no CFA at play but Perell J does talk a bit about CFAs in the context of his reasons
denying certification, see ‘Outcome’

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – see ‘Outcome’

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
As part of his reasoning, Perell J commented that “… there are no significant economic
barriers to litigating that would need to be overcome by a class action procedure.” (para
207) and neither Excalibur nor class members in this case need a class action in order to
obtain access to justice. In saying so, he states that: “There is ample her[e] for
a contingency fee, and Class Counsel would not be confronted with the risks associated
with obtaining certification.” (para 206)
Followed: Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch (2014 SCC 7); Hunt v. T &
N plc ([1999] SCR 959); Lipson v. Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP (2011 – Ont SCJ);
Parsons v. McDonald's Restaurants of Canada Ltd. (2005 – Ont CA); Silver v. Imax
Corp. (2009 – Ont SCJ)
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Hodge v. Neinstein (2014 ONSC 4503)
– see also (2015 ONSC 7345) below
2014 CarswellOnt 10316, 2014 ONSC 4503, [2014] O.J. No. 3572, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 537, 58 C.P.C. (7th) 37
Date

Heard: July 23-24, 2014
Judgment: July 29, 2014

Parties

Cassie Hodge, Applicant
Gary Neinstein and Neinstein & Associates LLP, Respondents

Counsel

Peter I. Waldman, Andrew Stein, for Applicant
Chris G. Paliare, Odette Soriano, Nasha Nijhawan, for Respondents

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Applicant had motor vehicle accident personal injury claim and hired respondent lawyer
and law firm to prosecute her statutory benefits and tort claims. Applicant signed CFA.
Litigation ended and applicant paid contingency fee. Applicant brought proposed class
action proceeding on behalf of all contingency fee clients of respondents. Applicant
asserted respondents fraudulently, in breach of contract and in breach of fiduciary duty
contravened contingency fee provisions of Solicitors Act and its regulations. Applicant
sought certification of application as class proceeding.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Alleged breach of Solicitors Act, ss. 28.1(8), 28.1(9), and 15 – considered ss 23-25,
28.1(8)-(10).
Also considered: Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 5(1)(a)-(e), 6; Rules of
Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 7.08; Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg.
195/04, ss 5, 7.

Contingency Fee
Agreement

Ms. Hodge signed a standard form stating: “In consideration for the professional services
provided and the risks in funding all costs and disbursements by N&A, I/We do hereby
understand and agree that N&A's legal fees arising from this Retainer agreement will be
25% of the damages recovered on my/our behalf, plus partial indemnity costs (which will
be no more than 40% of the total recovered) plus disbursements.” (para 66)

Issue/s with
Agreement

Major complaint: alleged contravention of sections 28.1(8) and 28.1(9) of the Act,
which prohibit, without court approval, a [CFA] that includes in the fee any amount of
costs recovered by the client and that stipulates that a [CFA] subject to approval is not
enforceable unless it is approved. Applicant submits that ss. 28.1(8) and 28.1(9) of
the Act are a free-standing strict liability civil wrong.
Also, alleged breach of s. 15 of Solicitors Act and its regulations: “Every conceivable
contravention is alleged, including:(a) the Respondents not following the formalities for
the formation of an enforceable [CFA]; (b) the Respondents not advising their clients
about their rights and choices in retaining a lawyer; (c) the Respondents misrepresenting
and deceiving the clients about their rights; and (d) the Respondents charging fees and
disbursements that contravened the substantive provisions of the statutory regime that
governs [CFA]. The Respondents are accused of contravening other provisions of the
Solicitors Act or breaching their professional responsibilities by improperly charging
disbursements and interest.” (para 4)

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
Application was not certifiable as class action. While identifiable group might have been
victimized by respondents, clients would have been victimized as individuals, common
issues criterion was not satisfied. Class proceeding was not appropriate procedure to
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obtain access to justice for group of individual claimants without commonality other than
possibility of having been victimized by same entity. Attempt to find commonality by
asserting that ss. 28.1(8) and 28.1(9) of Solicitors Act was strict liability offence failed.
Application satisfied cause of action criterion and breach of fiduciary duty and breach of
contract claims could be certified because it was not plain and obvious that they were
precluded by s. 23 of Solicitors Act and they had some evidentiary footprint.
Followed: Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch (2014 SCC 7); Fischer v. IG
Investment Management Ltd. (2013 SCC 69); Hunt v. T & N plc
Additional Reasons
given in Hodge v
Neinstein (2014
ONSC 6366)

Concerning costs to judgement earlier reported:
“In my opinion, I agree with Ms. Hodge that $390,000 is too high and beyond what an
unsuccessful party, even one that provoked the other side with the type of allegations
found in the immediate case, could fairly expect to pay. However, I think that $185,000 is
too low.” and,
“…having regard to the factors that influence the exercise of the court's discretion as to
costs, the Respondents should receive costs on a partial indemnity scale of $300,000 plus
HST, plus disbursements of $28,758.45.” (paras 97 and 98)

See also… (2014
ONSC 706)

In an earlier judgement in the same year, Hodge v Neinstein (2014 ONSC 706), class
action plaintiffs brought a motion to amend litigation plan, amend notice of application,
for leave to file further affidavits, and for costs and cross-examination. Hodge was
largely unsuccessful on the omnibus motion and costs were ordered against her.
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Hodge v. Neinstein (2015 ONSC 7345) – appeal of (2014 ONSC 4503)
2015 CarswellOnt 18937, 2015 ONSC 7345, 261 A.C.W.S. (3d) 272, 342 O.A.C. 306
Date

Heard: May 21, 2015
Judgment: December 9, 2015

Parties

Cassie Hodge, Appellant
Gary Neinstein and Neinstein & Associates LLP, Respondents
Law Foundation of Ontario, Intervenor

Counsel

Peter I. Waldman, Andrew Stein, for Appellant
Chris G. Paliare, Odette Soriano, Denise Cooney, for Respondents
Scott C. Hutchinson, Sherif Foda, for Intervenor, Law Foundation of Ontario

Judge/s

Then J., Molloy J., Lederer J.

Quick Facts

At trial court, plaintiff (Cassie Hodge) brought proposed class proceeding alleging that
defendant lawyer and firm used improper contingency fee agreements and took
unauthorized fees, failed to obtain court approval when required by law, and charged
illegal interest rates on disbursements. Plaintiff brought application to certify action as
class proceeding.
Trial judge found that plaintiff pleaded tenable cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty and breach of contract, as well as for application under s. 23 of Solicitors Act to
determine whether the contingency fee agreement was fair and reasonable. Trial judge
found that plaintiff failed to establish free-standing cause of action for a strict liability
claim under s. 28.1. Trial judge also ruled that there was an identifiable class capable of
definition and that the plaintiff was an acceptable representative, but that the claim failed
on the common issue requirement (claim would be too individualistic for class
proceeding). Application was dismissed and plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of
$328,758.45 to defendants. Plaintiff appealed.
(See Hodge v Neinstein 2014 ONSC 4503)

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 5.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s. 347. (no allegation of criminal conduct in this
case)
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, ss. 15, 16(1), 16(2), 23-25, 28.1(1)-(11), 33(2)
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R. 21.01(1)(b)

Contingency Fee
Agreement &
Settlement
Breakdown

A. Standard form retainer agreement (see full description at para 27, 28)

Issue/s with



included clause stipulating that appellant pay 25% of damages recovered + any
recovery for partial indemnity costs (more than 40% of amount recovered)
 also included that appellant liable to pay disbursements
 agreement did not include provision, as required under the Regulations, advising
her that she was entitled to any costs recovered unless a judge ordered otherwise
B. No application was made to a judge for approval of the agreement, as required under s.
281(8) of the Solicitors Act
C. Ms. Hodge settled for an “all-in-settlement’ of $150,000 in her tort claim. Ms. Hodge
charged $60,326.49 in legal fees (+GST) + $48,942.37 for disbursements, leaving her
with a total recovered sum of $41,906.41.
Respondents used improper contingency fee agreements and took unauthorized fees,
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Agreement

failed to obtain court approval when required by law, and charged illegal interest rates on
disbursements
Costs plus Fees: The appellants seek a declaration that any contingency
agreement entered into by Neinstein & Associates with a client in which the firm has an
entitlement to take any portion of costs in addition to a fee is unenforceable. (para 78)
Interest Recovery Charges: including charge related to interest on disbursements
incurred by the firm during the course of the litigation (average amount per client is
$2000 x 6000 members of class = $12 million) (para 84-87)
Other Improper Charges: charging clients for disbursements (para 88-90)
Referral Fees: Ms. Hodge alleges that Neinstein & Associates improperly paid finder's
fees to other firms and charged these fees to their clients. (para 91)

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed. Trial judge’s costs order set-aside.
Per Molloy J., Then J.: Trial judge erred in law in interpreting the Act, all criteria for
certification had been met and the action should have been certified as a class proceeding.
Trial judge failed to consider that ss. 23 - 25 of the Act might not apply
to contingency fee agreements that did not comply with s. 28.1, which was an arguable
issue. It was also arguable that: 1) clients had right to seek declaration
that contingency fee agreements were unenforceable; 2) the appropriate remedy would be
disgorgement of money received by law firm in respect of invalid
contingency fee agreements. Legal issues would be common to all clients within the
class, and quantification of claims would be straightforward. Law firm would have to
establish whether there was a valid claim to be paid fees on quantum meruit basis. While
those counterclaims would be individual, that would not bar using class procedure to
determine common claims. Class procedure would be the preferable proceeding
Per Lederer J. (dissenting in part): The appeal should be allowed, but for different
reasons. The trial judge erred in principle. It was not plain and obvious that an action
which depends solely on s. 28.1 of the Solicitors Act cannot succeed. The cause of action
should have been certified. The trial judge's interpretation of the applicable sections of
the Solicitors Act was not necessarily wrong and the majority opinion is not necessarily
correct. It is not plain and obvious that an action relying solely on s. 28.1 will inevitably
fail.
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Fulawka v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2014 ONSC 4743)
2014 CarswellOnt 11626, 2014 ONSC 4743, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 804, 69 C.P.C. (7th) 134
Date

Heard: August 12, 2014
Judgment: August 27, 2014

Parties

Cindy Fulawka, Plaintiff
The Bank of Nova Scotia, Defendant

Counsel

David F. O'Connor, Louis Sokolov, J. Adam Dewar, Jordan Goldblatt, for Plaintiff / Class
Martin Sclisizzi, Markus Kremer, for Defendant / Bank

Judge/s

Edward P. Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

Class action alleged employer's compensation system unlawfully deprived class members
of overtime pay. Action was settled. Settlement “not only reflects well on the Bank of Nova
Scotia ("Scotiabank") but is also reasonable and in the best interests of the class” (para 1).
Settlement was orally approved by judge earlier and these written reasons followed…

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA retainer provided that class counsel was entitled to either 30% recovery or a 4.0
multiplier, in the event of a successful outcome.
However, instead of following the CFA, the parties negotiated a settlement template that
provided class members with a claims-made compensation process just described and a
separate legal fees component to be paid by Scotiabank. There was some disagreement over
legal fees so parties hired Stephen Goudge (retired judge of ONCA) to mediate, and if need
be, to arbitrate as well. The issue did indeed go to arbitration and Goudge determined the
base legal fees to be $3.8 million and then applied a 2.75 multiplier for a total
legal fees award of $10.45 million. Disbursements and taxes were also to be paid by the
bank.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not class counsel’s fee is fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Settlement approved.
“…the legal fees represent less than half of what class counsel would arguably have been
entitled to under the 30 percent contingency agreement. I am therefore satisfied that the
$10.45 million amount is fair and reasonable.” (para 23) Additionally, a $15,000
honorarium was granted for the representative plaintiff.

Approval for
revised settlement
brought in (2016
ONSC 1576)

Fulawka v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2016 ONSC 1576) – request for approval of revised
settlement and class counsel’s legal fees
“Unfortunately, as things turned out, the claims process did not go smoothly…” Following
months of negotiation and a two day mediation in December 2015 before the Hon. George
Adams, the parties agreed to a new and more streamlined payment approach and the terms
of the Settlement were revised.
Bank proposed to pay class counsel $2.3 million in legal fees, separate and apart from the
revised settlement.
Held: Revised settlement and class counsel’s legal fees approved.
Class counsel could have requested a 30% contingency recovery per the CFA retainer OR
class counsel could also have insisted on the 2.75 multiplier that was applied by the
arbitrator in setting the legal fees for the original settlement. Instead, they settled at $2.3
million which, for the fees portion, reflects only a 1.99 multiplier. (para 19)
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Horgan v. Lakeridge Health Corp. (2014 ONSC 5209)
2014 CarswellOnt 12213, 2014 ONSC 5209, 244 A.C.W.S. (3d) 571, 69 C.P.C. (7th) 98
Date

Heard: September 9, 2014
Judgment: September 9, 2014

Parties

Michael David Horgan, Plaintiff
Lakeridge Health Corporation, David J. Ross and Hak Ming Chiu, Defendants

Counsel

Jonathan Ptak, Jody Brown, for Plaintiff
Barry Glaspell, for Defendant, Lakeridge Health Corporation
Mary Thomson, Belinda Bain, for Defendants, David J. Ross and Hak Ming Chiu

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiffs tested positive for tuberculosis after being exposed to index patients at hospital.
Plaintiffs alleged their infections were caused by defendants' negligence. Plaintiffs
commenced two class actions ten years ago. Plaintiffs signed retainer CFAs that provided
that full reimbursement of disbursements and fees were to be product of base fee and
multiplier of four or contingency of 30 percent if action settled after commencement of
discoveries. Parties reached settlements. Class counsel brought motion: 1) for approval
of contingency fee of 30 percent on settlement (which was $510,000); 2) honorarium of
$10,000 for each of representative plaintiffs; and 3) class counsel agreed to perform and
assume all further costs of administration of settlement

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 29(2).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA provided for full reimbursement of fees and disbursement :
 either as the product of a base fee + 4.0 multiplier OR 30% of settlement
Counsel seeks approval for the 30% option. The contingency fee ($510,000) amounted to
less than 25% of the value of time invested by Class Counsel, which is approximately
$2.5 million. The Representative Plaintiffs recommend approval of the Class
Counsel Fee.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not class counsel’s requested fee is fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motions granted. Settlement approved and Class Counsel’s fee approved.
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Eidoo v. Infineon Technologies AG (2014 ONSC 6082)
2014 CarswellOnt 14546, 2014 ONSC 6082, 246 A.C.W.S. (3d) 730
Date

Heard: September 19, 2014
Judgment: October 20, 2014

Parties

Khalid Eidoo and Cygnus Electronics Corporation, Plaintiffs
Infineon Technologies Ag, Infineon Technologies Corporation, Infineon Technologies
North America Corporation, Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America
Inc., Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,
Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., Samsung Electronics America, Inc. Samsung Electronics
Canada Inc., Micron Technology, Inc. Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. o/a Crucial
Technologies, Mosel Vitelic Corp., Mosel Vitelic Inc. and Elpida Memory, Inc.,
Defendants

Counsel

Jonathan J. Foreman, Rob Gain, for Plaintiffs
Eliot Kolers, for Defendants, Infineon Technologies AG, Infineon Technologies
Corporation and Infineon Technologies North America Corporation
Linda Plumpton, Jonathan Roth, for Defendants, Mitsubishi Electronic Corporation,
Mitsubishi Electric Sales Canada, Inc., and Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics USA, Inc.
Laura F. Cooper, Zohaib Maladwala, for Defendants, Toshiba Corporation, Toshiba
America Electronics Components Inc. and Toshiba of Canada Limited
Anna Tombs, for Defendants, Winbond Electronics Corporation and Winbond Electronics
Corporation America

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Representative plaintiffs commenced two class actions in Ontario alleging defendants
conspired to fix prices of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) devices. Other
plaintiffs commenced companion actions in British Columbia and Quebec. Class counsel in
three jurisdictions worked together, focusing attention on BC action which proceeded
through discovery and preparation for trial. Settlements were reached with most defendants.
Plaintiffs brought motion for: 1) approval of final four settlement agreements, which would
bring aggregate recovery to $79.5 million; 2) leave to discontinue against remaining two
defendants, who were impecunious; 3) approval of distribution protocol and administration
protocol; 4) appointment of claims administrator and arbitrator; 5) approval of class
counsel fees of $16,851,367.64 plus taxes; 6) approval of disbursements of $178,245.64
and US$2,218.93; and 7) directions concerning budget for notice to class members.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 29(1) and (2).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Harrison Pensa LLP and Sutts Strosberg LLP each entered into a CFA with their respective
Ontario Representative Plaintiff client, which was court approved on July 27, 2012. It
provided for:
 a fee payable up to 30% of the value of any settlement
 + disbursements and applicable taxes
Camp Fiorante Matthews Mogerman entered into a CFA with the B.C. Representative
Plaintiff , which was court approved on July 26, 2012. It provided for:
 a fee up to 33.33% on any settlement or compensation pertaining to the case
 + disbursements and applicable taxes
Class Counsel, collectively are seeking a fee of 30% of the total settlement funds. The fee
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sought is less than that permitted under the B.C. Fee Agreement and consistent with the
terms of the Ontario and Québec Fee Agreements.
Issue/s with
Agreement

Are class counsels’ fees fair and reasonable?

Outcome

Held: Motions granted.
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Boudreau v. Loba Ltd. (2015 ONSC 1648) – appealed in (2015 ONSC 4877)
– see below
2015 CarswellOnt 3680, 2015 ONSC 1648, [2015] O.J. No. 1288, 252 A.C.W.S. (3d) 601
Date

Heard: December 17, 2014
Judgment: March 13, 2015

Parties

Joseph Andre Boudreau et. al., Plaintiffs
Loba Limited, et. al., Defendants

Counsel

Paul K. Lepsoe, for Plaintiffs, Moving Parties
Heather J. Williams, for Defendants, Responding Parties

Judge/s

Master C. MacLeod

Quick Facts

Federal public servants were led to believe they could transfer their accrued pension
monies to private sector pension plan if they left public service. Defendant structured series
of reciprocal transfer agreements with Treasury Board Secretariat. Minister revoked status
of defendant pension plan. Minister threatened to revoke registration of CWI pension plan
after plaintiff transferred her federal pension monies into plan. Lawyer was counsel for
defendant at time. Lawyer provided legal advice to plaintiff at time on application for leave
to appeal as well because there was commonality of interest. Lawyer was never on record
and did not represent plaintiff before court. Defendant commenced action against federal
government for compensation and retained plaintiff as lawyer. Parties entered into
contingency agreement. Action was resolved by settlement. Plaintiff asserted entitlement to
additional compensation because defendant wrongfully deducted expenses it was not
entitled to deduct and plaintiff sued defendant for difference. Plaintiff claimed lawyer and
law firm of record for defendant acted for her in connection with related matters, would
have to be witness in proceeding, and was in conflict of interest. Plaintiff (Suzanne
Boudreau) brought motion to remove lawyers (Michael Rankin and McMillan LLP) as
lawyers of record for defendant (Loba companies).

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Plaintiffs and defendants entered into a CFA on January 23, 2006, it provided for:
 plaintiffs to provide legal services at a modest hourly rate

Issue/s with
Agreement

Issue on the Motion: Whether or not Mr. Rankin's involvement on behalf of Ms.
Boudreau in respect of her own appeal is such as to disqualify him from acting for the
Loba defendants in this action over her fees. Is this a conflict of interest that requires the
defendants to retain new counsel?

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed. Defendants presumptively entitled to costs.
“I am not persuaded by the evidence before the court that Michael Rankin will be a
necessary witness. Mr. Parent will not be calling him. While some of his services and fees
charged by his law firm are undoubtedly included in the amounts charged against the
proceeds of settlement, it is far from clear that the only way to prove the legitimacy of the
legal fees is to call Mr. Rankin.” (para 59)



if litigation was successful then there would be further compensation, as a
percentage of the net proceeds of the litigation
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Boudreau v. Loba Ltd. (2015 ONSC 4877)
2015 CarswellOnt 11731, 2015 ONSC 4877, [2015] O.J. No. 4085, 256 A.C.W.S. (3d) 719
Date

Heard: July 9, 2015
Judgment: August 4, 2015

Parties

Joseph Andre Boudreau and Suzanne Boudreau, Plaintiffs/Appellants
Loba Limited, Welton Parent Inc. and Sylvain Parent, Defendants/ Respondents

Counsel

Paul K. Lepsoe, for Plaintiffs / Appellants
Heather J. Williams, for Defendants / Respondents

Judge/s

Kershman J.

Quick Facts

Defendants retained lawyer R for complex and protracted multimillion dollar tort action
against federal Crown dealing with tax and pension relating proceedings. Plaintiff B, as
one of former public servants, represented herself in related class action against Crown, in
which defendants were named as third parties. When B applied for leave to appeal decision
in class action, dealing with enforceability of same pension transfer agreement at issue in
defendants' action, R provided assistance with application due to commonality of interest.
R's invoice for such assistance was paid by defendants. Plaintiffs brought action against
defendants, alleging that they were owed for services rendered under contingency
agreement. Defendants retained R and his firm as counsel. Plaintiffs' motion to remove law
firm and lawyer as counsel for defendants was dismissed, with costs. Plaintiffs appealed

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Appellants and respondents entered into CFA on January 23, 2006. The agreement
provided that the plaintiffs would provide litigation support services and would be
compensated at a modest hourly rate. The agreement also provided that there would be
further compensation if Loba was successful in the litigation. This was expressed as a
percentage of the value of the settlement after deducting out of pocket expenses.

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – issue did not engage with the CFA itself, but rather with privileges around the S-C
relationship.

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed.
There was ample evidence to find that invoice for R's work for B was directed to
defendants such that it would be subject to shared privilege or that B had waived any
privilege over it. B's claim for privilege was inconsistent with reliance on it to support
contention that there was conflict of interest. Plaintiffs did not show that communication
was intended to be confidential at time it was made.
Followed: Heck v. Royal Bank (1993 – Ont Div Ct); Hryniak v. Mauldin (2013 SCC 7);
Karas v. Ontario (2011 – Ont Master); Mazinani v. Bindoo (2013 ONSC 4744)
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Kutlu v. Laboratorios Leon Farma, S.A. (2015 ONSC 5976)
2015 CarswellOnt 14822, 2015 ONSC 5976, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 476
Date

Heard: September 25, 2015
Judgment: September 28, 2015

Parties

Carleen Kutlu, Paige Towle and Rebekah Thomas, Plaintiffs
Laboratorios Leon Farma, S.A., Chemo Iberica, S.A. and Apotex Inc., Defendants

Counsel

Won J. Kim, Megan B. McPhee, Alexander Zaitzeff, for Plaintiffs
Christopher C. Watkins, for Watkins Law Professional Corporation

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

In fall 2013, lawyer CW planned to commence class action against three pharmaceutical
companies alleging that negligently packaged contraceptive drugs had led to unexpected and
unwanted pregnancies. He approached AZ, lawyer with whom he shared office space, to handle
matter. AZ, in turn, came to arrangement with KO, class action firm in Toronto, to act as lead
counsel. 73 potential class members signed retainer agreements with KO and with AZ as
counsel for CW's firm. In November 2014, three representative plaintiffs commenced within
proposed class action against three pharmaceutical companies including A Inc and L Co in
Ontario. In September 2013, however, two other representative plaintiffs had commenced class
action against A Inc and L Co in Alberta with respect to same cause of action. Even though KO
attended certification hearing to object, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, found that Alberta
appropriate venue for determination of proceeding and certified multi-jurisdictional class action
with national class. In within action, professional relationship between AZ and CW ended.
Plaintiffs delivered Notice of Change of Lawyers to change counsel from lawyers KO and CW
to lawyers KO and AZ. CW contacted clients to suggest they join Alberta action which had
already been certified and had settlement approval hearing scheduled. Plaintiffs brought motion
for declaration that Notice of Change of full force and effect, for injunction restraining CW
from contacting any putative class member who had retained KO and AZ, and for mandatory
injunction requiring CW to direct any potential class member to KO and AZ. CW brought
cross-motion for order removing him as lawyer of record, injunction restraining AZ from
communicating with class members who had retained him, and order relieving him of
undertaking not to speak to class members pending motions. CW also sought order requiring
KO and AZ to disclose financial arrangements between themselves and with class members.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 12.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA – details of CFAs not provided

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed. Cross-motion dismissed on terms. Current retainer agreements and
CFAs with respect to any Ontario action against Laboratories Leon Farma, SA, Chemo
Iberica, SA, and Apotex are rescinded.
It was not in best interests of putative class members to allow uncertified class action to
continue when there was alternative with right to opt out and further advanced already
existing. Single class action would best achieve goals of access to justice and judicial
economy. Defendants should not have to face two class actions.
“Without court approval, Mr. Zaitzeff and Mr. Watkins are not entitled to claim any fee,
contingent or otherwise, for any services performed or disbursements incurred to date for the
Plaintiffs or any Class Member…” (para 39)
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Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada (Trustees of) v.
Sino-Forest Corp. (2015 ONSC 6354)
2015 CarswellOnt 15742, 2015 ONSC 6354, 258 A.C.W.S. (3d) 680
Date

Judgment: October 15, 2015

Parties

The Trustees of the Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada, the Trustees
of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 793 Pension Plan for Operating
Engineers in Ontario, Sjunde AP-Fonden, David Grant, Robert Wong, Davis New York
Venture Fund, Inc. and Davis Selected Advisers L.P., Plaintiffs
Sino-Forest Corporation, Ernst & Young LLP, BDO Limited (formerly known as BDO
McCabe Lo Limited), Allen T.Y. Chan, W. Judson Martin, Kai Kit Poon, David J. Horsley,
William E. Ardell, James P. Bowland, James M.E. Hyde, Edmund Mak, Simon Murray,
Peter Wang, Garry J. West, Pöyry (Beijing) Consulting Company Limited, Credit Suisse
Securities (Canada), Inc., TD Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Corporation, RBC
Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch
Canada Inc., Canaccord Financial Ltd., Maison Placements Canada Inc., Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (successor
by merger to Banc of America Securities LLC), Defendants Proceeding under the Class
Proceedings Act, 1992

Counsel

A. Dimitri Lascaris, Daniel E.H. Bach, S. Sajjad Nematollahi, Kirk M. Baert, Jonathan
Ptak, for Plaintiffs
Robert Staley, Derek J. Bell, Jonathan G. Bell, for Defendants, Sino-Forest Corporation,
Simon Murray, Edmund Mak, W. Judson Martin, and Peter Wang
Robert Rueter, Sara J. Erskine, Jason Beitchman, for Defendant, Allen T.Y. Chan
Larry Lowenstein, Geoffrey Grove, for Defendants, William E. Ardell, James P. Bowland,
James M.E. Hyde and Garry J. West
Peter R. Greene, Kenneth A. Dekker, David Vaillancourt, for BDO Limited
Susan E. Friedman, Brandon Barnes, for Defendant, Kai Kit Poon

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiffs purchased securities with allegedly inflated value. Plaintiffs brought action
seeking in excess of $7 billion from defendants. Plaintiffs brought successful motion for
certification and for leave to bring secondary market misrepresentation claim under
Securities Act. Action was settled as against SDs (settling defendants) only, with SDs
agreeing to pay plaintiffs over $1.7 million in disbursements and taxes. Hearing to
determine costs conducted…

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 31(1).
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 131(1).
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss 130.1, 138.5; Securities Act, 1933, 15 U.S.C. 2A, s
12(a)(2)
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 49, 57.01.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

It is a term of the CFAs of all of the Plaintiffs (except Davis Selected Advisers, L.P. and
Davis New York Venture Fund, Inc.) that Class Counsel receive any costs recovered from
the Defendants in addition to a contingency fee. Also requires Plaintiffs to pay for
disbursements.

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – CFA-specific issues not engaged with at costs hearing
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Outcome

Held: Costs awarded (see para 152 for details)

Earlier motion by
trustees in (2014
ONSC 62)

Labourers' Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v. Sino-Forest Corp. (2014 ONSC
62): Motion by trustees for approval of claim and disbursement of funds.
Canadian Class Counsel and Insolvency Counsel requested fees equal to 16.9% of
settlement ($17,846,250.00 (exclusive of tax) for fees and $1,737,650.84 for
disbursements). “…in the absence of any substantive criticism of the requested fees, I am
satisfied that the requested fees and disbursements are consistent with the
Retainer Agreement entered into with the plaintiffs and are fair and reasonable.” (para 47) –
no issues with CFA retainer or fees requested.
US Class Counsel fees and disbursements also approved (20% of 10% of E&Y settlement =
Cdn $2,340,000) – there was no challenge to the fees requested.
Held: Motion granted. (Decision by Morawetz R.S.J.)
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Airia Brands Inc. v. Air Canada (2015 ONSC 6367)
2015 CarswellOnt 20387, 2015 ONSC 6367, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 857
Date

Heard: October 14, 2015
Judgment: October 14, 2015

Parties

Airia Brands Inc., Startech.Com Ltd., and QCS-Quick Cargo Service GMBH, Plaintiffs
Air Canada, AC Cargo Limited Partnership, Societe Air France, Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschappij N.V. dba KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines, Asiana Airlines Inc., British Airways
PLC, Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Lufthansa Cargo AG, Japan
Airlines International Co., Ltd., Scandinavian Airlines System, Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,
Cargolux Airline International, Lan Airlines S.A, LAN Cargo S.A., Atlas Air Worldwide
Holdings Inc., Polar Air Cargo Inc., Singapore Airlines Ltd., Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE
Ltd., Swiss International Air Lines Ltd., Quantas Airways Limited, and Martinair Holland
N.V., Defendants

Counsel

Charles Wright, for Plaintiffs

Judge/s

L.C. Leitch J.

Quick Facts

Settlement agreements were entered into with defendants A Inc. and K Ltd.. Class counsel
had undertaken litigation pursuant to retainer CFA, previously approved by court. Class
counsel brought motion for order approving legal fees and disbursements to be paid from
settlement funds.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA provided for 25% of amount recovered on behalf of class.
Amount of fees sought by class counsel in Ontario and British Columbia is $1,299,200,
representing 25% of settlement amounts notionally allocated to Ontario and British
Columbia classes for the purposes of fee approval. Representative plaintiffs
approved fees and disbursements and there had been no objections.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not counsel’s fee was fair and reasonable.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Order approving the fees sought has been signed.
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Bancroft-Snell v. Visa Canada Corp. (2015 ONSC 7275)
2015 CarswellOnt 17869, 2015 ONSC 7275, 260 A.C.W.S. (3d) 223, 80 C.P.C. (7th) 88
Date

Heard: November 19, 2015
Judgment: November 23, 2015

Parties

Jonathon Bancroft-Snell and 1739793 Ontario Inc., Plaintiffs
Visa Canada Corporation, Mastercard International Incorporated, Bank of America
Corporation, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce, Capital One Financial Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Federation des Caisses
Desjardins du Québec, National Bank of Canada Toronto Inc., Royal Bank of Canada, and
- Dominion Bank, Defendants

Counsel

Reidar Mogerman, Jen Winstanley, for Plaintiffs
Michael Eizenga, Chris McKenna, for Defendant, Bank of America Corporation
Mike Adlem, for Defendant, Citigroup Inc.
Markus Kremer, for Defendant, Bank of Nova Scotia
Rob Kwinter, for Defendant, Visa Canada Corporation
James Musgrove, for Defendant, MasterCard International Incorporated
Vincent de l'Etoile, for Defendant, Federation des caisses Desjardins du Québec
David Rankin, for Defendant, Bank of Montreal
Daniel G. Cohen, for Defendant, Capital One Corporation
Katherine L. Kay, for Defendant, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
Paul J. Martin, for Defendant, Royal Bank of Canada
Paul Morrison, Christine Lonsdale, for Defendant, Toronto-Dominion Bank
William McNamara, for Defendant, National Bank of Canada Inc.
Edward Babin, for Objector, Walmart

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiffs entered into CFA with class counsel. Plaintiffs brought class actions in multiple
provinces against defendants with respect to fees charged to merchants accepting payment
from consumers via credit cards. To resolve carriage dispute, class counsel entered into feesharing agreement with law firm that brought carriage motions in two provinces Plaintiffs'
class action was certified in British Columbia. Plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements
with three of defendants. Plaintiffs brought motion for approval of settlements, of
fee agreement with class counsel, and of class counsel's fees and disbursements

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 29(2), 32.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

On April 15, 2011, the initial plaintiff in the British Columbia action, Mary Watson signed
a CFA with Branch MacMaster. (The agreement was updated on October 5, 2015 with the
current representative plaintiff, Coburn and Watson's Metropolitan Home, dba
"Metropolitan Home".) Also on April 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs in the Ontario action signed
a CFA with Branch MacMaster and Camp Fiorante Matthews Mogerman. CFAs were also
signed in the other proposed class actions. All agreements provided for:
 legal fee of 30% or an amount equal to multiplying the total hours worked by
counsel in accordance with their hourly rates, by a multiplier of 3.5
 payment of disbursements reasonably incurred from settlement or award
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Class Counsel seeks approval of the CFAs, and approval of payment of a counsel fee of
$3,407,500 and disbursements of $384,571.95.
Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not class counsel’s fee is fair and reasonable.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted in part. All three settlements approved, CFA approved, and class
counsel fee of $3,384,571.95 approved. However, Fee Sharing Agreement is
unenforceable.
“The Contingency Fee Agreements between Class Counsel and the respective
Representative Plaintiffs are typical or conventional agreements common to class actions.
The agreements comply with the formal requirements of the Act, and I approve them.”
(para 54)
Followed: McIntyre Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2002) (Ont CA)

1511419 Ontario Inc., Re (2015 ONSC 7518)
2015 CarswellOnt 20331, 2015 ONSC 7518, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 588
Date

Heard: November 19, 2015
Judgment: December 23, 2015

Parties

NA

Counsel

Jonathan Foreman, Lindsay Merrifield, for Ontario Consumers Class Action
James Harnum (Agent), for Harrison Pensa
David Mann, Robert Kennedy, for DirectCash in CCAA Proceedings
Eric R. Hoaken, for DirectCash in Class Action Proceedings
Peter Griffin, Matthew Lerner, for Gordon Reykdal
Jeff Galway, for N. Bland
Mark Polley, Eric Brousseau, for National Money Mart Company
Andrew Faith, Jeff Haylock, for 1573568 Alberta Ltd.
Geoff R. Hall, Stephen Fulton, for Monitor (FTI Consulting Canada Inc.)
Patrick Riesterer, for Chief Restructuring Officer of the Applicants
Michael Byers, for Craig Warnock
Serge Khallughlian, Charles Wright, for Ad Hoc Committee of Purchasers of Applicants'
Securities, including the Plaintiff in the Ontario Securities Class Action
Mary Margaret Fox, for ACE Insurance Company
Doug McInnis, for Axis Reinsurance Company
Brendan O'Neill, Carolyn Descours, for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders
Rebecca Wise, for Albert Mondor, Michael Shaw, Ron Chicoyne, William Dunn and
Robert Gibson
Ilan Ishai, for McCann Entities
David Hoffner, for Monitor in Chapter 14 Proceedings

Judge/s

G.B. Morawetz R.S.J.

Quick Facts

Ontario Consumer Class Action Counsel sought approval of contingent legal fee of
approximately 25 per cent of recoveries achieved in action settlements plus disbursements
and applicable taxes. Fee request was valued at $2,417,625 plus taxes and disbursement
182

request was for $707,387.66 inclusive. Unopposed motion was brought to
approve contingency fee and disbursement request of class counsel.
Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA retainer entered into by representative plaintiff Timothy Yeoman and class counsel,
which provided for:
 max. 30% of the recoveries achieved
 + disbursements
 + applicable taxes

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not contingency fee is fair and reasonable.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.

Motion by
securities
plaintiffs in (2015
ONSC 7535)

1511419 Ontario Inc., Re (2015 ONSC 7535) – motion by securities plaintiffs for order
approving fees and disbursements of class counsel in amount of $3,484,375.05 in fees plus
applicable taxes and $106,177.64 in disbursements
Requested fee represents 25.29% of settlement – less than CFA retainer between class
counsel and plaintiffs would allow.
Held: Motion granted. (judgement by Morawetz RSJ on same day as above)
“I am satisfied that the fee requests fit within the range of reasonableness, based on
comparison with other class proceedings. I accept that the fee award is both fair and
reasonable.” (para 8)
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Emms v. Christian Economic Assistance Foundation (2015 ONSC 7664)
2015 CarswellOnt 18759, 2015 ONSC 7664, 261 A.C.W.S. (3d) 271
Date

Heard: December 8, 2015
Judgment: December 8, 2015

Parties

Terry Emms, Plaintiff
Christian Economic Assistance Foundation and Ontario Alliance of Christian School
Societies, Defendants

Counsel

David Thompson, Matthew G. Moloci, for Plaintiff
Ward Branch, for Defendant, Christian Economic Assistance Foundation
William Chalmers, for Defendant, Ontario Alliance of Christian School Societies

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Defendant registered charity developed tax credit program in which taxpayer would
receive charitable donation receipt for amount of tuition paid to enroll student at private
Christian school. However, Canada Revenue Agency disallowed tax credits in 2010.
Plaintiff had enrolled his son in private Christian school and was one of group of taxpayers
that were denied amounts claimed as charitable donations, reassessed and penalized.
Plaintiff commenced proposed class action against defendants. Parties negotiated
settlement under which defendants consented to certification for settlement purposes, and
under which, without admitting liability, defendants agreed to pay up to $1.5 million in
exchange for release of claims against them. On consent, plaintiff brought motion for
certification of class proceeding, approval of settlement and approval of class counsel fee
and honorarium for representative plaintiff.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 5(1)(a)-(e), 29(2).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Mr. Emms entered into a CFA retainer with Scarfone Hawkins LLP on August 23, 2013. It
provides for:
 30% contingency fee calculated after all expenses (including taxes and
disbursements) deducted
Class Counsel is asking for payment of fee $508,500 + $12,904.27 for disbursements,
based on 30% of the Settlement Fund. Mr. Emms approves of the settlement and class
counsel’s fee request.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Is class counsel’s fee request “fair and reasonable,” based on the factors relevant for
assessing reasonableness of class counsel?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. All approved.
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Silver v. Imax Corp. (2016 ONSC 403)
2016 CarswellOnt 558, 2016 ONSC 403, 262 A.C.W.S. (3d) 856
Date

Heard: December 15, 2015
Judgment: January 15, 2016

Parties

Marvin Neil Silver and Cliff Cohen, Plaintiffs
Imax Corporation, Richard L. Gelfond, Bradley J. Wechsler, Francis T. Joyce, Neil S.
Braun, Kenneth G. Copland, Garth M. Girvan, David W. Leebron and Kathryn A. Gamble,
Defendants

Counsel

Jay Strosberg, Michael Robb, for Plaintiffs
Dana Peebles, for Defendants

Judge/s

Baltman J.

Quick Facts

In class action, plaintiff claimed damages from defendant and some directors on basis it
misrepresented revenue, resulting in decline in share price. Claims were brought under
common-law tort of misrepresentation and statutory cause of action under Ontario
Securities Act by residents who purchased shares in during class period. Nine years after
action was commenced, parties reached proposed settlement for $3,750,000. Class counsel
sought 33% of recovery plus taxes, for total of $1,398,375 plus unbilled disbursements of
$224,330. Motion by plaintiff for approval of settlement and class counsel fees.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s 29.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA retainer for Siskinds LLP provided for:
 33% of total recovery
 + taxes
 + disbursements
CFA retainer for Sutts, Strosberg provided for:
 sliding scale ranging from 25% to 33%
Class counsel request fees at 33% of the recovery (i.e. $1,237,500) + taxes ($160,875) +
unbilled disbursements ($224,330)
Note: 1) “The request for fees at 33% plus disbursements and taxes was contained in the
notice of certification, and, later, in the notice of settlement approval hearing. Both notices
were widely distributed and no one objected to the fees sought. Only one class member
opted out despite the public notice of the 33% contingency fee.” (para 44) and 2) “… two
firms comprising class counsel have collectively docketed approximately $4,000,000 in
time. That is more than the total recovery in the action. With the proposed fees class
counsel will be recovering less than one third of their docketed time.” (para 46)

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not class counsel’s legal fees were “fair and reasonable” and fairly reflected the
factors listed at para 41 to determine fairness and reasonableness.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of
the class. Class counsel legal fees also approved.
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AFA Livförsäkringsaktiebolag v. Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd. (2016 ONSC
532)
2016 CarswellOnt 2169, 2016 ONSC 532, 263 A.C.W.S. (3d) 632
Date

Heard: January 20, 2016
Judgment: February 12, 2016

Parties

AFA Livförsäkringsaktiebolag, AFA Sjukförsäkringsaktiebolag, AFA
Trygghetsförsäkringsaktiebolag, Kollektivavtalsstiftelsen Trygghetsfonden TSL and
William Leslie, Plaintiffs
Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited, Sean Boyd, Eberhard Scherkus and Ammar Al-Jound,
Defendants

Counsel

Michael G. Robb, Ronald Podolny, for Plaintiffs
James Doris, Luis Sarabia, Chantelle Spagnola, for Defendants

Judge/s

Edward P. Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

Securities class action, certified on consent, was settled for $17 million. Plaintiffs brought
application for judicial approval of settlement agreement and legal fees

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 5(1), 29(2).
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s 138.8.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

“Based on the retainer agreement, class counsel is seeking a 29.5 per
cent contingency recovery which amounts to $4,094,000, plus disbursements and taxes.”
(para 19)

Issue/s with
Agreement

Are the proposed legal fees fair and reasonable? Belobaba J notes, as he did in Canon, that
the CFA is presumptively valid in the context.

Outcome

Held: Application granted with one revision: “I only ask that class counsel reduce the
disbursements by $3828 for the "legal research" charge that, in my view, should not be
billed as a disbursement.”
Followed: Cannon v. Funds for Canada Foundation (2013 – Ont SCJ)
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Sheridan Chevrolet Cadillac Ltd. v. Furukawa Electric Co. (2016 ONSC
729)
2016 CarswellOnt 1571, 2016 ONSC 729, 263 A.C.W.S. (3d) 70
Date

Heard: January 28, 2016
Judgment: February 3, 2016

Parties

Sheridan Chevrolet Cadillac Ltd., the Pickering Auto Mall Ltd., and Fady Samaha,
Plaintiffs and Chiyoda MFG. Co., Ltd., Chiyoda USA Corporation, and Asti Corporation,
Defendants

Counsel

Charles M. Wright, David Sterns, for Plaintiffs
Robert Kwinter, for Yazaki Defendants
David Kent, Laura Brazil, for Chiyoda Defendants
Sandra Forbes, for Denso and Techma Defendants
Paul Martin, for G.S. and G.S.W. Defendants
Kelly Friedman, for Hitachi Defendants
Susan Freedman, for Furakawa Defendants
Linda Plumpton, for Mitsubishi Defendants
Suzy Kaufman, for Fujikura Defendants
Neil Campbell, Allison Worone, for Sumitomo Defendants
James Gotowiec, for Leoni Defendants
Mel Hogg, for SY Systems Defendants

Judge/s

Edward P. Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

Y Inc. and C Co. (defendants) were suppliers of auto parts including automotive wire
harness systems (AWHS), instrument panel clusters (IPC), and fuel senders. Plaintiffs
commenced class actions on behalf of persons in Canada who purchased or leased auto
parts supplied by defendants. Actions alleged that defendants engaged in price-fixing.
Parties reached settlements in four actions, including settlement in action against Y Inc. in
relation to AWHS (Y Inc. AWHS settlement). Plaintiffs brought motions for approval of
these four settlements

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA retainers with class counsel provided for:
 25% contingency fee
 + disbursements
 + taxes

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – “As I made clear in Cannon, this contingency amount is presumptively valid and
there is no good reason herein not to approve the legal fees” (para 16)

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
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Quenneville v. Volkswagen Group Canada Inc. (2016 ONSC 959)
2016 CarswellOnt 2163, 2016 ONSC 959, 263 A.C.W.S. (3d) 610
Date

Heard: February 3, 2016
Judgment: February 12, 2016

Parties

Matthew Robert Quenneville, Luciano Tauro, Michael Joseph Pare, Therese H. Gadoury,
Amy Fitzgerald, Renee James, Al-Noor Wissanji, Jack Mastromattei and Jay MacDonald,
Plaintiffs / Moving Parties
Volkswagen Group Canada Inc., Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Volkswagen Group of
America Inc., Audi Canada Inc., Audi Aktiengesellschaft, Audi of America Inc. and VW
Credit Canada Inc., Defendants and Merchant Law Group LLP, Responding Party

Counsel

David F. O'Connor, J. Adam Dewar, for Plaintiffs / Moving Parties
Anthony Tibbs, Chris Simoes, for Responding Party, Merchant Law Group
Robert Bell, for Volkswagen Defendants

Judge/s

Edward P. Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

In breach of carriage agreement and court order of December 2015 granting carriage of
Ontario Volkswagen class action to consortium of eight law firms, Merchant Law Group
LLP (MLG) law firm sent misleading email in January to some 9500 recipients urging
them, in essence, to join MLG class action. 150 Ontario residents acted on MLG's
misstatements and signed MLG retainer agreement that was attached to email. It was
beyond dispute that MLG agreed not to contest carriage in Ontario. MLG's carriage
motion was dismissed as abandoned and its own Ontario action was stayed. MLG agreed
to send out clarifying email and agreed not to execute retainer agreements received from
Ontario residents. Counsel on both sides were unable to agree on several points to be
included in clarifying email. Class counsel brought motion for costs of approximately
$100,000 on substantial indemnity basis.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Misleading e-mail sent by MLG included an attached CFA retainer and instructions.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Nothing contained in the CFA retainer was at issue in the case. It was the attachment of a
retainer agreement to MLG’s e-mail (CFA or not) that was of concern in its breach of the
court order.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted in part. Costs fixed at $40,000 payable by MLG to Class Counsel.
“It is plain from the retainer agreement attached to the January 22 email that MLG
intended to proceed either by way of class action or mass (individualized) litigation at its
discretion.” (para 5)
“MLG's breach of the Court Order is deserving of censure and condemnation and,
therefore, by definition, is reprehensible. An elevated costs award is therefore justified…”
(para 16)
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Donohue v. Baja Mining Corp. (2016 ONSC 1569)
2016 CarswellOnt 3317, 2016 ONSC 1569, 264 A.C.W.S. (3d) 79
Date

Heard: February 18, 2016; February 19, 2016
Judgment: March 4, 2016

Parties

John Matthew Donohue, Plaintiff
Baja Mining Corp., John Greenslade, Rowland L. Wallenius, Michael Shaw, Adam Wright,
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, Defendant

Counsel

Jonathan J. Foreman, Stephanie Legdon, Paul Bates, for Plaintiff
Laura Cooper, Sarah Armstrong for Defendants, Baja Mining Corp., Michael Shaw and
Adam Wright
Helen Daley, for Defendants, John Greenslade and Rowland Wallenius
Michael Schafler, for Defendant, PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP

Judge/s

L.C. Leitch J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiffs in class proceeding who acquired securities in defendant mining corporation
alleged that defendants misrepresented cost of development of its primary asset. Plaintiff
and defendants entered into settlement agreement that provided that certain defendants
would pay $11,000,000.00 for benefit of class members. Retainer agreement with class
counsel provided that class counsel could seek legal fees of 30 per cent of amount of any
recovery obtained on behalf of class plus disbursements and taxes. Plaintiff brought motion
for approval of settlement and class counsel fees.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, ss 32, 33.
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s 138.3.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Class counsel and representative plaintiff entered into a CFA, which provided for:
 30% of the amount of any recovery obtained on behalf of the class
 + disbursements
 + taxes
 CFA also states that all of the above is only payable upon a successful outcome,
settlement or judgement
Class counsel seeks an order approving legal fees in the amout of $2.75 million (at a 25%
rate, lower than CFA provides for) + $77,696.06 in disbursements and taxes. Notice of the
proposed fee was included in the notice given to class members and there has been no
objections as previously noted.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not the fees requested by class counsel “fair and reasonable.”

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Settlement and requested legal fees approved.
Very favourable outcome achieved in settlement, and legal fee 5% lower than maximum of
what class could have expected. Additionally, there had been no objections to the legal fees
and the representative plaintiff endorsed them.
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McIntyre (Litigation guardian of) v. Ontario (2016 ONSC 2662)
2016 CarswellOnt 6668, 2016 ONSC 2662
Date

Heard: April 25, 2016
Judgment: April 28, 2016

Parties

Sharon Clegg as Litigation Guardian of Marlene McIntyre, Representative Plaintiff of
Certified Class Action
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario, Defendant

Counsel

Kirk Baert, Celeste Poltak, David Rosenfeld, for Plaintiff
Robert Ratcliffe, Sonal Gandhi, for Defendant

Judge/s

Edward P. Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

“This is the fourth in a series of class actions, dealing with abuses in provincial "Schedule
1" facilities, that has settled before trial. In each of the other three cases, Huronia,
Rideau and Southwestern, Conway J. found the settlements to be fair and reasonable and
in the best interests of the class.” (para 1)

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA provided for:


contingency fee of up to 30% of settlement value (including notice and
administration)
Counsel only requests 9.67% contingency fee (i.e. $3.7 million), “They have wisely
reduced their request to about 10 per cent, no doubt because of the legal fee payments
already received from the Huronia, Rideau and Southwestern settlements.” (para 40)

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not the requested fee is “fair and reasonable.”

Outcome

Held: Both settlement and legal fees approved.
“The proposed settlement before me implements the same structure and compensation
template as in the other three. Given that this settlement, in essence, has already been
judicially approved three times, this court could have simply approved this fourth iteration
without any further discussion or explanation.” (para 3)
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I.

Aboriginal Issues/Groups

Missanabic Cree First Nation V. Ontario (2011 Onsc 5196)
2011 CarswellOnt 15345, 2011 ONSC 5196, [2011] O.J. No. 6569, 215 A.C.W.S. (3d) 814, 38 C.P.C. (7th) 385
Quick Facts

This case only mentions a CFA once and states that a CFA can only be applied to situations
where damages may be awarded (i.e. cannot apply if the only possible remedy is a reserve):
"However, these efforts have been unsuccessful. I accept that a [CFA] ... is not a viable
option in this case because of the possibility that the only remedy obtained could be a
reserve with no award of damages."

Fontaine V. Canada (Attorney General) (2012 ONCA 471)
– see later ONSC decision below
2012 CarswellOnt 8351, 2012 ONCA 471, [2012] O.J. No. 3019, 111 O.R. (3d) 461, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 780, 295
O.A.C. 127
Date

Heard: January 31, 2012
Judgment: July 4, 2012

Parties

Duboff Edwards Haight & Schachter (DEHS), Appellant
Chief Adjudicator, Respondent

Counsel

Harley Schachter, for Appellant
Charles Hofley, Leanne N. r, for Respondent
E.F. Anthony Merchant, Q.C., for Intervener (Merchant Law Group LLP)
Catherine Coughlan, Dalal Mouallem, for Intervener (Attorney General of Canada)

Judge/s

M. Rosenberg J.A., Paul Rouleau J.A., R.G. Juriansz J.A.

Quick Facts

Under national settlement agreement with respect to Crown's role in residential schools, class
members could obtain compensation for serious physical or sexual abuse through independent
assessment process (IAP). Law firm entered into contingency fee agreement with client for
30% of compensation awarded in IAP, which was maximum percentage permitted under
agreement. When client did not seek review of fairness and reasonableness of legal fees after
obtaining IAP award, IAP adjudicator undertook legal fee review on own motion and adjusted
fee down to 20 per cent of compensation awarded. Law firm's appeal to chief adjudicator was
dismissed, but law firm and chief adjudicator brought request for direction from
administrative judge under agreement prior to law firm commencing application for judicial
review. Administrative judge ruled that there was no right of appeal or judicial review from
fee review decision. Law firm appealed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, s. 2(1)
Legal Profession Act, S.M. 2002, c. 44, s. 55(5) and (7)

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

In July 2006, the appellant entered into a CFA with one of its IAP clients for 30% of any
compensation awarded. The client's claim was heard in April 2009 and the Adjudicator
awarded $103,000. Legal fees claimed at 30% of the award were $30,900, plus applicable
taxes totalling $3,708. The reported time value of DEHS' fees and disbursements when the
claim hearing took place was $15,685.88.
On May 25, 2009, the Adjudicator undertook a legal fee review hearing on his own
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motion. On June 30, 2009, the Adjudicator issued a ruling adjusting DEHS' proposed fee
down to $20,600, plus taxes totalling $2,472. The approved fees reduced the
30% contingency fee to 20% (15% to be paid by Canada, 5% to be paid by the client). After a
further hearing regarding whether GST and PST owed on a compensation award was to be
paid by Canada on behalf of the claimant, the reported time value of DEHS' fees and
disbursements had increased from $15,685.88 to $27,532.18.
Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Are there any circumstances in which a Chief Adjudicator's decision in the fee review
process is reviewable by a judge of the Superior Court?
B. Did the Administrative Judge err in not granting the specific directions requested by the
appellant?

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed. Parties agreed to no costs orders.
A fee review decision of the Chief Adjudicator in the IAP is not reviewable by way of an
appeal to the Superior Court, or by way of an application for judicial review to the Superior
Court. The Chief Adjudicator's decision is only reviewable by an Administrative Judge
through a Request for Direction under the CAP, but such review is available only in very
limited circumstances. The appellant did not establish that the Chief Adjudicator's decision
reflects a failure to comply with the S.A. or the implementation orders.
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Fontaine V. Canada (Attorney General) (2015 ONSC 7007)


see earlier ONCA decision above

2015 CarswellOnt 17295, 2015 ONSC 7007, 260 A.C.W.S. (3d) 462, 80 C.P.C. (7th) 136
Date

Judgment: November 13, 2015

Parties

Larry Philip Fontaine in his personal capacity and in his capacity as the Executor of the estate
of Agnes Mary Fontaine, deceased et al, Plaintiffs
The Attorney General of Canada, The Presbyterian Church in Canada et al, Defendants

Counsel

E. Anthony Ross, Q.C., Katrina Marciniak, for Applicants
Leona K. Tesar, for Attorney General of Canada

Judge/s

Perell J.

Quick Facts

Federal government resolved proceedings relating to Indian Residential Schools (IRS) by
entering into Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA). IRSSA included
common experience payments for all Aboriginal persons who attended IRS's and separate
claims process for Aboriginal persons who had suffered abuse at IRS's. Claimant was 82-yearold disabled, unemployed, and impoverished Aboriginal woman who had been student at
institution that was not yet recognized as IRS. Claimant brought motion for directions under
IRSSA seeking advance costs award so she could pursue claims under IRSSA.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 31.
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 57.01(1).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA – no CFA, see ‘Issue/s with Agreement’ below

Issue/s with
Agreement

Issue was that plaintiff could not secure CFA/s: “For the lawyers,
a contingency fee arrangement was useless to ameliorate the risk of the expense of providing
the unpaid legal services needed to complete the RFD. A successful Article 12 RFD would
result in adding the Fort William Sanatorium School to the IRSSA's list of IRSs, but there is
no money to be earned in obtaining a declaration other than the normal legal costs that goes
with winning, which was far from a sure thing, because this RFD was obviously going to be
strongly resisted by Canada.” (para 39)

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Mrs. Henry awarded costs.
“In my opinion, in the special circumstances of Mrs. Henry's particular circumstances and in
the special circumstances of an Article 12 RFD, it is in the public interest that Mrs. Henry
have access to justice through an advance costs award.” (para 96)
Followed: British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band (2003 SCC 71)

CFAs earlier
discussed in
(2015 ONSC
5431)

Fontaine v. Canada (Attorney General) – earlier in the same year, another request for
directions was brought in (2015 ONSC 3611), which made no mention of contingency fee
issues. However, in the additional reasons (2015 ONSC 5431), delivered two and a half
months before the second request for directions (summarized above), i.e. (2015 ONSC 7007),
CFAs were briefly dealt with in terms of their relation to the determination of costs.
In short, Perell J found that concerns around counsel choosing or not choosing to take on risk
by being retained on a CFA is “not a matter relevant to the assessment of costs” (para 40).
Perell J went on to order Canada to pay costs in the amount of $50,000 to the Applicants.
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Williams V. Whitefish River First Nation (2014 ONSC 1817)
2014 CarswellOnt 3426, 2014 ONSC 1817, 119 O.R. (3d) 551, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 731

Date

Heard: March 17, 2014
Judgment: March 20, 2014

Parties

Williams, Plaintiff
Whitefish River First Nation, Defendant

Counsel

R. Aaron Detlor, for Plaintiff
Stephanie Kearns, for Defendant

Judge/s

Master R.A. Muir

Quick Facts

Plaintiff was lawyer. Plaintiff provided legal services to defendant. For most part, work
involved representing defendant in connection with certain land claims and claim relating to
delineation of boundaries of reserve. Plaintiff alleged that he was owed $163,000.00, and
defendant denied that it owed anything to plaintiff. Registrar dismissed action for delay.
Action was dismissed by registrar due to failure on part of plaintiff to comply with
requirements of R. 48.14 of Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff brought motion for order
setting aside order of registrar.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 37.14(1), 48.14, 57.01(1).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Defendant takes the position that a portion of the work undertaken for them by the plaintiff
was done on a contingency fee basis, and that the Plaintiff’s fee was conditional upon a
successful resolution of the claims. However, the Defendant also claims that the CFA was
unenforceable. (There is no explanation in the decision for either of the Defendant’s claims.)
In general, Defendant denies that it owes anything to the plaintiff.

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – the CFA was mentioned once to the extent described above in ‘CFA Breakdown’

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
“The plaintiff has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay encountered with
this action as a whole and in bringing this motion. However, I am satisfied that the failure to
meet the Rule 48.14 deadline was a result of inadvertence on the part of his lawyer.
Importantly, the plaintiff has also satisfied the key consideration of prejudice.”|
Followed: 744142 Ontario Ltd. v. Ticknor Estate (2012 – Ont Master)
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Ross V. Pinaymootang First Nation (2015 ONSC 3274)
2015 CarswellOnt 7991, 2015 ONSC 3274, 255 A.C.W.S. (3d) 873
Date

Heard: May 17, 2015; May 18, 2015; May 19, 2015
Judgment: June 1, 2015

Parties

E. Anthony Ross, Plaintiff
Pinaymootang First Nation, also known as Fairford First Nation, also known as Fairford Band
and Harris & Harris LLP, also known as Harris & Harris, Defendants

Counsel

Tanya Walker, Andrew Ostrom, for Plaintiff
Darryl R. Buxton, for Defendant, Pinaymootang First Nation, also known as Fairford First
Nation, also known as Fairford Band
Douglas Christie, for Defendant, Harris & Harris LLP, also known as Harris & Harris

Judge/s

Diamond J.

Quick Facts

First nations band hired lawyer to commence proceedings against Federal Government for
damages arising out of construction of water control structures – signing a CFA retainer.
Lawyer joined new firm but continued to represent band. Action on behalf of band was
unsuccessful, although court found Province of Manitoba was responsible for band's damages.
Appeals were undertaken but settlement agreement was reached. New firm sent invoices to
band, who did not pay on grounds that no relationship existed between band and new firm.
Lawyer left new firm. New firm brought action against band. Band terminated original CFA
retainer agreement. Band, lawyer and new firm signed memorandum of understanding.
Amount of $950,000.00 was to be made payable from settlement funds forthcoming from
Government of Canada, and payment of second and third tranches were essentially dependent
upon further settlement funds to be obtained by band from Province of Manitoba. Band
council ratified settlement for less than amount of agreement, which lawyer claimed ended
settlement. Lawyer brought action against band and new firm. Two-way settlement was
reached between new firm and lawyer, and three way settlement between lawyer, new firm,
and band was reached regarding all proceedings for payment. Proceedings by lawyer against
band were stayed under consent judgment. Band paid only first installment of settlement
owing. Lawyer brought motion to lift stay imposed by consent and amend pleadings in his
action.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 26.01, 29.09, 59.06(1), 59.06(2)(a)-(d).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Pinaymootang First Nation (aka Fairford First Nation) retained Ross on or about August 23,
1994, effective February 26, 1992, through a CFA retainer. Scope of retainer was to
commence proceedings against Gov. of Canada and Prov. of Manitoba in Federal Court. The
CFA provided for:
 9% contingency fee of any future judgement or award
 if retainer were terminated, terms of the agreement provided that Ross would be
compensated for services rendered to the date of termination
In December 1996 Ross moved to a new firm, but with the formal agreement that the new
firm has no legal or financial interest in the files belonging to Ross, which were opened prior
to the relationship commencing with the new law firm (i.e. Harris). After Fairfold was
unsuccessful in their claim, Harris issued a Statement of Claim against Fairford seeking, inter
alia, payment of its outstanding fees and disbursements totalling $1,729,846.92 in December
2001. Ross commenced his own additional action, naming both Fairfold and Harris as
defendants, seeking inter alia payment of outstanding invoices totalling $3,149,747.50, and an
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order consolidating his action with the earlier Harris action [“Ross Action”]. In or around late
January 2004, Fairford terminated Ross' CFA retainer agreement and retained Robert Roddick
("Roddick") as its new counsel. By that time, Ross' docketed time had accumulated and
totaled in excess of $3,500,000.00.
Under the three-way settlement, Fairford was to pay the sum of $2,150,000.00 to Harris in
three tranches: $950,000.00, $650,000.00 and $550,000.00.
Under the two-way settlement, Ross and Harris further agreed that payment of the first
$950,000.00 due under the three-way settlement, would be distributed as follows: (a)
$445,594.50 to Ross; (b) $475,000.00 to Harris; (c) the balance of $29,405.50 paid in trust to
the credit of the Harris Action.
(see ‘Quick Facts’ for more)
Issue/s with
Agreement

On August 11, 2005, Fairford (through Roddick) delivered trust cheques to both Ross and
Harris of all three amounts contemplated under the two-way settlement agreement. The first
$950,000 was fully paid on August 11, 2005. Fairford never paid the second $650,000
installment due on January 1, 2006. Fairford never paid the third $550,000 installment due on
or before January 1, 2007. Issues in decision dealt with this ‘fall-out’, and did not engage
CFA issues directly, but instead focussed on how the earlier proceedings precluded, or did not
preclude Ross from taking further action against Fairfold.

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
“…there are not grounds to support an order varyig the consent judgement and.or lifting the
stay of the Ross Action, Ross is therefore unable to take any further steps, other than
enforcement steps, in the Ross Action.” (para 93)
Followed: McCowan v. McCowan (1995 – Ont CA); Monarch Construction Ltd. v. Buildevco
Ltd. (1988 – Ont CA)
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II.

Corporate/Commercial

Heydary Hamilton Professional Corp. V. Hanuka (2010 ONCA 881)
2010 CarswellOnt 9782, 2010 ONCA 881, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 905, 272 O.A.C. 271
Date

Heard: November 24, 2010
Judgment: December 21, 2010

Parties

Heydary Hamilton Professional Corporation (plaintiff), Appellant
Thakar Baweja, Rajiv Baweja, also known as Roger Baweja, 6369162 Canada Inc., Ben
Vladlen Hanuka and Davis Moldaver LLP (Defendants), Respondents

Counsel

Douglas Elliott, Ruzbeh Hosseini, for Appellant
David Silver, for Respondents (Ben Vladlen Hanuka, Davis Moldaver LLP)

Judge/s

E.A. Cronk J.A., J. MacFarland J.A., Janet Simmons J.A.

Quick Facts

On October 19, 2007, initial lawyers (appellant) were retained on CFA in franchise dispute.
Initial lawyers notified former clients that negotiating terms of lease was beyond scope of
retainer agreement. Successor lawyers acted for former clients regarding lease. Successor
lawyers served notice of change of solicitors on initial lawyers. Invoice from initial lawyers
was unpaid. Initial lawyers claimed that successor lawyers were involved in scheme to assist
former clients in avoiding compensation of initial lawyers. Initial lawyers brought action
against former clients and against successor lawyers for conspiracy, inducing breach of
contract and unlawful interference with economic interests. Successor lawyers' motion for
summary judgment was granted. Initial lawyers appealed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA retainer between the appellant and the former clients required that the former clients
pay the appellant $50,000 up front plus 27% of any future judgment or settlement proceeds.
The retainer agreement also provided that it could be terminated within 15 days of the date of
the agreement, and "[t]hereafter ... only by agreement between the parties or, if required, in
accordance with the Law Society of Upper Canada Rules of Professional Conduct."
During the period between October 2007 and November 2009 (when successor lawyers
served a notice of change of solicitors), the appellant accrued approximately $63,998.70 in
recorded legal fees and actual disbursements including GST in relation to the retainer
agreement.

Issue/s with
Agreement

The main issue on appeal is whether the motion judge erred in striking out the appellant's
claim against the successor lawyers for inducing breach of contract and intentional
interference with economic interests for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed with costs to the successor lawyers on a substantial indemnity basis,
fixed in the amount of $8,488.25, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.
“We see no basis for holding that the motion judge erred in failing to grant leave to amend.
The allegations made by the appellant are serious allegations of professional misconduct. No
facts were pleaded that are capable of supporting those allegations.” (para 16)
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Chrusz V. Cheadle Johnson Shanks Macivor (2010 ONCA 553)
2010 CarswellOnt 5896, 2010 ONCA 553, [2010] O.J. No. 3441, 191 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1106, 272 O.A.C. 1
Date

Heard: May 21, 2010
Judgment: August 16, 2010

Parties

Daniel Chrusz and Poli-Fibreglass Industries (Thunder Bay) Ltd., Appellants
Cheadle Johnson Shanks MacIvor aka Cheadles LLP, Robert D. Weiler Q.C. and Petrone
Hornak Garofalo Mauro, Respondents

Counsel

Roderick W. Johansen for Appellants
J. Douglas Crane, Q.C. for Respondent, Petrone Hornak Garofalo Mauro
John W. Erickson, Q.C. for Respondents Cheadle Johnson Shanks MacIvor

Judge/s

J. McComb J. (ad hoc), K. Swinton J. (ad hoc), and Wilton-Siegel J. (ad hoc)

Quick Facts

Clients were involved in two actions. Firm Petrone replaced Firm Cheadle as counsel for
clients. Clients and Firms reached mediated Settlement Agreement (SA) regarding payment to
Firms. After actions were settled and settlement funds received, clients instructed Firm P not
to pay Firm C. Clients brought application for determination of rights under SA and
declaration of amount payable by clients to Firms or order referring issue to assessment
officer. Firm C brought cross-application for determination of rights under SA and declaration
confirming amount due to it under SA. Application judge found SA was fair and reasonable
and determined $177,344.18 was payable to Firm C and $300,576.67 was payable to Firm P.
Clients appealed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, ss. 4, 15, 24, 28

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Settlement Agreement provided, among other things that:
1. the "recovery amount" in the actions would be split one-third with the lawyers and the
balance to Chrusz;
2. Cheadle and Petrone would divide the amount allocated to the lawyers on a 30/70 basis;
3. costs in the action would be split on the basis of 50% to Chrusz and the balance
apportioned 70/30 in favour of Petrone; and
4. a consent charging order would be granted to Cheadle to secure a solicitor's lien in its
favour over any proceeds of the litigation or costs and a consent order would be granted by
Cheadle releasing the litigation files to Petrone.

Issue/s with
Agreement

The Appellants raised the general issue of whether the Settlement Agreement was enforceable
as a CFA given the provisions of the Act at the time of execution of the Agreement (i.e. pre2010 changes to the contingency fee legislation).

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed in part. Appellants ordered to pay $15,000 in costs to the Respondent
(Cheadle)
The application judge did not err in concluding that the Agreement was reasonable in respect
of Cheadle, notwithstanding the considerations raised by the Appellants, for two reasons.
First, the current rules pertaining to contingency fee arrangements do not apply retrospectively
[Section 28 of the Act as it existed in 2000 did not render contingency fee agreements void ab
initio. (para 27)]. Second, while these provisions identify considerations that should be taken
into account, they must be addressed as part of an evaluation of the totality of the arrangement
between Cheadle and the Appellants. The particular elements of the arrangement identified by
the Appellants are not such as to render the arrangement unreasonable on their own. (para 40)
Appeal allowed in part with respect to the determination of the amount of the fees owing to
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Petrone, the issue of fairness and reasonableness is remitted to the Superior Court of Justice.
Followed: Raphael Partners v. Lam (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.); Housen v.
Nikolaisen (2002), 10 C.C.L.T. (3d) 157, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 577

Morrison V. Morrison (2010 ONSC 6268)
2010 CarswellOnt 8701, 2010 ONSC 6268, [2011] W.D.F.L. 385, [2011] W.D.F.L. 386, [2011] W.D.F.L. 392,
[2011] W.D.F.L. 394, 194 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1213
Date

Heard: October, 2010
Judgement: November, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Glen Everald Morrison
Defendant: Theresa Calara Morrison

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Mr. G. E. Morrison for himself
For Defendant: Mr. Michael H. Tweyman for Respondent

Judge/s

Then: MacKenzie J.

Quick Facts

CFA agreement discussed within the context of spousal support payments, and CFA not at
issue: "The position of the applicant is quite simply that his only source of income is
approximately $39,000.00 per annum from his pensions and that although he has been
involved on a part-time or ad hoc basis with the Business transferred by him to his daughter,
such involvement has been strictly on a pro bono basis since he was diagnosed with a form of
cancer in 2008. As to the basis on which the Business generates its income, his position is that
the retainer/compensation agreements entered into by the clients of the Business provide only
for payment of fees on contingency basis, namely, 20% of the amount recovered on the
client's behalf."
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Heydary Hamilton Professional Corp. V. Baweja (2011 ONSC 2568)
2011 CarswellOnt 2877, 2011 ONSC 2568, 201 A.C.W.S. (3d) 349
Quick Facts

"On October 19, 2007 Thakar retained the Lawyers to prosecute a franchise dispute against
Druxy's." MOTION to set aside an Order for Assessement.
Note: not helpful for the discussion of CF%, this case is more about interpreting a particular
retainer agreement.

Contingency Fee
Agreement

27% contingency fee: "Thakar signed a written retainer agreement... "an initial flat fee
retainer in the amount of $50,000"... [plus a] "partial contingency fee" by which Thakar
would pay the Lawyers "with reference to the actual amounts actually recovered inclusive of
interest, but exclusive of the initial $50,000.00 or any amount awarded...in respect of costs
and disbursements (the "Recovery Amount"), twenty-seven per cent (27%) of any Recovery
Amount." "The Agreement confirmed that if costs of the Action were awarded to the Clients
and paid to the Lawyers they "would be deducted from any fee payable to" the Lawyers. The
Agreement had the following termination provision:”

Issue/s with
Agreement

"… The issue is what the Clients should be required to pay for that work." "The Lawyers are
of the view that in accordance with the Agreement they are entitled to the [$50k] simply for
the privilege of retaining the Lawyers and thereafter they are entitled to 27% of recovery or in
the event of termination, [$50k] plus the greater of 27% of recovery or of time based fees...
their position is that they are entitled to the $50,000 in addition to their time based fees for
which they have rendered an account for [$64k]" "The issue is this: In the event of recovery,
are the Lawyers entitled to the $50,000 retainer plus their contingency based fees of 27% of
recovery or is the $50,000 retainer part of and deducted from their contingency based fees? In
the event of termination before recovery (as is the case here), are the quantum meruit fees to
which the Lawyers are entitled $50,000 plus their time based (or contingency based) fees or
must the $50,000 be deducted from their time based (or contingency based) fees? In this
Assessment the issue in dispute is whether the [$50k] retainer is to be treated as part of or in
addition to the time based fees and disbursements of [$64k]"

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed.
"In my view, the determination of whether the Lawyers are entitled to $50,000 plus time
based fees or whether the Lawyers must account for the $50,000 retainer as part of time based
fees is a matter relating solely to the quantum of the account." "Given my determination that
the Order for Assessment stands, section 6(4) [of the Solictors Act] prevents the Lawyers from
claiming the fees of [$64k] as against Thakar ... in the Action without leave."
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Simpson V. Bridgewater Bank (2012 ONSC 2191)
2012 CarswellOnt 5054, 2012 ONSC 2191, 18 C.L.R. (4th) 257, 215 A.C.W.S. (3d) 326
Quick Facts

This case details the interaction between a CFA agreement and indemnity costs: "The
existence of a [CFA] does not affect the amount or any right or remedy for the recovery of
costs payable by a third party to a client. However, the client who has entered into the [CFA]
is not entitled to recover more than the amount payable by the client to the client's own
solicitor under the agreement. See sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the Solicitors Act, as noted in
Orkin, The Law of Costs..."" "The [CFA] between Mr. Simpson and his solicitors is that he
will not be required to pay unless he is successful.... if Mr. Simpson is successful, the
solicitors "... will recover based on standard billing rates plus premium for risk" in accordance
with their Bill of Costs."
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Indcondo Building Corp. V. Sloan (2012 ONCA 83)
– see second ONCA decision below
2012 CarswellOnt 1742, 2012 ONCA 83, 18 C.P.C. (7th) 223, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811, 347 D.L.R. (4th) 119
Date

Heard: February 2, 2012
Judgment: February 7, 2012

Parties

Indcondo Building Corporation (plaintiff), Appellant
Valerie Frances Sloan, David Robin Sloan and Cave Hill Properties Ltd. (defendants),
Respondents

Counsel

Philip P. Healey, for Appellant
P. James Zibarras, Trung Nguyen, for Respondents

Judge/s

Robert P. Armstrong J.A.

Quick Facts

Law firm for appellant was retained on contingency basis. It was accepted that appellant
corporation and its principal were impecunious, and had been so found in previous motion for
security for costs. Appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs below and costs of
appeal. Respondents brought motion seeking order requiring law firm for appellant to pay into
court $300,000 as security for costs of action, which was dismissed as abuse of process, and
also to pay into court $75,000 as security for costs of appeal. (see more detailed Facts in 2nd
chart below)

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Details of CFA not provided, see ‘Quick Facts’

Issue/s with
Agreement

The respondents argue that lawyers who act on a contingency basis and who have accepted
the risk of bearing the plaintiff's costs of litigation should be treated no differently than the
plaintiff would be treated when it comes to the costs obligations to a successful defendant.
(para 5)

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed without costs.
“…as a matter of principle, the lawyer who acts on a contingency fee basis is already carrying
the significant risk of not being paid and, as in this case, being stuck with the costs of paying
the disbursements. To add the additional burden of posting security for costs would no doubt
have a chilling effect on those lawyers who might otherwise make their services available on a
contingency basis — thus creating another problem for access to justice.” (para 7)
Followed: Intellibox Concepts Inc. v. Intermec Technologies Canada Ltd. (2005), 2005
CarswellOnt 1603, [2005] O.T.C. 310, 14 C.P.C. (6th) 339 (Ont. S.C.J.)
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Indcondo Building Corp. V. Sloan (2012 Onca 502) – Appeal And Motion For Review
Of (2012 ONCA 83)
– see above
2012 CarswellOnt 9030, 2012 ONCA 502, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 540, 22 C.P.C. (7th) 22, 293 O.A.C. 392, 352 D.L.R.
(4th) 235, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 324
Date

Heard: March 14, 2012
Judgment: July 18, 2012

Parties

Indcondo Building Corporation (plaintiff), Appellant
Valerie Frances Sloan, David Robin Sloan and Cave Hill Properties Ltd. (defendants),
Respondents – brought this motion

Counsel

P. James Zibarras, Trung Nguyen, for Appellant
Philip P. Healey, Miranda Spence, for Respondents

Judge/s

S.T. Goudge, Robert J. Sharpe, R.G. Juriansz JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Impecunious plaintiff was judgment creditor of defendant David Sloan (DS). DS allegedly
fraudulently conveyed or preferred certain property to others to defeat plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff brought action to set aside allegedly fraudulent or preferential conveyances
("2002 action"). DS subsequently became bankrupt, 2002 action was stayed by operation
of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and plaintiff proved claim in bankruptcy. DS was
subsequently discharged, and obtained Act order dismissing 2002 action. Plaintiff then
retained counsel on contingency basis to pursue derivative trustee action against bankrupt
and related defendants said to be recipients of fraudulent or preferential conveyances
pursuant to s. 38 of Act ("2008 action"). DS brought motion to dismiss 2008 action as
abuse of process as, inter alia, res judicata of 2002 action. Motion was granted, 2008
action was dismissed and plaintiff appealed. Defendant brought motion for order
compelling counsel for plaintiff to post security for costs of appeal and of proceedings
below personally (see above chart). Motion was dismissed and now the defendant has
brought a motion for review. (Thus, there are two matters dealt with in this decision: 1)
motion for review brought by defendant; and 2) appeal.)

Statute & Rules
Considered

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s 38, a 178(2)
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R. 61.06

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA – see Indcondo Building Corp. v. Sloan (2012 ONCA 83) above

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – see Indcondo Building Corp. v. Sloan (2012 ONCA 83) above
(Appeal itself not directly relevant to CFA.)

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed and motion to review dismissed. “The appellant is entitled to its
costs for the motion and in this court, including the review of the order of Armstrong J.A.
and the appeal itself.” (para 34)
Goudge J.A. agreed with reasons of Armstrong J.A. to dismiss motion (see chart above), a
successful motion would have required that the appeal be deemed “frivolous” per Rule
61.06… which clearly was not the case (per Goudge J.A.) given that it was allowed.

Additional Reasons
in Incondo Building
Corp v Sloan (2012
ONCA 619)

Additional reasons relating to costs of judgement reported in this decision were delivered by
S.T. Goudge J.A., Robert J. Sharpe J.A., R.G. Juriansz J.A. (same judges as on this
appeal/motion) on September 21, 2012.
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Rbc Life Insurance Co. V. Janson (2013 ONSC 3154)
2013 CarswellOnt 8593, 2013 ONSC 3154, 116 O.R. (3d) 264, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 851
Quick Facts

Only mention of CFA: "It should have come as no surprise that RBC Life balked at paying an
account provided by a firm it did not retain and calculated on the basis of a contingency
arrangement not previously disclosed to or accepted by RBC Life. No description was
provided of the services rendered except the statement in the accompanying correspondence
that the firm had acted for Mr. Janson "through three appeal levels (Claims, Appeals, Tribunal)
and continue to do so." As noted, despite the wording of the policy, RBC Life offered to
contribute $6,500 towards costs in May, 2011 notwithstanding the fact that the law firm did not
provide a summary of the services rendered and time expended until fifteen months later.20 "
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Stojanovic V. Bulut (2014 ONSC 672)
2014 CarswellOnt 1025, 2014 ONSC 672, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 868
Date

Heard: November 29, 2013
Judgment: January 29, 2014

Parties

Miodrag Stojanovic, Plaintiff (Responding party)
Nikola Bulut (aka Nicolas Bulut), Steven Bulut, Marko N. Bulut, 1091369 Ontario Inc. and
1112618 Ontario Inc., Defendants (Moving parties)

Counsel

J. Kleiman, for Plaintiff / Responding Party
P. Jervis, for Defendant / Moving Party

Judge/s

Master C. Albert

Quick Facts

Defendants asked court to order plaintiff to post security for costs of $217,918.35 and to
submit to further examination for discovery. Plaintiff was resident of Belgrade in State Union
of Serbia and Montenegro. In action plaintiff sought to recover $1,368,923 that he claimed he
paid in kind by providing equivalent value in pulp products to Serbian government corporation
to satisfy guarantee. He claimed to have guaranteed funds given by corporation to defendant
NB. He hoped to recover money by forcing sale of land registered to defendant numbered
company in Ontario. Principal of numbered company was defendant SB, son of NB. Plaintiff
alleged that NB fraudulently transferred assets to his son to prevent plaintiff from realizing on
his Serbian judgment, and brought motion for security of costs.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 56.01(1)(a) and (1)(e).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

MS entered into a CFA with Mr. Genereaux, which provided for:
 30% contingency fee

Issue/s with
Agreement

The Buluts allege that the CFA between the plaintiff, MS and Mr. Genereaux makes Mr.
Genereaux a litigation creditor and creates an obligation on the part of Mr. Stojanovic to obtain
the funds to post security for costs from Mr. Genereaux to fund Mr. Stojanovic's litigation.
“The issue is whether a lawyer who accepts a deferred fee arrangement should be required to
post security for costs.” (para 41)

Outcome

Held: Motion granted.
On CFA issue: “In my view a lawyer who accepts such a fee arrangement is not a commercial
creditor. Rather, such a lawyer is providing access to justice to litigants who may not otherwise
have sufficient liquidity to participate in time consuming and costly litigation. It would not be
good policy for the court to provide a disincentive to lawyers willing to take cases on
a contingency basis and risk an unsuccessful result.” (para 41)
“Having found that Mr. Stojanovic has no assets in Ontario and is neither impecunious nor in
an involuntary position of financial hardship, and further finding that his claim does not have a
strong chance of success, THIS COURT ORDERS THAT Mr. Stojanovic pay into court
security for costs…” (para 57)
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Hames V. Greenberg (2014 ONSC 245)
2014 CarswellOnt 664, 2014 ONSC 245, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 649, 23 B.L.R. (5th) 117
Date

Heard: December 13, 2013
Judgment: January 20, 2014

Parties

Richard Hames, R. Hames Family Trust and BHCC Services Inc., Applicants
Stanley Greenberg, S. Greenberg Family Trust, Zvia Wered, Josip Zaborski, J. Zaborski
Family Trust, Sabatino Cipro, S. Cipro Family Trust, 1327519 Ontario Inc., Residential
Energy Savings Products Inc. and Consumer's Choice Home Improvements Corp.,
Respondents

Counsel

L. Munro, for Applicants
M. Klaiman, for individual Respondents
J. Levitt, for corporate Respondents

Judge/s

D.M. Brown J.

Quick Facts

Shareholders Hames (H), Greenberg (G), Zaborski (Z), and Cipro (C) and their respective
trusts held shares in corporation that owned two subsidiaries. H was allegedly excluded from
all corporate matters including payouts when he announced his intention to retire. H and his
trust commenced action against other shareholders, their trusts, corporation, and subsidiaries
for relief from oppression. H and his trust brought motion for order requiring corporation to
pay interim costs

Statute/Rules
Considered

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, ss 248, 248(4), 249(4).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Greenberg filed an affidavit deposing that Hames once told him that he had "a special
arrangement with Lerners wherein they had agreed to accept payment at the end of the case,
rather than requiring payment on an ongoing basis for fees incurred". (para 57)
Greenberg thought Hames meant a contingency fee arrangement. Hames denied making any
such statements and deposed: "My retainer agreement with Lerners LLP is not now and never
has been on a contingency fee basis. I am required to pay all legal fees and expenses, as they
are incurred." (para 57)

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – the only mention of contingency fees in the lengthy decision is in paragraph 57 – which
I have recreated above. There were no contingency fee issues per se and the above was
developed any further later in the judgement.

Outcome

Held: Motion granted in part. Interim costs awarded to Hames.
Followed: Alles v. Maurice (1992 – Ont Gen Div)
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Siskinds Llp V. Canadian Imperial Bank Of Commerce
– not a traditional CFA under Solicitors Act – likely not relevant for your purposes but included just in case
2014 CarswellOnt 7133, 2014 ONSC 3211, [2014] O.J. No. 2548, 241 A.C.W.S. (3d) 592
Date

Heard: January 22, 2014
Judgment: May 28, 2014

Parties

Siskinds LLP, Plaintiff
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Defendant

Counsel

E. Cherniak, Q.C., J. Squire, for Plaintiff
P. LeVay, J. Safayeni, for Defendant

Judge/s

D.M. Brown J.

Quick Facts

Parties entered into agreement pursuant to which plaintiff would collect debts owing to
defendant and would receive percentage of amounts collected (agreement). Part of the work
the plaintiff completed for the defendant was work on “opposition files”, essentially files on
which an opposition to a BIA discharge had been filed and which might require court
attendances. CIBC paid Siskinds a contingency fee on "opposition files".
Section 15(d) of agreement included clause stating that that if agreement was terminated,
plaintiff could invoice defendant for services performed up to date of termination (disputed
clause). Plaintiff's interpretation of disputed clause was that it entitled plaintiff to be
compensated in respect of payments made by debtors after termination date. Defendant's
interpretation of disputed clause was that plaintiff was only entitled to fees on payments
received up until termination date. Defendant terminated agreement. Plaintiff commenced
action claiming compensation based on its interpretation of disputed clause. Plaintiff brought
motion for partial summary judgment, and defendant brought cross-motion for summary
judgment dismissing action.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CIBC paid Siskinds a contingency fee on "opposition files", ranging from 30% all inclusive to
35% plus costs plus taxes, depending upon the file.
CIBC also paid Siskinds a 10% contingency fee on all payments received, prior to the
termination date of June 30, 2011, on the Siskinds Files.

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – see ‘Outcome’

Outcome

Held: Motion dismissed; cross-motion granted.
“I see little if any resemblance between the work performed by Siskinds under the 2008
Business Agreement and that performed by lawyers under traditional [CFAs] because
Siskinds performed largely clerical, administrative debt monitoring and collection work using
non-legal staff under its agreement with the CIBC.” (para 58)
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Hervé Pomerleau Ontario Inc. V. Ottawa (City) (2014 ONSC 1496)
2014 CarswellOnt 2727, 2014 ONSC 1496, [2014] O.J. No. 1040, 238 A.C.W.S. (3d) 312
Date

Judgment: March 7, 2014

Parties

Defendant counsel not named in decision.

Counsel

David Elliott, Christopher McLeod, for Plaintiff
Ronald Caza, Alyssa Tomkins, for Defendant

Judge/s

Albert Roy J.

Quick Facts

Defendant successfully defended plaintiff's action. Defendant submitted that costs should be
awarded on substantial indemnity basis because of repeated allegations of bad faith on part of
plaintiff toward defendant. Parties made submissions regarding costs

Statute/Rules
Considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 131.
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 20(2).
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 49,, 49.10, 57, 57.01.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Fee agreement provided for:
 blended rate of $171/hour
 if costs awarded by the Court were in excess of the blended rate, excess would be
shared by counsel and Defendant

Issue/s with
Agreement

An ancillary issue to the main costs disagreement: Is the fee agreement a CFA? Counsel
for the Defendant asserts that it is.

Outcome

Held: Fixed costs awarded (see paras 14-15 for details)
“Plaintiff's language may well have been exaggerated and colorful but I made no findings that
the Plaintiff conducted the litigation in a reprehensible or outrageous manner.” (para 3)
On fee agreement: “I disagree with counsel that this is a contingency agreement. Nor would I
categorize it as Plaintiff counsel has a risk premium which have been referred to in the
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Walker v. Ritchie [citation removed] and usually
involves counsel representing an impecunious Plaintiff.”
Followed: Dunstan v. Flying J Travel Plaza (2007 – Ont SCJ); Mantella v. Mantella (2006 –
Ont SCJ); Wasserman, Arsenault Ltd. v. Sone (2000 – Ont SCJ)
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Evans Sweeny Bordin Llp V. Zawadzki (2015 ONSC 869)
– see ONCA decision below
2015 CarswellOnt 2872, 2015 ONSC 869, 250 A.C.W.S. (3d) 696
Date

Heard: February 5, 2015
Judgment: February 6, 2015

Parties

Evans Sweeny Bordin LLP, solicitors
Joseph Zawadzki, Frenchmen's Creek Estates Inc. and 550075 Ontario Inc., clients

Counsel

Mr. Michael Bordin, for Solicitors
Mr. William L. Roland, for Clients

Judge/s

J.A. Ramsay J.

Quick Facts

Three invoices for legal services were referred to an assessment officer by order of a judge.
The assessment officer made a report on December 10, 2013. The assessment officer allowed
$268,354.13 of $812,543.91 in fees. He added pre-judgment interest of $29,333.87. He
deducted $4,691.86 for fees already paid and $47,870.62 for costs of the assessment. His final
certificate, then, required the clients to pay $245,125.52. The clients submit that the fees
should be further reduced. The solicitors accept the $268,354 for fees, but submit that the
assessment officer should not have disallowed the $500,000 bonus that was provided for in a
written CFA. Motion by solicitors and clients opposing confirmation of assessment officer's
report.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 54.09.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Of the approximately $800,000 in fees submitted for assessment, $500,000 were payable
under a CFA, which provided for a bonus of $500,000 if appeal was granted (appeal was
granted).

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Did the assessment officer have the jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the CFA?
B. If yes, was the assessment officer’s conclusion unreasonable?

Outcome

Held: Report of assessment officer varied (see para 35 for details)
A. “…assessment officer can decide the validity of a [CFA] only if the question is referred to
him, and that an assessment officer has no jurisdiction to decide whether such a contract is fair
and reasonable. In the case at bar, nothing to do with the [CFA] was referred to the assessment
officer. He acted without jurisdiction.” (para 12) “Under the order of Tucker J., the entire
amount is now payable.” (para 16)
B. Yes. “The assessment officer's conclusion was unreasonable. I would have set it aside on
that ground if I had thought that he had jurisdiction.” (para 34)
Followed: Girao v. Bogoroch & Associates (2012 ONSC 2495); Williams (Litigation
Guardian of) v. Bowler (2006) (Ont SCJ)
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Evans Sweeny Bordin Llp V. Zawadzki (2015 ONCA 756)
– SEE ONSC DECISION ABOVE
2015 CarswellOnt 16984, 2015 ONCA 756, 127 O.R. (3d) 510, 259 A.C.W.S. (3d) 380, 342 O.A.C. 160, 393
D.L.R. (4th) 399, 80 C.P.C. (7th) 1
Date

Heard: October 20, 2015
Judgment: November 9, 2015

Parties

Joseph Zawadzki, Frenchmen’s Creek Estates Inc. and 550075, Appellant
Evans Sweeny Bordin LLP, Respondent

Counsel

William L. Roland, for Appellant
Michael Bordin, for Respondent

Judge/s

E.E. Gillese, P. Lauwers, David Brown JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Pursuant to CFA, land owners and developers (“owner” – now appellant) agreed to pay
solicitors a bonus of $500,000 in the event their appeal from final order of foreclosure was
granted. The appeal was granted and solicitors (now respondent) rendered account for just
over $700,000, including the bonus. Owner obtained order to assess account, assessment
officer reduced amount, and held that CFA was not fair or reasonable. Both parties moved to
oppose confirmation of assessment officer's report. Motions judge held that assessment officer
lacked jurisdiction to consider fairness and reasonableness of fee agreement and concluded
that agreement was fair and reasonable. Owner appealed.

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 3.
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R. 54.09(5)

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

On October 17, 2007, the parties entered into a CFA governing the appellants’ retainer of the
respondents, to represent them in an appeal of their initial failed application for relief from
foreclosure. Under the CFA, the appellants agreed to pay the respondents "the full sum of all
legal fees and all disbursements incurred by the Law Firm." And that, "In the event that the
appeal is granted, the Law Firm shall be paid $500,000...The above amounts shall be due and
payable to the Law Firm within 60 days of the granting... of the appeal."
The appeal was granted by order of the ONCA dated February 6, 2008. The respondents
rendered an August 7, 2008 account to the appellants for $700,307.96, which included the
$500,000 bonus.

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Was the CFA fair and reasonable?
B. And, did the assessment officer have the jurisdiction to make determinations of the fairness
and reasonableness of the CFA?

Outcome

Held: Appeal dismissed. Appellants ordered to pay the respondents $11,000 in costs
(including disbursements and HST)
The motions judge correctly found that the assessment officer lacked jurisdiction to consider
the fairness and reasonableness of the contingency fee agreement. The record before the
motions judge enabled him to assess fairly the agreement, and there is no basis for appellate
intervention in his conclusion that the agreement was fair and reasonable.
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G M Textiles Inc V. Sidhu (2016 ONSC 2055)
2016 CarswellOnt 4377, 2016 ONSC 2055
Date

Heard: September 30, 2013; January 2, 2014; January 3, 2014; January 28, 2014; June 30,
2014; July 2, 2014; July 3, 2014; July 4, 2014; April 13, 2015; April 14, 2015; April 16, 2015;
April 30, 2015; January 26, 2016; March 1, 2016; March 9, 2016
Judgment: March 23, 2016

Parties

G M Textiles Inc., Gurdev Singh Grewal, and Mohinder Singh Matharoo, Applicants
Fateh Singh Sidhu, et al, Respondents

Counsel

M. Solmon, F. Damji, for Applicants
M. Simaan, for Respondents

Judge/s

Robert B. Reid J.

Quick Facts

Applicants invested and loaned money to several Popeye’s franchise businesses. The
corporate respondents were the operating companies and companies which had leasehold
interests in the businesses. Mr. Fateh Singh Sidhu was the principal of the companies and was
in charge of running the businesses. On June 14, 2012, all the legal proceedings were settled
and Minutes of Settlement were executed. A final judgment was granted on July 20, 2012 for
approximately $1.7 million for the applicants against the respondents. Prior to the execution
of the Minutes of Settlement, a number of court orders were made, some of which continued
in force. Applicants brought two motions to the court seeking findings of contempt against the
respondents, and in particular against Fateh Singh Sidhu, as a result of his breaches of these
court orders.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 57.01, 60.05, 60.09, 60.11, 60.11(5).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Counsel for the applicants worked under a CFA, which provided for “a significant increase in
the billed hourly rate in the event of success” (para 68). The CFA was not court approved.

Issue/s with
Agreement

CFA was only at issue in the final determination of costs awarded against the respondents.

Outcome

Held: Motions granted.
Reid J: “I found that Fateh Singh Sidhu was in contempt as a result of numerous failures to
comply with multiple terms of six orders of this court” (para 2).
And, since the “…contingency fee agreement has not been approved in advance by the court. I
do not consider it appropriate to impose that obligation on the respondents [in the
determination of costs].” (para 68) Respondents ordered to pay applicants $369,644.26
(inclusive of HST and disbursements).
Followed: Sussex Group Ltd. v. Fangeat (2003 – Ont SCJ)
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III. Employment Issues
Loreto V. Little (2010 ONSC 755)
2010 CarswellOnt 916, 2010 ONSC 755, [2010] O.J. No. 679, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 230
Date

Heard: January/February, 2010
Judgement: February, 2010

Parties

Plaintiff: Loreto
Defendants: Little; Morello; Segreto; Vettese; Borello; Miranda; Sawczak; Morello, Vettese,
Segreto LLP

Counsel

For Plaintiff: Jonathan Speigel for Plaintiff
For Defendants: Enzo Di Iorio, Melissa Mackovski

Judge/s

Then: Edward Belobaba J.

Quick Facts

Termination of an employee at a firm, and what amount of compensation the terminated
employee was entitled to, given that most of the firm's employees were billed through CFAs.

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement

30% CFA: "The legal fee was 30% of the total amount recovered less disbursements which
had to be paid in any event by the client. If the retainer was terminated by either LLM or the
client … the client agreed to pay for the time that had been spent on the file to date at the
prevailing hourly rates..."

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – CFA was not considered

Outcome

NA – CFA was not considered
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Tossonian V. Cynphany Diamonds Inc. (2015 ONSC 766)
– additional reasons relating to costs of judgement in (2014 ONSC 7484)
2015 CarswellOnt 1283, 2015 ONSC 766, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 43
Date

Judgment: February 3, 2015

Parties

Razmig Tossonian, Plaintiff
Cynphany Diamonds Inc., o/a Symphony Diamonds, Defendant

Counsel

Andrew Wray, Christian Vernon, Niiti Simmonds, for Plaintiff
William Chalmers, for Defendant

Judge/s

Graeme Mew J.

Quick Facts

Plaintiff commenced application for wrongful dismissal. At trial it was concluded that
plaintiff did not have fixed term contract of employment, but that he was dismissed and was
entitled to two months' notice of termination. Plaintiff was awarded damages of $13,520 plus
pre-judgment interest, which were within monetary jurisdiction of Small Claim Court. Parties
made submissions regarding costs.

Statute/Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA had not been produced

Issue/s with
Agreement

Issue regarding CFA was that it had not been produced and defendants argue that this is
“essential evidence” lacking regarding the costs equation.

Outcome

Held: Plaintiff awarded partial indemnity costs of the trial (fixed at $88,450.98 – inclusive of
disbursements and HST + $3,500 for costs of the motion)
“Counsel have not directed my attention to any case in which the disclosure of
a contingency fee agreement has been held to be a pre-requisite of a plaintiff's entitlement to
recover partial indemnity costs of a proceeding. In the circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff
had a contingency fee agreement with his lawyers is not a sufficient reason for not awarding
him costs in this case.” (para 17)
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IV. Estates/Trusts
Krentz Estate V. Krentz (2011 ONSC 1653)
2011 CarswellOnt 1651, 2011 ONSC 1653, [2011] O.J. No. 1124, 199 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1025, 66 E.T.R. (3d) 132
Judge/s

Then: Turnbull J.

Quick Facts

"Roman Krentz (Roman) must have been a wise man. He recognized that appointing one or
more of his four children to administer his estate would widen the existing estrangement
among his children... When the Trustees moved to pass the accounts of the estate, a series of
simmering issues bubbled to the surface."

Statute & Rules
Considered

N/A - See "Contingency Fee Agreement" section

Contingency Fee
Agreement

The Judge in this case was merely analogizing contingency fee retainers to a trustee of an
estate, to decide what would be required of an estate trustee: "In recent years, the legislature
has had to deal with an analogous situation with respect to contingency fees in various forms of
civil actions, including class actions and personal injury claims. Strict requirements to validate
such agreements have been included in relatively recent amendments to the regulations enacted
under the Solicitors' Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S. 15. ... Unfortunately, similar provisions have not
been included in the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.T. 23 to deal with situations where the
solicitor will have a "contingent" interest in the estate. Compensation for a lawyer who is
counsel and a Trustee is notionally similar to the lawyer acting on a contingency fee retainer in
that ..."

Mcpeake V. Cadesky And Associates (2013 ONSC 6237)
2013 CarswellOnt 14926, 2013 ONSC 6327, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 360
Quick Facts

Action related to allegations of professional negligence against lawyer and firm of chartered
accountants related to formation and constitution of family trust for plaintiff. In 2006, parties
reached agreement that plaintiff would issue notice of action and then adjourn action sine die.
Plaintiff's lawyer obtained different order for extension to February 2007 to serve and file
statement of claim. Plaintiff's lawyer still understood that action was suspended. In 2007,
action was administratively dismissed for delay but plaintiff's lawyer did not become aware
that action had been dismissed until 2011. Plaintiff brought motion to reinstate action.
(Motion was granted.)

Summary

Two mentions of CFA: "The withdrawal of funding meant that McPeake would have damages
regardless of the outcome, as indicated above (in the form of either increased taxes or
contingency fee)… It appears as if neither the Tax Court proceeding nor the rectification
application had been started by the time Dawe's client decided to stop funding Rachert in June
2007. On July 12, 2007, Rachert wrote again to the Defendants stating that McPeake had
retained him on a contingency fee basis and that his fees would form part of the damages
claimed in the Ontario action."
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Vitale V. Martin (2014 ONSC 2396)
2014 CarswellOnt 5472, 2014 ONSC 2396, 100 E.T.R. (3d) 152, 240 A.C.W.S. (3d) 57
Date

Heard: February 18-21, 24-28; April 2, 4, 2014
Judgment: April 16, 2014

Parties

Myrna Winnifred Vitale, Applicant
Joanne Martin, Estate Trustee of the Estate of Salvatore Vitale and in her Personal capacity,
Filippo Vitale and Giuseppina Vitale, Respondents

Counsel

A. Saji, for Applicant / Respondent
Joanne Martin, Estate Trustee of the Estate of Salvatore Vitale, Respondent, for herself
Filippo Vitale, Giuseppia Vitale, Respondents, for themselves
J. Webster, for A. Saji

Judge/s

Peter B. Hambly J.

Quick Facts

Wife was married to deceased. There were two major assets in deceased's estate, which were
his home and RSP's as well as life insurance. Subject to general term permitting sale of assets
to pay debts, deceased left house to wife and her children. Wife brought application for
dependant's relief under Succession Law Reform Act. Estate brought application for
directions, including order for sale of house to pay debts and income tax on RSP. Following
mediation, parties allegedly entered into settlement, with wife agreeing to pay estate $95,000
in return for title to house, which would be transferred to wife subject to current mortgage.
Wife did not sign minutes of settlement. Issue arose as to whether parties entered into
settlement agreement.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 1.04(1), 2.01(1), 49.09.

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Details of CFA not given beyond: “Mr. Saji has acted for Myrna without charging her
anything with the expectation of taking his fees out of whatever she may receive in these
proceedings” (para 33)

Issue/s with
Agreement

Main issue in case was whether or not parties entered into a settlement agreement. And,
flowing from that, what legal fees are available to Mr. Saji.

Outcome

Held: Legal fees issues deferred to assessment officer, but with the following statement:
“I would not think that Mr. Saji would be entitled to any fees from Myrna for his work at this
trial since he accepted a retainer to take a case to trial that I have found had already been
settled. I leave that to whatever Mr. Saji can work out with his client and to the assessment
officer.” (para 35) “This case is an illustration of the perils of contingency fees because the
lawyer has a financial interest in the outcome of the case.” (para 34)
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Spiteri Estate V. Canada (Attorney General)
2014 CarswellOnt 14831, 2014 ONSC 6167, 246 A.C.W.S. (3d) 769
Date

Heard: October 6, 2014
Judgment: October 23, 2014

Parties

Christopher Spiteri, as Estate Trustee of the Estate of Tessa Spiteri et. al., Plaintiffs
The Attorney General of Canada et. al., Defendants

Counsel

C. Katie Black, for Plaintiffs
Miriam Vale Peters, for Defendant, Hay
Agnieszka Zagorska, for Defendant, Attorney General of Canada

Judge/s

Master MacLeod

Quick Facts

Deceased purported to change beneficiary of employer pension from ex-husband to mother,
for benefit of her children. Unbeknownst to deceased, employer rejected her change of
beneficiary form. After deceased's death, death benefit was paid to ex-husband, who refused
to pay it to deceased's estate or children. Estate trustee brought action against employer and
ex-husband. Estate’s counsel was retained on a CFA (Caza Saikaley LLP). Action was settled
on terms discontinuing action against ex-husband without costs and that employer would pay
death benefits to estate. Estate and deceased's ex-husband brought motions for costs of settled
action.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.43, s 131.
Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg. 194, R 20.04(2)(b), 57, 57.01(1)(a)-(g), 57.01(7),
58

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

CFA provided:
 20% of recovery in the event of a successful outcome
 disbursements and applicable HST to be paid on an ongoing basis
 in the event the retainer terminated by the client prior to resolution of the claim, then
hourly rates apply, which are “contingency rates”, higher than the firm’s normal
hourly rates to account for risk of contingency fee work

Issue/s with
Agreement

What is the relevance of the actual fee charged to the client pursuant to the CFA to the
appropriate amount to be paid by the defendant Attorney General to the plaintiff estate as
costs award?

Outcome

Held: Estate’s motion granted. Ex-husband’s motion dismissed.
It would not be appropriate to use 60% of the "contingency rate” because it incorporates a risk
premium that is not relevant here, and is only provided for in the CFA for when the client
terminate their counsel’s services. “I fix the amount to be paid by the Attorney General as
partial indemnity costs at $49,162.11 inclusive of HST and disbursements. There will be no
costs of the motion.” (para 70)
Followed: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (Ontario) (2004) (Ont CA); McLean v.
Knox (2012) (Ont SCJ); Moore v. Getahun (2014) (Ont SCJ); Walker v. Ritchie (2006 SCC
45)
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V.

Other /Unclear

Sun V Pomes (2012 Onsc 3031) – Motion To Extend Time For Appeal
– see (2013 ONSC 508) below
2012 CarswellOnt 6342, 2012 ONSC 3031
Date

Heard: May 22, 2012
Judgment: May 23, 2012

Parties

Jia Ke Sun (plaintiff), Moving Party
Dr. Regis Pomes and Hospital for Sick Children, Altaf M. Khan, Respondent on Motion

Counsel

Jia Ke Sun, for himself
No one for Altaf M. Khan

Judge/s

Aston J.

Quick Facts

Order was made in the Superior Court of Justice proceeding in which Dr. Sun is the plaintiff
and Dr. Pomes and the Hospital for Sick Children are named as defendants, but the order in
question relates to a dispute between Dr. Sun and his former solicitor Altaf Khan. When Dr.
Sun brought a motion to add a defendant in the Superior Court of Justice proceeding, solicitor
Khan brought a motion the same day to be removed as Dr. Sun's solicitor of record.
Dr. Sun disputed provision requiring law firm acting for defendant to reissue cheque drawn in
favour of plaintiff and ordering that new cheque be drawn in favour of lawyer. Order required
Sun to pay additional $390 to lawyer to receive delivery of file. Order required court file to be
charged for solicitor's lien for one-third amount against any settlement of judgment. Plaintiff
brought motion to extend time for appealing and for leave to appeal. Plaintiff claimed plaintiff
never received motion material from lawyer until day in court and copy of notice of motion
and supporting material were handed to plaintiff after decision was made. Plaintiff was not
asked for submissions on any of issues now challenged.
(unclear what the nature of the underlying claim is.)

Statute & Rules
Considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s 19(1)(a)
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 28.1(8), 28.1(12)
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 15.04(2), 15.05(b), 16.03, 62.02

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA – see Sun v Pomes (2013 ONSC 508) chart below

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA – see Sun v Pomes (2013 ONSC 508) chart below
Aston J. lacked jurisdiction to set-aside but stated… “ I have reviewed the motion record of
Mr. Khan. It is quite obvious on its face that there is nothing contained in that record to
establish a contingency fee agreement that would be enforceable under the Solicitors Act. In
particular, the prescribed regulations for form, content and enforceability found in Ontario
Regulation 195/04 "contingency fee agreements", authorized and promulgated pursuant to s.
28.1(12) of the Solicitors Act, have not been met. Furthermore, the specific section of
the Solicitors Act that Mr. Khan was trying to identify for Justice Allen, s. 28.1(8), only
authorizes judicial approval of contingency fee agreements "arising as a result of an award of
costs" (as is the case here) on a joint application to a judge by the solicitor and the client. A
solicitor cannot unilaterally apply for approval. In short, s. 28.1(8) — incorrectly cited as s.
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28(8)(b) in the handwritten endorsement — was a red herring.” (para 12)
Outcome

Held: Order granted
“(i) extending the time for perfection of Dr. Sun's appeal by 60 days from today's date, if
necessary; and
(ii) granting leave to appeal paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the order of Allen J. dated November 21,
2011, if necessary.” (para 14)

Sun V Pomes (2013 ONSC 508)
– see other ONSC decision above
2013 CarswellOnt 999, 2013 ONSC 508, 228 A.C.W.S. (3d) 266
Date

Heard: January 21, 2013
Judgment: January 21, 2013

Parties

Jia Ke Sun (plaintiff), Appellant
Dr. Regis Pomes and Hospital for Sick Children, Altaf M. Khan, Defendants

Counsel

Jia Ke Sun, for himself
Mr. Khan, also for himself

Judge/s

Herman J., Lederer J., Ray J.

Quick Facts

Order was made requiring Bennett Jones, the lawyers acting for the defendants in the main
action, to pay the $28,815 costs award to Mr. Khan instead of to Dr. Sun. The order also
required Dr. Sun to pay $390 to Mr. Khan to receive the solicitor's file and created a lien in
Mr. Khan's favour for one-third of any future settlement or judgment. Individual plaintiff (Mr.
Sun) appealed.
See more detail in ‘Quick Facts’ in Sun v Pomes (2012 ONSC 3031) above.
(unclear what the nature of the underlying claim is.)

Statute & Rules
Considered

Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s 28.1(8)

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

See ‘Quick Facts’

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Individual defendant (Mr. Khan), admittedly, failed to serve motion in accordance with
Solicitors Act.
B. Individual defendant also failed to make joint application for approval of CFA.
C. And, Dr. Sun did not have an opportunity to address the issues at the hearing of the motion.

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed with costs awarded to Dr. Sun in the amount of $250
Any payments made to individual defendant to be paid to plaintiff.
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Cookish V. Paul Lee Associates Professional Corp. (2013 ONCA 278)
– see additional reasons in (2013 ONCA 425) below
2013 CarswellOnt 5070, 2013 ONCA 278, [2013] O.J. No. 1947, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1181, 305 O.A.C. 359, 39
C.P.C. (7th) 227
Date

Heard: January 14, 2013
Judgment: April 30, 2013

Parties

Paul Lee Associates Professional Corporation (respondent), Appellant
Kathleen Cookish (applicant), Respondent

Counsel

Tanya A. Pagliaroli, for Appellant
David S. Wilson, for Respondent

Judge/s

Doherty, Laskin, Blair JJ.A.

Quick Facts

Respondent client was represented by appellant law firm for long-term disability claim. Client
signed what lawyer called standard contingency fee agreement, after first meeting with firm.
Firm negotiated settlement of claim for client. 11 months after settlement, client informed
law firm that she would seek accounting of bill. Client did not indicate issue with nature of
retainer as contingency fee, but only challenged amount. On this understanding, firm
consented to order requiring hearing with assessment officer (upon order by Corrick J. of the
Superior Court). At assessment, new counsel for client raised issue of validity of retainer, to
which firm responded that matter should be referred to Superior Court. Over objections of
client, assessment officer adjourned hearing. Firm moved to have consent order set aside, but
was unsuccessful. Firm appealed from consent order and failure to set order aside.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 90, 90(3)
Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, 3, 3(a), 4, 4(1), 6, 6(4), 6(5), 11, 18, 23, 24, 26-28, 28.1,
30
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, Rs 1.03(1), 54.01, 54.02, 55

Contingency Fee
Agreement &
Settlement
Breakdown

Appellant firm negotiated settlement for respondent for a total settlement of $285,000 +
$44,000 in costs and disbursements. Respondent received a net recovery of $237, 120, after
deduction of the retainer amount.

Issue/s with
Agreement

Was the parties’ agreement a CFA? Can an assessment officer make that
determination? At the heart of the dispute was a difference of opinion over the validity of the
retainer agreement as a valid CFA. Appellant argued that assessment officer did not have
jurisdiction to deal with the matter given this added layer of difficulty, needed to go to a judge
instead (per s. 28.1 of the Solicitors Act).

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed. Orders of motion judge and Corrick J. set-aside. Matter remitted to a
judge of the Superior Court to hear the application for assessment. Costs awarded to appellant.
Legislation placed matter of review in power of judge, not assessment officer, who has more
limited powers. Although not a strict requirement, it was preferable that a judge determine the
initial issues over what kind of agreement the retainer was, and refer matters of quantum to
assessment officer afterwards if necessary. Issues of fairness and reasonableness
of agreement were within knowledge of judge, more so than that of assessment officer.
Jurisprudence supported proposition that if retainer was in dispute, matter was to be referred
to judge.
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Cookish V. Paul Lee Associates Professional Corp. (2013 ONCA 425)
– additional reasons to (2013 ONCA 278) – see above
2013 CarswellOnt 8517, 2013 ONCA 425, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 352
Date

Heard: January 14, 2013
Judgment: June 21, 2013

Parties

Kathleen Cookish (applicant), Respondent
Paul Lee Associates Professional Corporation (respondent), Appellant

Counsel

Tanya A. Pagliaroli, for Appellant
David S. Wilson, for Respondent

Judge/s

H. Doherty J.A., John Laskin J.A., R.A. Blair J.A.

Quick Facts

Client retained law firm pursuant to CFA. Law firm negotiated settlement of claim for client,
who subsequently sought accounting of bill. Law firm consented to order requiring
assessment hearing. Client's new counsel raised issue of validity of retainer. Assessment
officer adjourned hearing. Law firm's motion to have consent order set aside was
unsuccessful. Appeal by law firm was allowed

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

NA

Issue/s with
Agreement

NA

Outcome

“After considering the submissions, we fix costs of the appeal, including costs of the previous
motion to quash, in favour of the appellant in the amount of $10,000 inclusive of
disbursements and all applicable taxes… We confirm as well that, since the consent order of
Corrick J. was set aside, including the costs order made by her against the appellant, any
monies paid on account of that costs award must be returned.” (paras 3-4)
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Miller, Canfield, Paddock And Stone Llp V. Bdo Dunwoody Llp (2015 ONSC 4806)
– see ONCA decision below
2015 CarswellOnt 16539, 2015 ONSC 4806, 260 A.C.W.S. (3d) 168
Date

Heard: July 27, 2015
Judgment: August 7, 2015

Parties

Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone LLP, Plaintiff
BDO Dunwoody LLP, Defendant

Counsel

Myron W. Shulgan, Q.C., for Plaintiff
James Thomson, for Defendant

Judge/s

Pamela L. Hebner J.

Quick Facts

Two members of defendant accounting and tax firm were charged with criminal offences.
Charges were dismissed at preliminary hearing. Defendant funded cost of defence, exceeding
$3 million. Defendant retained plaintiff law firm to bring action against Crown and others,
seeking damages for wrongful prosecution. Parties entered into CFA. Defendant's action,
alleging various causes of action was dismissed on summary judgment, except for claim for
misfeasance in public office. Plaintiff did not have counsel capable of prosecuting appeal and
recommended outside counsel. Parties disagreed over whether outside counsel's fees were
disbursement payable by defendant or were plaintiff's responsibility to cover. Appeal was
substantially successful, and defendants' claims were resurrected. Plaintiff submitted account
to defendant in amount of $427,891.57. When account was not paid, plaintiff commenced
action. Defendant brought motion for summary judgment dismissing action.

Statute/Rules
Considered

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 20.04(2).

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Retainer agreement (CFA) struck between BDO and MCPS in April 2007 provided for:
 25% contingency fee of gross recovery of any damages, costs or re-judgement interest
recovered
 interim billing of client for disbursements in excess of $5,000, “from time to time”
CFA included provision stating that client could have fee set-out in agreement reviewed by
judge, and for the client’s right to terminate services, but that client would be liable to pay for
services up until that point on based-on time spent on the case.

Issue/s with
Agreement

A. Can the legal fees for the appeal be charged to BDO as "disbursements" within the
meaning of the CFA?
B. Was the CFA breached by MCPS? (I.e. The CFA requires MCPS to "act on our behalf in
any and all proceedings against the informants, the DOJ, the CRA and their servants, agents
and employees ...". MCPS suggests that "proceedings" does not include appeals.
C. Did the breach of the agreement amount to repudiation and, if so, what options were
available to BDO?
D. Is BDO obligated to pay anything to MCPS on account of fees and disbursements?

Outcome

Held: Motion granted. Action dismissed.
A. “In my view, MCPS cannot refer any of the work it agreed to do under the
retainer agreement with BDO to another firm, then pay that firm as a disbursement. To
include fees for any step as a disbursement would be inconsistent with the [CFA] reached
between the parties.” (para 15)
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B. The appeal is a breach of the retainer agreement. “Proceedings” does include appeals.
C. “the breach of contract on the part of MCPS was a substantial breach such as would justify
future non-performance of BDO's obligations. The breach constituted a repudiation of
the [CFA] on the part of MCPS.” (para 27)
D. No. “BDO is not obligated to pay anything to MCPS on account of fees and disbursements
as MCPS, as the repudiating party cannot enforce any of the terms of the agreement against
BDO.” (para 36)
Followed: Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp.[1999] 3 SCR 423;
968703 Ontario Ltd. v. Vernon (2002) (Ont CA)
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Miller, Canfield, Paddock And Stone, Llp V. Bdo Dunwoody Llp (2016 ONCA 281)
– see ONSC decision above
2016 CarswellOnt 5970, 2016 ONCA 281
Date

Heard: April 15, 2016
Judgment: April 21, 2016

Parties

Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, LLP (plaintiff), Appellant
BDO Dunwoody LLP (defendant), Respondent

Counsel

Myron W. Shulgan, for Appellant
James P. Thomson, for Respondent

Judge/s

John Laskin J.A., C.W. Hourigan J.A., David Brown J.A.

Quick Facts

Appellant law firm acted for respondent company (BDO) under a CFA. CFA allowed for firm
to demand fees for services provided, if retainer was terminated. BDO terminated retainer,
and firm delivered its account to company. BDO took the position that the Law Firm's refusal
to accept responsibility for appeal counsel's fees amounted to a repudiation of the CFA
(retainer). On June 19, 2012, BDO wrote the Law Firm to advise that BDO accepted the
repudiation and directed the Law Firm not to take any further steps on behalf of BDO. BDO
brought motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Law Firm's action to collect its fees.
Motion was granted. Law firm appealed

Statute & Rules
Considered

NA

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Under the CFA (dated April 30, 2007):
 Law Firm agreed to act on behalf of BDO "in any and all proceedings" BDO intended
to commence against certain defendants
 contained a provision entitled "Termination of Legal Services," which provided that
the client, BDO, had the "right, with or without cause, to cancel" the Law Firm's
services
 In that event, BDO agreed it would be "responsible to protect and pay the value of all
services to date," and the retainer agreement specified how the value of services
would be calculated.
On April 15, 2014, the Law Firm rendered an invoice to BDO in the amount of $427,891.57
for the value of the services rendered to the date of termination of the retainer agreement. (no
dispute about the amount)

Issue/s with
Agreement

Whether or not the Law Firm’s refusal to accept responsibility for appeal counsel's fees
amounted to a repudiation of the CFA.

Outcome

Held: Appeal allowed. Costs awarded to the Law Firm in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of
disbursements and HST, and its costs of the motion below in the amount of $20,000, plus
disbursements and HST.
“…the motion judge did not apply the proper principle of law to her interpretation of that
contract. A repudiatory breach of a contract does not, in itself, bring an end to a contract.
Rather, it confers upon the innocent party, such as BDO, the right of election to treat the
contract at an end.” (para 6) “We grant judgment in favour of the Law Firm in the amount of
$427,891.57, together with pre-judgment interest.” (para 8)
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Guest V. Fletcher (2016 ONSC 2623)
2016 CarswellOnt 6035, 2016 ONSC 2623
Date

Heard: March 11, 2016
Judgment: April 20, 2016

Parties

Christopher Stephen Guest, Appellant
Beverley Evelyn Fletcher and Michael Patrick Fletcher, Defendants

Counsel

Appellant, for himself
Eric Lavictoire, for Defendants

Judge/s

R. Smith J.

Quick Facts

The appellant, Christopher Guest is a lawyer who seeks leave to appeal the decision of
Laliberté J. dismissing his claim for costs against his former clients. The motion judge
exercised his discretion and refused to award Mr. Guest any costs because he found that he
purchased his clients' interest in their action, which breached section 28 of the Solicitors' Act,
s. 4. He found that the agreement whereby Mr. Guest acquired his clients' right to claim for
damages against the vendors, in return for abandoning his claim against them for fees of
approximately $15,000, was void ab initio. Mr Guest made motion for leave to appeal.
Solicitors' Act, 2002, c. 24, Sched. A, S. 4, s 28
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, R 62.04(4) -- sets out the grounds on which
leave to appeal may be granted
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, ss 1, 2(10), 3.1, 4(4)
Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 , s 152
Mr. Guest submits that his unsigned retainer agreement with the Fletchers qualifies as a CFA
and allowed him to recover 100% of the amount they recovered in their cause of action
against the Vendors as legal fees, in return for foregoing his claim against them for fees of
$15,000.
Mr. Guest submitted that he sent letters to the Fletchers but acknowledged that his clients
never signed an agreement with him containing any such terms. (para 27)
A. Can a lawyer acquire a right of subrogation in his or her clients' action (and receive 100%
of the damages recovered therefrom as legal fees)?
B. Is this agreement between Guest and his clients an illegal CFA?
C. Is this agreement prohibited by s. 28 of the Solicitors' Act?
Held: Motion for leave to appeal dismissed.
A. Mr. Guest is not an insurer as defined under the Insurance Act and he has not made any
payment to his clients to indemnify them for a loss they suffered. As a result, Guest could not
acquire any right of subrogation to bring an action in the name of his clients where he is not
an insurer' but rather their lawyer, and where he never indemnified the Fletchers for any
damages suffered.
B. Agreement and minutes of settlement between Guest and his clients is not a CFA. It does
not comply with requirement under the CFA Regulation, as it was unsigned, it did not clearly
state it was a CFA, and the client no longer retained rights to make “critical decisions
regarding the conduct of the matter”—i.e. the right not to proceed with the claim or to
discontinue it (in contravention of ss. 1, 2(10), 3.1, 4(4)).
C. Yes. “Whether the agreement was illegal or void ab initio was not essential to exercise of
his discretion. I find that there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's
decision to dismiss Mr. Guest's claim for costs as being very unfair and in breach of s. 28…”
(para 32)
Followed: Koliniotis

Statute/Rules
Considered

Contingency Fee
Agreement
Breakdown

Issue/s with
Agreement

Outcome
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APPENDIX NINE

Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement31 32 33
[Firm Name34, Address35, Telephone Number36, Email]

[Date]37
[Client Name] 38
[Client Address]39
[Client Telephone Number]40

Re: Accident of [date of accident]
Part 1: Our Services
Legal services covered by this contract

[Firm Name and/or Lawyer Name] is being retained by the client to provide the following services
and to represent the client in respect to injuries, losses and damages resulting from a [type of accident]
which occurred on or about [date].41

31

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, “1(1)(a) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement, (a) shall be entitled "Contingency Fee Retainer Agreement"…
32
Solicitors Act, s.28.1(1) “A solicitor may enter into a contingency fee agreement with a client in accordance
with this section.”
33

Solicitors Act, s.28.1(4) “A contingency fee agreement shall be in writing.”

34

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1 “2. A solicitor who is a party to a contingency fee
agreement shall ensure that the agreement includes the following: 1. The name, address and telephone number
of the solicitor and of the client.”
35
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1
36
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(b) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition to being
in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (b) shall be dated; and…
37

38

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1
40
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.1
41
s.2.2 A statement of the basic type and nature of the matter in respect of which the solicitor is providing
services to the client.”
39
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Your role as client
You understand the importance of giving us all the facts and of being totally honest with us. We can
only do our best job if we have your trust and are fully informed.
In particular, we ask you to give us all information you have, or have access to, which could help us in
working on your lawsuit. We need copies of all letters and documents relating to the accident; medical
reports; physiotherapy records; income tax records; paycheque stubs; and medical, drug, and parking
receipts. If necessary, we will ask you to give us written authorization to obtain this information from
other parties.
You retain the right to make all critical decisions regarding the conduct of your claim.42
Sole Representation
We will be representing solely you in this matter. Our representation of you does not include the
representation of related persons or entities, such as family members; friends; the individuals or entities
that are shareholders, directors or officers of a corporation, its parent, subsidiaries or affiliates; partners
of a partnership or joint venture; or members of a trade association or other organization. In acting for
you, we are not acting for or taking on any responsibilities, obligations or duties to any such related
persons or entities and no lawyer-client or other fiduciary relationship exists between us and any such
related persons or entities.

[Multiple Clients – Optional in the alternative if not sole representation]

Representing Multiple Clients with Apparent Same Interest (Joint Representation)
As you know the following [party/parties] are involved with you in this matter and you and they have
asked us to represent all of you:
[name(s)]
We have discussed with you the principles we must follow of undivided loyalty. No information
received from one of you as a part of the joint representation can be treated as confidential as between
all of you. If we should receive information from one of you which we are instructed to keep
confidential as between all of you, we will have to stop acting for all of you.
We have discussed these matters with you and have concluded that, at least at present, each of your
individual interests in this matter are the same. The areas in which these individual interests may
diverge in the future are:
[describe]

42

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.10 “A statement that informs the client that the client retains
the right to make all critical decisions regarding the conduct of the matter.”
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If we agree to act for one of you in a matter separate from this one, and we receive confidential
information from that separate matter that is relevant to this matter, and the client in that separate matter
wishes to keep it confidential, then
[Lawyer when drafting agreement must choose (i) or (ii) following]
(i) the information must not be disclosed to the other in this matter. This means we must withdraw
from the joint representation.
or
(ii) the information must be disclosed to each of you in this matter and we may continue to act jointly
for both of you.
Other conflicts may arise that cannot as yet be foreseen. A conflict of interest occurs when what is best
for one of our clients somehow is not best for or hurts another of the firm’s clients. At the present time
we can represent all of you. However, if it later becomes apparent that there is a conflict, we confirm
each of your instructions to attempt to resolve this conflict. If a successful resolution cannot be
accomplished in a timely way or at all, or if our attempts to resolve the issue cause us ethical concerns,
we will have to withdraw from representing all of you.

[if applicable] We confirm your agreement that if a contentious issue between you and
_______________ arises, we may continue to advise _______________________________
about the contentious matter and that I we will refer you to another lawyer or paralegal.
Our billings will name and be sent to all of you and each client is responsible for payment of the entire
amount. You will need to decide between you how our accounts will be divided.

Part 2: Our Fees, Expenses, and Billing Arrangements
Our fee is a percentage and contingent on a favourable settlement or trial outcome
We have explained to you that you have the option of retaining a lawyer other than by a contingency
fee agreement.43
There are two main ways a lawyer can bill you:44

43

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(i) “A statement that indicates, i. that the client and the
solicitor have discussed options for retaining the solicitor other than by way of a contingency fee agreement,
including retaining the solicitor by way of an hourly-rate retainer”
44
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(i)
ithout court approval, and thus le. the client must prove that the ch were quite tever way the lawye nts, and the
court228228228228228228228228
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Option 1 — by charging an hourly fee for work done;
Option 2 — by charging a percentage of the amount of money awarded in a settlement or
court judgment; or, alternatively, by accepting court ordered costs as the fee.45
We have explained that hourly rates may vary among lawyers and that you can speak to other lawyers
to compare rates.46
You have asked us to charge you fees based on a percentage of the amount of money awarded to you in
a settlement or court judgment, or by accepting court ordered costs as the fee, whichever is greater
(option 2). We agree.47
You acknowledge and understand that all the usual protections and controls on retainers between a
lawyer and client, as defined by the Law Society of Upper Canada and the common law, apply to this
contingency fee agreement.48
The disadvantage of choosing a percentage arrangement (option 2) is that you may end up paying us
more in legal fees than if we were to charge you an hourly fee for work done (option 1). This could
happen if we are fortunate in favourably settling your lawsuit quickly.
There are also advantages to choosing a percentage fee. First, if we cannot settle your case or if you lose at trial,
then you would only have to pay our disbursements. You would not have to pay us any fees. Second, if we go
to trial and win, the percentage fee may be less than an hourly fee if we have spent a significant amount of time
on the trial.
The contingency fee is to be paid to us contingent on a settlement or trial verdict.49
Percentage based on work done
Our percentage fee will be less if your claim is settled than if it goes to trial. If it is settled, the fee will
depend on the stage at which the lawsuit is settled. Our percentage fee will be:

1. [___, for example, 20]% of the damages awarded if we settle your claim before the
examination for discovery (Steps in a Lawsuit explains this step)
2. [___, for example, 25]% of the damages awarded if we settle your claim during or after the
examination for discovery and at least 90 days before trial
3. [___, for example, 30]% of the damages awarded if we settle your claim less than 90 days
before trial or during trial, but before the court judgment

45

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.5. “A statement that sets out the method by which the fee is
to be determined…”
46
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(ii) “that the client has been advised that hourly rates may
vary among solicitors and that the client can speak with other solicitors to compare rates,”
47
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(iii). “that the client has chosen to retain the solicitor by
way of a contingency fee agreement, and”
48
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.3(iv) “that the client understands that all usual protections
and controls on retainers between a solicitor and client, as defined by the Law Society of Upper Canada and the
common law, apply to the contingency fee agreement.”
49 Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.4 “A statement that explains the contingency upon which the fee is to
be paid to the solicitor.”
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4. [___, for example, 33-1/3]% of the damages awarded if your claim does not settle and is
decided by a trial.

For the purposes of calculating our percentage fee, any amount awarded in respect of costs and
disbursements is excluded.50
You understand that we will not recover more in fees than you recover in damages or receive through a
settlement.51
Costs
If we successfully settle your claim or win at trial, we will seek a sum of money called costs from the
Defendant(s). If our fee is calculated as a percentage of the settlement or court judgment, you will
receive the full amount of these costs since these costs are not included in the calculation.52
You understand that unless ordered otherwise by a judge 53 , you are entitled to receive any costs
contribution or awarded to you, on a partial or substantial indemnity scale.54 55
If, on the other hand, you are liable to pay costs, you are responsible for paying any costs contribution
or award, on a partial or substantial indemnity scale.56

50

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.5 “… and, if the method of determination is as a percentage
of the amount recovered, a statement that explains that for the purpose of calculating the fee the amount of
recovery excludes any amount awarded or agreed to that is separately specified as being in respect of costs and
disbursements.”
51
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.1 “If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that the solicitor
shall not recover more in fees than the client recovers as damages or receives by way of settlement.”
52
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.5 “… and, if the method of determination is as a percentage
of the amount recovered, a statement that explains that for the purpose of calculating the fee the amount of
recovery excludes any amount awarded or agreed to that is separately specified as being in respect of costs and
disbursements.”
53
Solicitors Act, s.28.1(9) A contingency fee agreement that is subject to approval under subsection (6) or (8) is
not enforceable unless it is so approved.
54
Solicitors Act, s.28.1(8) A contingency fee agreement shall not include in the fee payable to the solicitor, in
addition to the fee payable under the agreement, any amount arising as a result of an award of costs or costs
obtained as part of a settlement, unless,
(a) the solicitor and client jointly apply to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice for approval to include the
costs or a proportion of the costs in the contingency fee agreement because of exceptional circumstances; and
(b) the judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances apply and approves the inclusion of the costs or a
proportion of them.
55
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.3(i) “A statement that explains costs and the awarding of
costs and that indicates, i. that, unless otherwise ordered by a judge, a client is entitled to receive any costs
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party
entitled to costs, and…”
56
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.3(ii) “that a client is responsible for paying any costs
contribution or award, on a partial indemnity scale or substantial indemnity scale, if the client is the party liable
to pay costs.”
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Disbursements57
In addition to our percentage fee or court-ordered costs as our fee, you agree to pay all disbursements,
even if we cannot settle your claim or lose at trial.
Minor disbursements
We will charge you for the minor ongoing disbursements that we have to pay. Some of these disbursements
are: long distance telephone calls; photocopying costs; costs to deliver documents to court or the other lawyers;
faxes; court filing fees (which the court charges to keep an official record of court documents); and, necessary
land or company registry searches (for example, to find out the proper name of the defendant).
If we successfully settle your claim or win at trial, the settlement or court judgment most likely will require
the Defendant(s) to reimburse you for some of these disbursements.
Major disbursements
We may have to hire other people such as court reporters, expert witnesses, accountants, and property
appraisers to help us with your lawsuit. If we need to hire these people, we will first discuss the matter
with you. We usually ask you to pay these major disbursements in advance, or we will have the bill sent
directly to you to pay. Again, please pay these bills within 30 days. After 30 days we will begin
charging interest at [XX]% per annum.
Also, as with the minor disbursements, if we successfully settle your claim or win at trial, the settlement
or court judgment most likely will require the Defendant(s) to pay you costs to reimburse you for some
of these disbursements.
First Charge
We have first charge on any funds received in regards to disbursements or taxes as a result of a
judgment or settlement of the claim, subject to section 47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998.
HST
In addition to our legal fees and disbursements, you agree to pay any Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) that
we must charge you.
Example of Contingency Fee Calculation58
To illustrate how our percentage will be determined, we offer the following sample calculation. A claim
settles before examinations for discovery for the following amounts paid as a lump sum:

57

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.3.2 “A statement in respect of disbursements and taxes,
including the GST payable on the solicitor's fees, that indicates, i. whether the client is responsible for the
payment of disbursements or taxes and, if the client is responsible for the payment of disbursements, a general
description of disbursements likely to be incurred, other than relatively minor disbursements, and ii. that if the
client is responsible for the payment of disbursements or taxes and the solicitor pays the disbursements or taxes
during the course of the matter, the solicitor is entitled to be reimbursed for those payments, subject to section
47 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1998 (legal aid charge against recovery), as a first charge on any funds
received as a result of a judgment or settlement of the matter.”
58
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.6. “A simple example that shows how the contingency fee is
calculated.”
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Damages

$100,000.00

Costs

$10,000.00

Disbursements

$10,000.00

HST (on costs and disbursements)

$ 2,600.00

Total (lump sum payment from defendant)

$122,600.00

Since the claim settled before examinations for discovery, our fee would be 20% of the damages
including interest awarded to the client. The client receives the total amount of the costs. The invoice
delivered to the client would look like this:

Fee of 20% x $100,000.00 damages

$

20,000.00

Disbursements (reimbursed by defendants)

$

10,000.00

Other Disbursements (not paid by defendants)

$

300.00

HST (on fee and disbursements totaling $30,300)

$

3,939.00

Sub-total

$34,239.00

The client would then receive ($122,600.00 - $34,239.00 =) $88,361.00
You have the right to ask the Superior Court of Justice to review and approve our bill if payment of fees
and disbursements is by way of this contingency agreement. Should you wish to do so, you may apply
to the Superior Court of Justice for an assessment of the bill within six months of its delivery.59
Billing Arrangements
You agree and direct that all funds claimed by us for legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements shall be
paid to us in trust from any judgment or settlement money. We will then deduct our fee, any HST, and
any unpaid disbursements, and give you the balance.60
Structured Settlements
Instead of a lump sum payment, some claims are paid out by way of a structured settlement. A
structured settlement will pay you tax-free payments at set time intervals for a period of time. If your
claim is paid out by way of a structured settlement, our contingency fee is calculated and paid in lump
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Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.8 “A statement that informs the client of their right to ask
the Superior Court of Justice to review and approve of the solicitor's bill and that includes the applicable
timelines for asking for the review.”
60
s.3.4 “If the client is a plaintiff, a statement that indicates that the client agrees and directs that all funds
claimed by the solicitor for legal fees, cost, taxes and disbursements shall be paid to the solicitor in trust from
any judgment or settlement money.”
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sum based on the total damages award at the time of settlement.61
Part 3: Dealing with Each Other
Ending the relationship
By you
You are free to end our services before your case is completed by writing us a letter or note. If you do,
you agree to pay our disbursements and an hourly fee based on the actual time spent up to the date of
ending those services.62
Our hourly fee depends on which lawyer or assistant helps with the work. I will be the main lawyer
responsible for your case, but some work may need to be done by a more senior lawyer, and other work
can be done equally well by a more junior lawyer. There are also many services, such as gathering
information and preparing routine documents, that our paralegal assistant is well qualified to perform.
A paralegal works under the supervision of a lawyer, but may not give legal advice. Our paralegal can
serve you at a lower cost than one of our lawyers can.
If you end our relationship, our hourly fee will be based on these rates:
My rate

$[amount] per hour

[senior lawyer’s] rate

$[amount] per hour

[junior lawyer’s] rate

$[amount] per hour

[paralegal’s] rate

$[amount] per hour

If a lawsuit has already commenced, you will take the appropriate steps under the Rules of Civil
Procedure to file and serve a Notice of Change of Lawyers or a Notice of Intention to Act in Person. If
you do not do so within 30 days, we will bring a motion to remove ourselves as lawyers of record and
charge you a flat rate of $1,000.00.

By us
Subject to our obligations to you to maintain proper standards of professional conduct, we reserve the right
to terminate our services to you for good reasons which include, but are not limited to:
1. if you fail to cooperate with us in any reasonable request;
2. if our continuing to act would be unethical or impractical; or
3. did not pay our bills on time without making other arrangements for payment.
Again, you agree to pay our disbursements and an hourly fee for our legal services up until the time we
stopped acting for you.

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.7 “A statement that outlines how the contingency fee is calculated, if
recovery is by way of a structured settlement.”
61

62

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04, s.2.9 “A statement that outlines when and how the client or the
solicitor may terminate the contingency fee agreement, the consequences of the termination for each of them
and the manner in which the solicitor's fee is to be determined in the event that the agreement is terminated.”
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[If the client is a minor or person under disability include the following section:
Minors or Persons under Disability
If you are a party under disability as defined under the Rules of Civil Procedure, you, as represented by
a litigation guardian, must have the contingency fee agreement reviewed by a judge before the
agreement is finalized or as part of the motion or application for an approval of a settlement or a
consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The amount of the legal fees, costs, taxes and disbursements are subject to the approval of a judge when
the judge reviews a settlement agreement or consent judgment under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Any money payable to a person under disability under an order or settlement shall be paid
into court unless a judge orders otherwise under Rule 7.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.]
Confidentiality
As your lawyers, we have to share relevant information about your case with the Defendant(s) and the
court. But unless we need to share this information as part of our work, all information you give us will
be kept confidential between us. Your information will be collected, used and disclosed for the sole
purpose of providing our services to you in accordance with our Privacy Policy.
You confirm communication via the following is confidential and consent to me/our firm contacting
you at:
[client address]
[client home number]
[client cell number]
[client email]
No guarantee of success
We will work with you towards your desired outcome. However, all legal actions are subject to many
possible variables such as the demeanour and recollection of witnesses, the availability of substantiating
documents and other evidence, and the evidence marshalled by the other side - all of which affect the
decision of a judge or jury. Accordingly, we cannot guarantee that your desired result will in fact be
achieved. For us to work towards your desired outcome, it will be necessary for you to abide by the
terms described in this agreement. Remember that all lawsuits involve risks and uncertainties in the
law, the facts, and the evidence.
Part 4: Signing this Contract
This contract contains the whole agreement between us about our relationship with each other and our
legal fees and disbursements. It will not be changed unless we both agree and sign any changes. It will
legally bind anyone such as heirs or legal representatives who replace either you or us, but it does not
legally bind other lawyers who might act for you if you decide to end our relationship.
If you want us to proceed on the basis described above, please sign both copies of this agreement in
the space provided and return one copy to us in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. If there is
anything you do not agree with, or if there is anything you would like to discuss before signing, please
write or call us.
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____________________________

________________________

63

Lawyer’s signature

Date

_____________________________

________________________

Witness64

Date

_____________________________

________________________

Client’s signature65

Date

_____________________________

________________________

Witness66

Date

63

Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(c) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (c) shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each
of their signatures being verified by a witness.
64
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(c) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (c) shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each
of their signatures being verified by a witness.
65
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(c) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (c) shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each
of their signatures being verified by a witness.
66
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg 195/04 “1(1)(c) For the purposes of section 28.1 of the Act, in addition
to being in writing, a contingency fee agreement,… (c) shall be signed by the client and the solicitor with each
of their signatures being verified by a witness.
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